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The Morality of Modern Socialism

By

Rev. JOHN J. MING, S.J.

Author of "The Characteristics and the Religion of Modern Socialism," "Data of Modern Ethics Examined," etc.

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PREFACE

IMPORTANT as is the attitude which socialism has assumed toward religion, its moral teachings are certainly of no less, perhaps even of greater consequence. Morality, as we understand it, bears both on personal and common welfare. By subjecting passion to reason and directing reason to the supreme good and ultimate end, it at once elevates man to the highest rank in the visible creation and ensures his perfect happiness. So, too, by establishing the right relations among men and by enjoining on them the duties of justice and charity, it unites them into social bodies for the promotion of public security and prosperity. This is so true that wherever morality is declining, the degradation of manhood, the decay of society, the destruction of peace and order must follow as unavoidable consequences.

Socialism, which nowadays is spreading in ever widening circles, is inseparably connected with ethics and morality. As a social movement it aims at the overthrow of our present civilization and the reconstruction of the social order on a new, non-religious basis. As a philosophical theory it likewise adopts a new conception of the world, essentially materialistic, embraces new views of human life, cutting it off from existence beyond the

grave, proposes new laws for individual and social development, which it regards as not distinct from cosmic evolution, and so sets up a new code of ethical precepts. All this it begins to explain in the press and in frequent addresses to the masses at large and especially to the working population.

The general public can not be indifferent to this most recent phase of morality. For the sake of society, its welfare and existence, it is bound to inquire into the laws and tenets of socialist ethics and to weigh their bearings on State, Family, and Church.

The following chapters have been written with the purpose of throwing some light on so vitally important a subject. To achieve this end critically and systematically, the authentic sources of socialist ethics have been searched into, the most renowned and reliable of its expounders consulted, and their views reproduced in their own words, while the first and fundamental principles, the basis of all conclusions, have been accurately set forth and carefully elucidated. The materialistic theory underlying socialist philosophy, however, does not require investigation, as this has been made at full length in another work lately edited.*

In conclusion the author wishes to acknowledge his special indebtedness to the Rev. John MacHale of Cleveland. THE AUTHOR.

*The Characteristics and the Religion of Modern Socialism. By the Author. New York, Benziger Bros., 1908.

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INTRODUCTION

MODERN socialism, both as a philosophical system and as a social movement, not only pronouncedly disavows but also combats religion. Its very founders, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, disdainfully look upon religious belief as an absurd popular superstition, nay, as a fantastic degradation of human nature. Subsequent leaders and authors go farther still in their hostility to religion. To their mind it is not merely an erroneous superstition, but a bane to human society, an instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling class, the extinction of social interest in the hearts of the oppressed. So pronounced is their opposition to it, that they anxiously look forward to its extermination, in part by the spreading of atheistical teachings, in part by the abolition of the abnormal economic conditions which, in their opinion, gave it existence. The religious attitude of socialism, therefore, is utterly destructive.

Is such also its attitude toward morality? It might scarcely seem so. In whatever sense we take it, morality can not, like religion, be altogether set aside. In its primary signification it means not only the freedom of our actions but also their dependence on reason apprehended as their law. Now reason is necessarily a law for

man. When it manifests what is right or wrong, well-ordered or ill-ordered, its dictates should be inviolable. Were he at liberty to trample them under foot, he would cease to be a rational agent; he would become a monster, a living contradiction. He would know by nature the right order of conduct, and yet not be bound to observe it, understand right and justice, and yet be permitted to disregard them as if ignorant of them, like the brute animal. If reason is not an inviolable law for man, it follows that what is highest in him must be enslaved to the lower appetite, whose impulses and emotions are but too often stronger in him than the longing of the rational will for the future goods of a spiritual nature. By this total inversion of all right order, man would be lowered from his high pre-eminence in nature even to the very level of brute creation.

Much less could human society subsist and achieve its end, if its members were not subject to a common law proclaimed by reason, by which they are laid under strict obligation to be truthful in their speech, to observe justice and charity, to respect the life, property, and reputation of others, and to co-operate harmoniously with one another for the common good.

A law for human conduct, dictated by right reason, is, therefore, of absolute necessity. Of its existence every individual man is directly conscious as soon as he has acquired sufficient mental devel-

opment to act with full deliberation. Its reflex and reasoned knowledge, too, is so general, that from Grecian antiquity down to our own day it forms an integral part of every philosophical system. For, the inquiry into the ultimate causes of all things would be considered incomplete, did it not descend to the law itself, upon which the order of human life, both individual and social, is ultimately based.

Hence conduct is never morally indifferent, nor is man, as long as he is free and has the power of deliberation. For free or human acts, which make up conduct, are either conformable to the law of reason or not; if conformable, they are necessarily good and worthy of praise and reward; if not, they must be morally bad and deserving of blame and punishment. And so man himself is virtuous or wicked, of good or bad moral character, according as he complies or not with the law of conduct dictated by reason.

Morality, therefore, in whatever sense it be taken, whether we consider it as conscious dependence on reason as a law, or as the knowledge of the law of conduct, direct or reflex, or as conformity of action with law, can not disappear among men, neither by the change of time and circumstances, nor by the advance of philosophy and the progress of human culture.

Socialist philosophers, too, acknowledge a law to which human conduct is subject, a moral law.

What they object to, is, as they aver, the interpretation put on it during the capitalistic ages. Nor do they in any way, as they assure us, intend to relax morals. On the contrary, they promise to purify and elevate them, both by teaching a truer law of conduct and by promoting conformity with it more effectively than has ever been done in the course of history. Hence they do not hesitate to claim that socialism is the consummation of morality corresponding to the last stage of human evolution.

But here the question presents itself: Is socialism, after it has utterly destroyed religion, able to construct a new morality? Is a right and elevated order of human conduct still possible, when man's ultimate end is no longer thought to consist in his union with the Supreme Good, but is placed in earthly happiness based on economic conditions? Can law retain any binding force when it ceases to emanate from the Supreme Ruler, the source of all authority; and can it still uphold virtue in individual life, peace and harmony in society, in State and family, when it is no more than an animal instinct evolving with organic nature?

These are the questions we are to solve in the following chapters.

PART I

The Basis of Morality

CHAPTER I

THE THEISTIC BASIS OF MORALITY

To CONSTRUCT a system of morality, a basis is first of all required on which all its tenets may rise with logical consistency as one solid superstructure. Such a basis is the conception of moral goodness, man's ultimate end, the moral law and its sanction. Without an idea of moral goodness we could not take the first step in building up an ethical system. Furthermore, as the goodness of the human action consists in its relation to man's ultimate end, the knowledge of the latter is indispensably necessary for the complete conception of the former. This end must, therefore, be clearly defined and thoroughly comprehended. But that we may know what actions are rightly conformed to the ultimate end, we need a norm which can guide us in our judgments; and that we may act accordingly, we require an obligation which lays our will under the necessity of doing what we know to be right and of abstaining from what we know to be wrong. The norm of right and wrong, at-

tended by the obligation which binds our will, constitutes the moral law. Again, to restrict our freedom and efficiently sustain the right order, law needs a sanction consisting in a just retribution for its observance or violation.

On this basis all moral systems have been built, by the philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome as well as by modern thinkers, by Christian theologians and by pagan moralists. But though generally admitted, these basic principles have found diverse interpretations which make it possible to construct on them different and even opposite ethical theories. For our purpose it is necessary briefly to set forth here the interpretation given them by theistic philosophers. For it is only by comparison with the Christian teaching that socialist ethics can be thoroughly understood and correctly valued.

Theistic philosophy acknowledges the existence of a personal God who, self-existent and infinitely perfect in Himself, is the Supreme Cause of all that exists beside Himself, the Creator and Ruler of the universe. Hence it regards Him as the Supreme Good and the ultimate end of all creation. To glorify Him by the acknowledgment of His infinite perfection and the love of His infinite goodness is in particular the ultimate destiny of all rational creatures. In proportion as they pursue and achieve this end they will attain in God their own perfection also, and their ultimate bliss and happiness. Since God is man's ultimate end, the

moral goodness of human actions ultimately consists in their direction and subordination to Him.

Theistic philosophy, furthermore, teaches the spirituality and immortality of the soul and consequently the freedom of the will. Accordingly, it regards human conduct, not as necessary after the manner of organic activity, but as free and self-determined, and, therefore, as imputable to man with all its moral attributes, both its goodness or its badness.

Man, possessed of freedom, needs a law which constrains his will to do good and to abstain from evil, yet so as not to destroy his freedom; a law, therefore, of a peculiar kind, not found in any other realm of nature; a law, not consisting in force or physical necessity, but in moral obligation. This is the moral law.

God Himself enacted the moral law and deeply implanted it in human nature itself, when He created man. As such the moral law consists in the self-evident principles of practical reason and the legitimate conclusions drawn from them, because in their light we not only discern what is right and wrong, but also know what we are bound to do or to avoid. These moral principles, while necessarily manifest to us, are also necessarily true in themselves. For they are based on the essential relations that exist between God and rational creatures, between man and man as endowed with personal freedom and dignity, and between the

lower or sensuous faculties and reason in man himself. They are, therefore, *a priori* truths, prior to all experience, absolutely necessary, unchangeable, universal, and identically the same among all nations and in all times. The obligation inherent in this moral law descends from God's infinite, supreme authority. For, as the order of conduct contained in the principles of practical reason must be conceived as essentially good and absolutely necessary, He, because of His essential holiness, can not but enjoin on rational creation its strict observance, forbid its transgression and give to such command and prohibition a weight which lays free man under a strict necessity of obedience. Furthermore, on account of His infinite holiness and justice, He can not but effectively uphold and enforce the moral law He enacted in creating man. He does so by just retribution, that is, by just rewards for its observance and by just punishments for its transgression. The reward consists in the attainment, the punishment, in the loss of the ultimate end or supreme good to which the moral law directs human conduct. Retribution, therefore, constitutes a sanction, which effectively upholds the order established by the moral law, both by avenging it when violated, and by affording to the free will of man a powerful motive for its faithful observance.

The moral law, as defined by theistic philosophy, establishes the most perfect order in creation.

It subordinates the lower faculties of man to reason, and harmoniously regulates all his actions; it marks out the right relations between man and man, and, while it guarantees freedom to each individually, unites all into one large family or society; and finally it refers each and all, singly and conjointly, to God as their ultimate and supreme good, securing to them in everlasting union with Him perfect bliss and happiness.

Christianity still further elevates the morals taught by unaided reason. It affords us a fuller and more certain knowledge of God, leads us to a closer union with Him, by the love of intimate friendship, binds us by a holier law, enforced by a more effective sanction, enjoins on us purer motives of action, greater sacrifices and more complete self-renunciation, ministers to us ampler means for subduing our passions to reason and thus for acquiring virtue, unites mankind more closely by the oneness of faith and the universality of one Church, which embraces not only all individual men but also all nations.

Unquestionably this is a broad and deep basis of morality. Still socialist philosophy attempts to overthrow it thoroughly. It denies God, the Supreme Being and Supreme Good, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, and the Lawgiver for mankind; it denies the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the possibility of attaining happiness in another than this earthly existence, retribution af-

ter death, the freedom of the will, the necessary and unchangeable principles constituting the moral law implanted in man's rational nature. After such a radical denial of all theistic positions, there is not a trace left of the old Christian basis of morality. Of what kind, then, is the new basis which is to be substituted for the old so utterly demolished?

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIALIST CONCEPTION OF MORAL GOODNESS

SOCIALIST philosophers, when about to build up a new theory of morality, begin by setting forth a new conception of moral goodness and badness. According to the theistic view the morally good is a universal and unchangeable concept. For the moral goodness of human acts consists in their right direction to God, the ultimate end of man, and the norm by which this direction is discerned are the principles of practical reason. But God is eternal and unchangeable; and such, too, are rational principles. They are necessary, universal, the same at all times, in all countries, and among all nations, because they are not based on experience, but on the unalterable nature of things.

Socialist philosophy, on the contrary, being a system of evolutionary materialism, does not know of anything that is not subject to continual changes; it knows, in particular, of no unchangeable end set for man, and of no unchangeable moral laws and principles. According to the materialistic conception of history, morality, like religion, is ultimately the outcome of the economic conditions under which men live and pursue their temporal well-being. But these conditions change in the course of time so as never to remain the

same in any two periods of history; consequently morality, also, is subject to ever-succeeding changes. Every particular period in history has its own moral code, which is expressed in the customs, social institutions, and public opinion that prevail in it; for these mirror the ethical views and convictions forced on the people by the peculiar economic conditions under which they live. Hence one and the self-same action may be good in one age, but may become bad in the succeeding one; and what was wrong in the past may be right in the future, the conception of moral goodness changing with the phenomena in the economic world.

Socialist writers set forth these views in the most explicit terms. Concerning the changeableness of the moral code Bebel says:

"As each social stage of human development has its own conditions of production, so likewise has each its code of morals, which is but the *reflection of the social condition.* That is moral which is usage; and that in turn is usage which corresponds with the innermost being, *i.e.,* the needs of a given period."*

He advances this variability of the moral code as a reason why we should not condemn the promiscuity of sexes among the savages as immoral.

Herron speaks in similar terms of the changes which the standard of morality undergoes.

*Woman under Socialism. Translated by Daniel de Leon. New York 1904. p. 16.

"Standards of moral value which served very well in the past, during the centuries when society was slowly emerging from slavery, are valueless and vicious now. Moralities of yesterday are immoral to-day and destructive of the liberty and integrity of the soul. Some of the sternest virtues of the past are to-day prostituting and disintegrating human life. We forget that there is no such thing as a fixed ethic, but that human society must constantly enlarge its experience and thought of the good, constantly transvalue its spiritual values, constantly widen the sphere of individual choice. We see the economic crisis of society, but we do not so clearly see its nearing religious and ethical crisis—a crisis which will take the word of custom for nothing, but will examine clean to the roots every received notion of right and wrong."*

May Wood Simons writes in the same strain:

"All such systems of morals, as pointed out by Spencer, Loria, and others, are changing both in time and place. There has never yet been a permanent or a universal code of ethics. Like every other social institution, they have been a product of the changes in material surroundings, geographical locations, and different methods of gaining a livelihood that have marked different ages and peoples. That any system of ethics prevailed at a certain period argued that it was produced by an underlying economic development

*Int. Soc. Rev. Jan. 1901. p. 434.

which at that time was making for human advance. In the earlier stages of barbarism, community of goods was in general accordance with social progress and ordinarily prevailed. Gradually the institution of private property displaced this, and with it came a code of ethics that was suitable in every way to further and support the rights of individual owners of property. The societies first making this change were better able to compete, that is, more fitted to survive, in the new economic environment, than those retaining the communal organization belonging to an earlier environment.

"Further, as has been frequently pointed out, the practice of killing those captured in battle was regarded as right at a time, when tribes which conquered, if they were to retain their conquests, had no other way of disposing of their enemies. But as soon as these nomads settled to agricultural pursuits they found it profitable to utilize their prisoners for cultivating the land, and an ethical system arose under which slavery was 'right.' In States where the slave passed directly into a wage-earner, the institution of slavery was viewed as 'wrong' by public opinion only when modern industry found it more profitable to hire men and women by the day and leave them to shift for themselves at times when a profit could not be made off their labor, than to house and clothe the slave through the year. Again, as shown by

Wundt, the Reformation, which was an outgrowth of the great economic transformation of the time, found the ethics of Christianity of the day unable to meet the needs of the new conditions, and a fundamental change took place."*

On account of the continual changes of the moral code, James Oneal justifies private ownership of land, slavery, and murder as they were in use in former ages. He says:

"There can be no eternal ethical or moral code to whose court can be brought every institution of the past and present. Such a code would be compelled to outlaw some and acquit others, when the fact is that every institution, custom, and belief, has been in the line of advance in some stage of history. To pass judgment on slavery or land ownership of centuries ago, because it does not harmonize with moral standards based on twentieth century culture and philosophy, is to ignore the law of adaptation to environment, which calls into existence serviceable institutions as well as destroys them when they become outgrown.

"It may be said that in the case of land ownership and slavery, which we admit as based on force, it is evident they can at least be universally condemned because of the means employed. The answer is that this blood and conquest was merely the rude form in which the struggle for supremacy, still being waged, was carried on, and was as much

*Int. Soc. Rev. Dec. 1900. p. 337.

a necessary factor in the evolution from the nomadic to the industrial type as modern battleships are to the development of world capitalism preparatory to its conquest by the politically organized working class.

"The material interests of the ruling class of every age are reflected in the moral code of their time, and this code will be changed, modified, and adapted to suit the changing character of production, even though the change be so rapid as to reverse in a single year the code of the previous year."*

Robert Rives La Monte in his latest work sets forth similar views. To quote his own words:

"The ruling ideas of every age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class." This applies to ideas of right and wrong—of what is commonly known as morality—as fully as to the ideas of any other kind.

"Conduct that has tended to perpetuate the power of the economically dominant class—since the increase of wealth has divided society into classes—has ever been accounted moral conduct; conduct that has tended to weaken or subvert the power of the ruling class has always been branded as immoral. There you have the key of the varying codes of ethics the world has seen. For it must never be forgotten that ideas of right and wrong are not absolute, but relative, not fixed, but fluid,

*The Worker. Dec. 2, 1905.

changing with the changes in our modes of producing food, clothes, and shelter. Morality varies not only with time but with social attitude."

"Ethics simply register the decrees by which the ruling class stamps with approval or brands with censure human conduct solely with reference to the effect of that conduct upon the welfare of that class."

"Morality is, in its very essence, a class institution—a set of rules of conduct enforced or inculcated for the benefit of a class."*

According to J. Dietzgen there is no intrinsic or essential distinction between good and bad; they differ only relatively and in degree.

"There is no fixed gulf in science between worthy and unworthy objects, and none in scientific ethics between good and evil. All things are useful and suitable; clean and unclean, love and hate, enjoyment and renunciation—all is relative, more or less, according to time and conditions."†

"Different stages of human evolution have different moral laws and even so contradictory ones that virtue is in one place what is vice in another."‡

The same relativity is asserted by Kautsky:

"What is specifically human in morality, the

*Socialism: Positive and Negative. Chicago 1907. pp. 59-63.

†Some of the Philosophical Essays. Translated by M. Beer and Th. Rothstein. Chicago 1906. p. 128.

‡Ibid. p. 165. See also p. 170.

moral codes, is subject to continual change. This does not prove, all the same, that a class or a social group can not be immoral; it proves simply that so far at least as the moral standards are concerned, there is just as little an absolute morality as an absolute immorality. Even the immorality is in this respect a relative idea. Only the lack of more social impulses and virtues, which man has inherited from the social animals, is to be regarded as absolute immorality.

"If we look, on the other hand, on immorality as an offense against the laws of morality, then it implies no longer the divergence from a distinct standard, holding for all times and places, but the contradiction of the moral practice to its own moral principles; it implies the transgression against moral laws which people themselves recognize and put forward as necessary. It is thus nonsense to declare particular moral principles of any people or class, which are recognized as such, to be immoral simply because they contradict our moral code. Immorality can never be more than a deviation from our own moral code, never from a strange one."*

As hinted at in the preceding quotations, socialist writers distinguish in the past changes of the moral code four different stages, which correspond to the primitive, slave, feudal, and capitalistic society.

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. Translated by John B. Askew. Chicago 1907. pp. 192, 193.

The last stage, however, in which morality will attain its ultimate perfection, has not yet been reached, but is to come in final society, the socialist commonwealth. Bebel characterizes the moral code of these different stages briefly in the following words:

"Just as with religion, moral conceptions are also born of existing social conditions at given times. Cannibals regard the eating of human beings as highly moral; Greeks and Romans regarded slavery as moral; the feudal lord of the Middle Ages regarded serfdom as moral; and today the modern capitalist considers highly moral the institution of wage-slavery, the flaying of women with night work and the demoralization of children by factory labor. Here we have four different moral social stages, and as many different conceptions of morality, and yet in none does the highest moral sense prevail. Undoubtedly the highest moral stage is that in which men stand to one another free and equal; that in which the principle: 'what you do not wish to be done unto you, do not unto others' is observed inviolate throughout the relations of man to man. In the Middle Ages, the genealogical tree was the standard; today it is property; in future society, the standard of man is man. And the future is Socialism in practice."*

Changeableness is not the only feature, however,

*Woman. p. 322. See also Int. Soc. Rev. Dec. 1900. p. 337.

by which the socialist conception of moral goodness differs from the Christian. There are still other and even wider differences. The human act, which is morally good or bad, according to theistic philosophy, is free and peculiar to man as a rational agent. But against such an admission evolutionary materialism, as taught by socialists, raises a solemn protest. The materialist absolutely denies free will, and the evolutionist regards man with all his higher faculties, rational and moral, as a descendant of brute ancestors.

True, sometimes materialists speak of freedom. But when they proceed to a fuller explanation, it becomes evident at once that they do not mean by it self-determination or the capability of acting or not acting, of putting forth or withholding an action when under given circumstances all the prerequisites for it are present. Karl Kautsky, for instance, quite positively asserts the necessity of freedom.

"Of it (the future) I have not the smallest experience. Apparently free, it lies before me, as the world which I do not explore as one knowing it, but in which I have to assert myself as an active agent. Certainly I can extend the experience of the past into the future, certainly I can conclude that these will be even so necessarily determined as those; but even if I can only recognize the world on the assumption of necessity, yet I shall only be able to act on it on the assumption of a certain

freedom. Even if compulsion is exercised over my action, there remains to me the choice, whether I shall yield to it or not, there remains to me as last resort the possibility of withdrawing myself by a voluntary death. Action implies continual choice between various possibilities, and be it alone that of doing or not doing, it means accepting or rejecting, it means defending or opposing. Choice, however, assumes in advance the possibility of choice just as much as the distinction between the acceptable and the inacceptable, the good and the bad. The moral judgment, which is an absurdity in the world of the past, the world of experience, in which there is nothing to choose, where iron necessity rules, is unavoidable in the world of the unknown future—of freedom.

"But not simply the feeling of freedom is assumed by action, but also certain aims. If in the world of the past, the sequence of cause and effect (causality) rules, so in the world of action, of the future, the thought of aim (Teleology). For action the feeling of freedom is an indispensable psychological necessity, which is not to be got rid of by any degree of knowledge."*

We grow rather distrustful, however, regarding the nature of the freedom thus asserted, when to the words quoted he immediately subjoins:

"But all that is no monopoly of man but holds also of the animals. Even these have freedom of

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 59-61.

the will, in the sense that man has, namely as a subjective, inevitable feeling of freedom, which springs from ignorance of the future and the necessity of exercising a direct influence on it. And just in the same way they have command of a certain insight into the connection of cause and effect. Finally the conception of an end is not quite strange to them."

In fact, notwithstanding the subjective inevitable feeling of freedom respecting the future, man is subject to physical necessity, when he comes to set up the end to be pursued. Kautsky had said just before:

"His (man's) whole experience lies in the past, all experience is past, and all the connecting links which past experience shows him lie with inevitable necessity before, or still more, behind him. In these there is nothing more to alter, he can do nothing more in regard to them than recognize their necessity. Thus is the world of experience, the world of knowing, and the world of necessity."*

Now applying this axiom to the setting up of aims, he says:

"The setting up of aims is not anything which exists outside the sphere of necessity, of cause and effect. Even though I set up aims for myself only in the future, in the sphere of apparent freedom, yet the act of setting up aims itself, from the very moment when I set up the aim, belongs to the past,

*Ibid. p. 59.

and can thus in its necessity be recognized as the result of distinct causes. That is not in any way altered by the fact that the attainment of the end is still in the future, in the sphere of uncertainty, thus in this sense in that of freedom. Let the attainment of the end be assumed as ever so far distant, the setting up of the aim itself lies in the past. In the sphere of freedom there lie only those aims which are not yet set up, of which we do not know anything as yet. The world of conscious aims is thus not the world of freedom in opposition to that of necessity. For each of the aims which we set ourselves, just as for each one of the means which we apply to its attainment, the causes are already given and are under certain circumstances recognizable as those which brought about the setting up of these aims and determined the way in which that was to be achieved."

"What is to-day the future will be to-morrow past; thus what to-day is felt to be free action will be recognized to-morrow as necessary action. The moral law in us, which regulates this action, ceases, however, with that to appear as an uncaused cause; it falls into the sphere of experience and can be recognized as the necessary effect of a cause—and only as such a cause are we at all able to recognize it, or can it become an object of Science."*

The reader may wonder at Kautsky's reasoning. No doubt, if an action has once been performed

*Ibid. pp. 61, 62, 64.

and thus become an object of experience, it follows with logical necessity that it exists, but it does not follow that it has been performed with antecedent physical necessity. The fact of a murder may be established with full certainty by the experience of witnesses, but hence it can not be inferred that the murderer acted compelled by necessity. Otherwise a judge would have to dismiss a criminal and abstain from pronouncing sentence on him, as soon as his crime has been proved as an undeniable fact. For he can not in justice punish a man who committed murder under physical necessity, any more than he can sentence to death a lion who, driven by hunger, tore a traveler to pieces.

The moral act, devoid of freedom, is said to be not peculiar to man, but common to man and brute. For, as Kautsky holds, animals are moved by moral impulses, are subject to moral laws and have conscience and feeling of duty. In saying so he is in full agreement with other evolutionary materialists, especially with Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, who discovered subhuman morality in the animal kingdom. Hence in the opinion of Dietzgen and Kautsky morality itself has an animal origin and is but a natural quality, not distinct from the bodily and physical,* and in the opinion of Ladoff a purely biological phenomenon.†

*Kautsky. Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. p. 200. Dietzgen. Philosophical Essays. pp. 164, 168, 171.

†Int. Soc. Rev. Chicago, June 1908. p. 740.

Great as is the difference between theists and socialists in defining moral goodness and characterizing the moral act, the discrepancy between them with regard to the ultimate end of man is still more striking.

CHAPTER III

THE ULTIMATE END OF MAN

SECTION I

The Ultimate End in the Lower Stages of Evolution

SOCIALIST philosophy, denying both the existence of a personal Deity and the immortality of the soul, can not possibly propose God as the ultimate end of man, so as to regard His glorification our final destiny and perpetual union with Him our consummate happiness. To the socialist human society is the supreme being. Hence he looks on social welfare as the ultimate object which every individual man must pursue, and considers human actions as morally good or bad according as they further or hinder the common or public well-being. Accordingly, socialist ethics is a moral science, whose sole object is to determine the duties which are incumbent on man toward society; a utilitarian system which regulates conduct and values its moral worth exclusively by its social utility. So, in fact, ethics is defined by Ladoff:

"Morality or ethics is a system of conduct of the members of a social group toward each other.

Conduct approved and sanctioned by the group is considered as correct and praiseworthy. *Vice versa* —behaviour condemned by public opinion is looked upon as immoral and blameworthy. The conduct of the members of a social group is regulated and controlled by the group in its collective interests. Acts injurious to the interests of the group are condemned as immoral, and *vice versa,* acts useful to the interest of the group are praised as moral."*

Morris Hillquit concurs with his view when he writes:

"Morality, which was defined by Professor Ward as conducive to 'race safety,' and by Mr. Stephan as conduct conducive to the 'health of society,' and which in the earlier stages of social evolution stands principally for courage and loyalty in battle, in a more advanced society comes to a large extent to signify conduct favoring the economic efficacy and prosperity of the nation."†

These statements fairly express the conception of morality and the ethics adopted by socialist writers, as we shall see in the sequel. An exception is made by A. Loria and a few others, who regard individual well-being harmonized with social welfare as the end of man and the standard of conduct.

*Int. Soc. Rev. Feb. 1905. p. 449; June 1908. p. 740.

†Socialism in Theory and Practice, New York, 1909. pp. 52, 53.

Socialist philosophers inquire into morality not only as it will prevail in future society, when it will reach its highest stage of perfection, but also as it was practised in preceding ages, when it was as yet deficient. For in their opinion, it was, like civilization in general, slowly developing in the course of history under the influence of economic conditions. As long as these were abnormal, it, too, could reach but a lower degree, but whenever they improved, it changed and rose to higher perfection. This was required by the law of universal evolution. When the present economic conditions shall disappear and be succeeded by better ones, the old moral code must be abolished, because it will have become unfit and even an impediment to progress, and a new one will be introduced, which will further the advancement of society.

This is well set forth by May Wood Simons, in an article written for the "International Socialist Review." Speaking of those codes of ethics actually existing in different stages of social development, she says:

"In each and every stage of society the test of the fitness of any system of ethics lies in the proof that it does or does not make for the progress of the race. By progress here is meant an increasing control by man over the forces of nature; a greater ability to make them serve his comfort and perform his tasks; in short, a growing mastery over his environment. This greater control is

equivalent to a higher development of the human race. Up to this test every system of morality has been obliged to come or disappear."*

Bax has made the four stages through which the utilitarian morality of socialism has passed thus far a special subject of his studies. According to him primitive morality was the identification of individual with social interests, in so much that the common welfare was the only end and object had in view by individual man, though as yet in an unconscious and rude manner.

"We have first of all to remember that in the ancient world and in earlier phases of society, morality affirmed itself as the solidarity of the individual with his kin, his 'gens, his tribe, his people.' There was then no opposing interest between individual and community; the interest of the individual was absolutely identified with that of the race. He had not as yet drawn the distinction between himself and the society to which he belonged. The Greek of the pre-Homeric age, the Hebrew in the period echoes of which are discernible in the Pentateuch, the Teuton as described by Tacitus and many later writers, did not exist for himself or others as an independent individuality; his significance consisted in the particular clan of which he was a member, or in the particular tribe or group of tribes he represented. His personal *telos* was identified with the social whole into

*Int. Soc. Rev. Dec. 1900. p. 336.

which he entered. But at the same time that he had no interest independent of his race, he had likewise no duties outside that race. Society, and therefore Ethics, existed on the basis of *Kinship* and of kinship alone. Within the charmed circle all was sacred, without it all was profane. The primitive society of kinship, then, was a self-concentered organism, apart from which the constituent units, the individuals composing it, had no significance."*

"At first the 'Society of Kinship' is the end of all duty; the individual *implicitly* conscious of his own inadequacy is sunk in the society, knows and cares for no existence outside of society. This is from the Socialist point of view the highest morality which up to now has been generally prevalent in the world."†

In slave-society, which subsequently to the introduction of private property was established in Greece and Rome, morality deteriorated. As clans and tribes were dissolved, society was converted into the political State, which consisted of the possessing and ruling classes intent upon their particular interest. The other classes remained unprotected or were oppressed. While thus society and man, social and private interests were separated, and life was looked upon with dissatisfaction, the individual began to pursue his own happiness, ma-

*Ethics of Socialism. London 1902. pp. 9, 10.

†Ibid. p. 26.

terial or spiritual, natural or supernatural, as his ultimate end.

"With the dissolution of early tribal society with its kinship basis," says Bax, "with the rise of political society with its property basis, and the leisure thence resulting, the old ethical object of the individual gradually lost its power. He now became *explicitly* conscious of his own inadequacy to himself; but tried to resolve his consciousness and to abolish the dissatisfaction of which it was the cause by (1) resolutely turning his attention in upon himself, and with conscious purpose definitely placing self-interest before him as his end (Cynics, Cyrenaics, earlier Stoics and Epicureans); and (2) by holding up before himself a professedly extra-individual, but also extra-natural ideal, as his end (later Stoics, Neo-Platonists, Gnostics, and Christians). Man as an individual thus no longer recognised his end in the society; but rather in himself, either as natural individual, or as spiritual individual. Hence arose the two systems of individualist ethic which though they have passed through many variations of aspect, have remained substantially the same from that day to this. On the one hand, amongst the well-to-do you have, in the shape as it were of a light froth, the Epicurean-Benthamite Ethic of 'enlightened self-interest,' on the other the Stoic-Christian Ethic of personal 'holiness' and 'sin.' This, though it reaches its classical historic expression in Christianity, is fun-

damentally the same in Neo-Platonism, Buddhism, Parseeism, and even Islamism."*

Stoic-Christian morality is more fully characterized by Bax in the following passage:

"The old feeling of duty, of the *ought,* still survived, but without its old object, and without its old basis. Metaphorically speaking, it 'wandered through dry places, seeking rest and finding none.' It was already long since man had begun to reflect, and through reflection to distinguish not merely his own personality from society and the universe at large, but also to distinguish his thinking self from his corporeal self; and the sense of the importance of these distinctions was growing on him year by year. It was out of the depth of this introspection, coupled with his dissatisfaction at the then orthodox official morality which had now lost its meaning for him, that a solution of the enigma and object for his moral consciousness seemed to offer itself. Was not the material universe like his body, the outward manifestation of a soul or self? Nothing could be more obvious, as it seemed to him. Further, was not this personality enshrined in the body of the universe the immeasurably higher counterpart of the personality enshrined in his body? and was not this higher personality at once its source and its end? No less assuredly as he thought. He, the feeble reflection of the divinity, had as his chief end the fulfilment of the divine

*Ethics of Socialism. London 1902, pp. 26, 27. See also pp. 10-16.

will preparatory to his ultimate union with the divinity. Morality, duty toward his fellow man, might be, it is true, a part of the divine system of things, and conscience even a spark of the divine flame; yet nevertheless the only ultimate sanction of morality was the will of God. This chief end was not to be found in any relation between his individual self and society, which was only incidental and by the way, but in the relation between him and the divinity. It was by careful searching of his own heart, by lengthened self-introspection that the divine will might be discovered. The first and chief end of all morality was to purify his highest self from the gross taint of material desires. He must negate and subdue his inferior part, his body, which was the greatest hindrance to his higher perfection and of which his soul was independent, just as the Deity was essentially independent of the physical universe. The result was that the aims of moral action became diverted into the negation of bodily desire—asceticism."

"The highest and most complete expression of this phase is to be found in Christianity, though it is also embodied, in its essential features, in all the great ethical religions (so-called) as well as those later philosophies and theosophies of the Pagan world which Christianity superseded."*

The essence of Christian morality is comprised by Bax in these few words:

*Ibid. pp. 11-13.

"At last then in the notion of a transcendent yet immanent God, the *end* of man, that is of the individual man (the only aspect of man that was now considered) was found. In God this individual man saw the completion and perfection he lacked when considered as an independent being. Duty in the worldly sense was in the last resort merely a condition prescribed by God for attaining individual holiness."*

Bax, however, does not fail to remark that the rise of this new individualistic morality was a necessary consequence of new economic conditions.†

If we are to believe him, a rise to higher morality took place again in feudal society. In his opinion, the feudal system, economically considered, was nothing else than primitive communistic society with the superadded notion of limited sovereignty conferred on the head of the community. As to religion, feudalism, though entirely the offspring of the customs of the German tribes, was wedded to the Church of the decaying Roman Empire, the mother of Monasticism. "Yet the acceptance of Christianity by the German peoples could be little more than nominal." "Much of the old tribal morality of the Germans, and many of their old modes of thoughts continued to exist under the sanction of the Church." "The indi-

*Ethics of Socialism. London 1902. pp. 14, 15.
†Ibid. p. 15.

vidualism and supernaturalism of the Church subsisted side by side with the semi-paganism of the popular creed." Hence "the mediæval mind had reserved to itself the idea of two separate spheres, a religious and a secular. To the 'secular' man religion consisted in external and pagan observances, in consideration of which the Church guaranteed his ultimate salvation. It was only to the monastic recluse, and even rarely to him, that religion was a personal matter."*

Owing to this historical development morality was not individualistic under feudalism.

"Duty and lealty towards the feudal superior, as representing the community, continued for ages to be the mainspring of his (the German's) life. Even with the monk, as a general rule, it was the welfare of his order which was uppermost in his thoughts rather than his own personal salvation, as Carlyle has remarked in his 'Past and Present,' and this notwithstanding that the genesis of monasticism itself is traceable to a totally opposite sentiment."†

With the downfall of feudalism, as Bax tells us, individualism was again in the ascendency. Toward the end of the Middle Ages an opposition arose between the proletariat and the middle classes, the burghers and the nobles. In the six-

*Religion of Socialism. London 1901. pp. 25, 26, 176. See also Ethics of Socialism. p. 16.

†Religion of Socialism. p. 177.

teenth century this antagonism had reached a point of development which was incompatible with the continued existence of feudal society. The world-market was opening up, trade and commerce prospered everywhere. The middle or manufacturing and trading class, now become important factors in civilization, commenced to emancipate themselves from the trammels of the feudal or land-owning classes, and thereby to attain to individual freedom of action in the furthering of private interests. Then it was that a capitalistic middle class, free and independent, rose to power and became the leading form of society.

In politics the new movement was characterized by the consolidation of the European nationalities, which was accomplished by bureaucratic centralization, by the extension of royal prerogative, and by the rise of modern commercial patriotism. Its great political expression is Constitutionalism, the real supremacy of the middle classes in the State.*

Religion, as Bax goes on to say, lost its influence and underwent a change.

"The mediæval church, the Kingdom of heaven on earth, in full sympathy with the temporal hierarchy, in which also everyone had his divinely appointed place, and which restricted commerce and forbade usury, such was no religion for the new commercialism; the latter's creed must have noth-

*Religion of Socialism. pp. 27-30.

ing to do with the business of this world." A new form of Christianity, therefore, had to be found to suit the needs of the new Europe which was being born. This adaptation of Christianity took two shapes, which, though widely different from each other, are but two sides of the same shield. The two forms were Protestantism and modern or Jesuitical Catholicism.*

"Protestantism proclaimed the doctrine of *personal* salvation by faith alone *i.e.*, the whole religion was resolved into a purely personal matter. . . . In Protestantism the supremacy of individualism in religion, its antagonism to the old social religions, reaches its highest point of development."†

"Jesuitical Catholicism, while retaining all the mediæval forms, was in reality more akin to Protestantism, and was but a product of the necessities of the Ecclesiasticism of the Renaissance."

Both this modified Catholicism and the so-called Reformed religions were but adjuncts of the spirit of commercial society and in equal measure allies of the rising bureaucratic system.‡

Along with all these changes morality became again individualistic and divorced from public life.

"Bourgeois morality is eminently personal. A

*Growth and Outcome of Socialism. By W. Morris and E. B. Bax. London 1893. p. 95.

†Religion of Socialism. p. 28.

‡Growth and Outcome of Socialism. pp. 98, 99.

man in his public acts, in all he does that concerns the people, may prove himself an ill-conditioned ruffian or an unscrupulous adventurer, careless though he plunge a whole nation into misery to serve his own purposes or ambition, . . . yet he may still, if he only make himself sufficiently prominent, expect honorable mention when living, and a monument when dead. All is fair, it is said, in love and in war. This principle is nowadays commonly extended to public life, and in politics all is fair that tends to personal advancement. The man who takes a serious view of social and political duty is an enthusiast to be laughed at."*

Public welfare having thus far failed to be recognized as the ultimate end, morality has, in Bax's opinion, up to this day reached a very low stage of development.

Loria, too, finds it as yet very little advanced, though for another reason. He, unlike Bax, regards private well-being, harmonized with general welfare, as the supreme end, and egoism as the necessary motive of all human acts. Nevertheless, according to him the recognized ethical codes have thus far ensured the well-being of particular classes only and not that of men in general. Primitive society is to some extent an exception. For in it men co-operated for their *real* good, but under external coercion.

"In the primitive economy," says he, "where in-

*Religion of Socialism. p. 31.

dividuals are compelled by some despotic power to co-operate—but for the good of the labourer himself, be it remembered, and not at all to the advantage of the private capitalist—moral coercion is applied with a view toward forcing men to act in conformity with their real interests, of which they, indeed, are unconscious, but which, in reality, demand the conjunction of their forces. A code of ethics adapted to such conditions is developed by means of a series of penalties, preeminently religious in character, which are imposed upon all acts conformable with man's apparent egoism that tend toward disassociation."*

A change for the worse followed in slave society.

"The labourer is reduced to the condition of a brute. His acquiescence in usurpation is assured through fear, which causes him to look upon revolt as totally incapable of securing him his liberty. An imposing system of moral oppression succeeds in making the labourer really believe that he is a slave by nature, that his chains have been forged by a superior power, that it is vain to strive to break them. Thus the usurpant egoism of one class, while assuring it enormous advantages, engenders as its natural corollary, the necessity of perverting the egoism of the other class, in order to induce it to endure in silence the injustice of

*Economic Foundations of Society. Translated from the French by Lindley M. Keasbey. London 1899. pp. 28, 29.

which it is a victim. The necessary perversion is accomplished by investing the ruling class with an appearance of terror and almost superstitious awe, which exert an overwhelming influence upon the oppressed."*

Hence for the possessing class force constituted the highest law, while for the slave passive obedience was the only alternative. Religion exercised, however, a mitigating influence on the proprietors. It tempered and facilitated the relations among them. So also did ethics. It counseled kindness to one another, while it allowed the perpetration of flagrant outrages upon the enslaved laborers, and even proclaimed the abjection of the latter to be in conformity with nature.

"In slave society the dominion of the morality of fear thus operated very differently upon the proprietary classes and the labourer. By threatening free citizens with the wrath of gods and men as a result of their excesses or their faults, this ethical system succeeded in instilling a spirit of kindness and equity into the reciprocal relations of proprietors, and, at the same time, prevented them from exercising such cruelties toward slaves as might have provoked them to revolt. In other words, it imposed actions on proprietors which were really in harmony with their egoism, although they themselves were unaware of the fact.

*Economic Foundations of Society. Translated from the French by Lindley M. Keasbey. London 1899. pp. 31, 32.

On the other hand, it held the slaves to obedience by giving the dominating class an awe-inspiring aspect, and thus succeeded in directing the actions of the oppressed in a manner contrary to their real egoism."*

The introduction of serf economy, Loria goes on to say, was attended by a radical change in the ethical system.

"Moral suasion is still applied to the capitalists, to lead them to act in opposition to their conscious interest, as well as upon the labouring classes, to force them to act contrary to their real interests; but the methods of such compulsion are completely changed. Acts that are socially injurious are now threatened with punishment in the life to come, and a dread of the future is thus made to take the place of present fear. Such was the great capitalistic function of Christianity."†

Armed with the anathema of sanction in the future life, Christianity addressed itself to the laboring classes and dictated to them a series of acts in opposition to their egoism. The serf's resignation was assured by the threat of terrible punishment in the world beyond for disobedience, and still more by that fecund dogma that the gates of heaven were open only to the poor. The unfortunates were reconciled with the system that exploited them.

*Ibid. pp. 33, 34.
†Ibid. pp. 34, 35.

"With its dogma of charity this new religion (Christianity) addressed itself no less efficaciously to the ruling classes and directed their acts in conformity with their real interests. The self-interest of those classes demanded that they should look with care to the well-being of the labourer, in order to avoid all danger of a revolt on his part, and in order that production—which had practically been brought to a standstill through slavery—should receive a fresh impulse."*

But the Christian religion went still farther. Besides enjoining on them the duty of almsgiving as the only means by which they could enter into the kingdom of heaven, it sought to confine the intercourse of the proprietors among themselves within definite bounds and to prevent all such extremes of violence as might compromise the property system.

"But this same religion which took such care to check all acts injurious to the proprietors gave free scope to the most unbridled usurpation, provided it was not of such a nature as to compromise the capitalistic system; it permitted cruelty to serfs, violence, massacres, rapine, persecution of the Jews.

"Thus during the entire feudal period, religion constituted a powerful organ of moral coaction, imposing upon the proprietors acts that were contrary to their conscious interests, and upon the

*Economic Foundations of Society. Translated from the French by Lindley M. Keasbey. London 1899. pp. 35, 36.

labourers certain acts that were in opposition to their real interests."*

With the appearance of the wage economy the influence of religion was impaired, and coercion by public opinion substituted in its place.

"We must recognize," says Loria, "that the conduct of the labouring classes has in our day to be subjected to a more modern and potent method of discipline. This modern method of moral coercion is supplied through the influence of public opinion, which, by means of a series of psychological processes and adroitly inspired ideas, succeeds in rendering every act dishonorable which carries with it any menace to the property system and thus prevents its commission. Public opinion requires the labouring man to acquiesce in the domination of capital. It appeals, indeed, to his intelligence, but only to warp his judgment with a view of urging him to fulfil certain requirements which, though directly contrary to his own real interest, are nevertheless rendered attractive by the approbation of the well-born.

"Public opinion at the same time requires the capitalists to restrain themselves in their policy of usurpation within certain bounds, in order not to compromise the fate of the property system. Having become the despotic arbiter of judgments and deeds, public opinion now sets the seal of its disapproval upon the least reaction on the side of the

*Ibid. pp. 37, 38.

labourers against the system which oppresses them, and yet it tolerates usurpation on the part of the proprietors to the injury of the labourers, and even it favours suspicious appropriations by one capitalist to the detriment of another, so long as such acts do not threaten the cohesion of the capitalistic system."*

Capitalistic morality is thus upheld exclusively by the egoism of the dominant classes; it is their interest that dictates the lines of conduct to be followed by proprietors and laborers respectively and enacts the necessary moral sanctions. This, of course, implies a twofold moral code in capitalist society, one allowing pleasure and license to the rich, and another counseling submission to the numerically stronger class of the workers. Though opposite to one another, still both of them are grounded on the egoism, real or apparent, of the class for which they are made. For though the regulations laid down for the laborers are contrary to their real interest, they nevertheless, by a clever display of psychological force, are made to appear to be conducive to their welfare. *Vice versa,* though the regulations imposed on the possessing classes are in opposition to their immediate interests, they in reality promote their remote and lasting interests. Rooted in the real interest of the one class and the apparent interest of the other,

*Economic Foundations of Society. Translated from the French by Lindley M. Keasbey. London 1899. pp. 39, 40.

this double moral code succeeds in guaranteeing the persistence of capitalistic society.*

Kautsky, like Bax and Loria, characterizes all morality which has thus far prevailed in the civilized world as egoistic. Tracing its evolution in the course of history, he discovers that the following ethical systems were successively adopted in philosophical and theological schools.

Ethics became a special branch of scientific knowledge, when after the Persian wars nature lost its interest for the Greek philosophers, and instead of it humanity was made the central point of investigation. Very soon, however, there arose different ethical schools. Those who, like Epicurus, followed materialism looked on happiness consisting in natural pleasure, sensuous and intellectual, as man's supreme end. Others, on the contrary, who with Plato and Plotinus adopted monotheism and idealism found the real object of happiness only in God, with whom man was to be united in an immortal, spiritual life after death. Between these two extremes there were the Stoics, with Zeno as their head, according to whom happiness is arrived at when man, disregarding individual pain and pleasure, acts in accordance with nature, that is, in accordance with Universal Reason, which is the soul of the universe.

"Stoicism and Platonism became elements of Christianity and overcame in this form Epicurean

*Ibid. pp. 60, 68.

materialism." The latter "was bound to be rejected by the whole society so soon as this had so far degenerated that even the ruling classes suffered under the state of affairs, so that even these came to the opinion that no good could come out of the existing world, but that this only brought forth evil. To despise the world with the Stoics, or look for a Redeemer from the other side with the Christians, that was the only alternative."

"A new element came into Christianity with the invasion of the barbarians, which substituted for the decadent society of the Roman Empire another, in which the decrepit remains of the Roman world were again invigorated by the youthful social life of the Germans." But these two elements combined to produce a new construction.

On the one hand the Christian Church, dominating the brute force of the barbarians as a spiritual power, became the bond which held the new State together; an effect which only contributed to strengthen the philosophic foundation of Christianity and its system of ethics.

"But on the other hand there came through this new situation the joy in life and a feeling of self-confidence into society which had failed at the time of the rise of Christendom. Even to the Christian clergy—at least in the mass—the world no longer appeared a vale of tears and they acquired a capacity for enjoyment—a happy Epicureanism, certainly a coarser form and one which

had nothing in common with the ancient philosophy. Nevertheless the Christian priesthood was obliged to hold to the Christian ethic, no longer as the expression of their own feeling, but as a means of maintaining the rule over the people. . . . Thus the new social situation produced on the one hand a tendency to a materialist system of ethics, while on the other a series of reasons arose to strengthen the traditional Christian ethic. Thus arose the double morality, which became characteristic of Christianity, the formal recognition of a system of ethics which is only partially the expression of our moral feeling and will, and consequently of that which controls our action. In other words, moral hypocrisy became a standing social institution, which was never so widely spread as under Christianity."*

When, after the Renaissance, the study of nature after an interruption of many centuries was again in the ascendant, ethics took but a secondary place. It was, however, revived in the eighteenth century. But then again as in antiquity we find three schools of thought side by side: the traditional Christian, the materialist, and the Kantian. "The optimism and joy of life in the rising Bourgeoisie, at least in their progressive elements, especially the intellectuals, felt itself strong enough to show itself openly and to throw aside all hypocritical masks which the ruling Christi-

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 18-24.

anity had hitherto forced on them." With the bourgeoisie sided the court nobility. The new ethical school then founded was essentially materialistic, revolutionary, and egoistic. It was based on a materialistic view of the universe, combated Christianity and the State, priests and kings, setting up against them new ideals, and regarded self-interest as the motive that always determines man.

Materialistic ethics of this description flourished chiefly in France. In England a compromise was made between materialism and Christianity, between the bourgeoisie and the feudal aristocracy. The English philosophers setting egoism and moral sense over against each other, made an approach to Platonism and Christianity, yet so as still to differ widely from the latter.

"While according to Christianity, man is bad by nature, and according to the Platonic theory our natural impulses are the source of evil in us, so for the English school of the eighteenth century, the moral sense was opposed certainly to egoism, but was as much as the latter a natural impulse. Even the egoism appeared to them not as bad, but as a fully justifiable impulse which was as necessary for the welfare of society as sympathy with others."*

Kant's ethics, also, is characterized by Kautsky as a philosophy of reconciliation.

"The French Materialism had been a philos-

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 26-38.

ophy of fight against the traditional methods of thought, and consequently against the institutions which rested on them. An irreconcilable hatred against Christianity made it the watchword, not only of the fight against the church, but of that against all the social and political forces which were bound up with it.

"Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason equally drives Christianity from the Temple; but the discovery of the origin of the moral law, which is brought about by the Critique of the Practical Reason, opens for it again the door with all due respect. Thus through Kant, Philosophy became, instead of a weapon of the fight against the existing methods of thoughts and institutions, a means of reconciling the antagonisms."

"The greatest advantage thereby was drawn by theology. It emancipated this from the quandary, into which the traditional belief had fallen through the development of science, in that it rendered it possible to reconcile science and religion."*

A great and decided advance over the materialistic ethics of the eighteenth century was made by Charles Darwin. As Kautsky says:

He "proved in his book on the Descent of Man, that the altruistic feelings formed no peculiarity of man, that they are also to be found in the animal world, and that there, as here, they spring from

*Ibid. pp. 65-70.

similar causes, which are in essence identical and which have called forth and developed all the faculties of beings endowed with the power of moving themselves." "Darwinism was the first to make an end to the division of man . . . into a natural and animal on the one hand and a supernatural heavenly, on the other."

"Yet with that was the entire ethical problem not yet solved."*

To sum up Kautsky's history of ethics in a few words, the prevailing moral systems since the time of primitive society were based either on materialism or Platonic philosophy or Christian theology. If based on materialism, they were plainly egoistic, because they placed man's ultimate end and happiness in natural pleasure. If based on Platonism or the Christian religion, they taught a more refined sort of egoism; for they regarded as man's supreme good the spiritual and perpetual union with an imaginary deity invented as the author of the moral law.

The result of the historical analysis of morality made by Bax, Loria, and Kautsky may be briefly stated in the words of J. Dietzgen:

"The ruling classes have always and everywhere shown the disposition to consider their own selfish morality as the general ethical law and have tried to impose it upon the people.†

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 71, 103.
† Philosophical Essays. p. 158.

Let it not be objected, that the views expounded regarding the evolution of morality are merely a speculation of English and German philosophers. They are set forth, though in plainer language, by American socialists as well. Charles Kerr offers the following definition of the morally good:

"In any state of society the commonly accepted idea of moral or right conduct is such conduct as tends to increase the happiness or well-being of the ruling class."*

He illustrates this definition by an analysis of the moral conceptions formed in the different historical periods in accordance with prevalent economic conditions.

"In Germany, 100 A.D., all members of a group were equal, but they had no fellow-feeling for outsiders. There a good man was one who risked his life fearlessly to bring victory for his group in war and spent his labor prodigally to secure comfort and plenty for his group in peace. The most immoral conduct was cowardice and shirking."

"In Rome at the same date the ruling class consisted of wealthy land owners, who were also slave-holders and cultivated their vast estates by slave labor. A pre-eminently good man among the ruling class was one who treated his slaves kindly so that they would not be tempted to rebel, and who studied and practised the military art so as to be of service to the state in suppressing any re-

*Morals and Socialism. Chicago 1899. p. 10.

volt of slaves or repelling any invasion of barbarians. Among slaves, on the other hand, a good man was one who was loyally obedient to his master without any regard to himself or his own class, and the worst criminal was one who stirred up his fellow-slaves to revolt."

In feudal England "the ruling class was made up of soldier-barons who owned large tracts of land, cultivated by people who were free as to their persons, but were obliged to turn out and fight for their lord and to make over to him a certain portion of their product a year. A good baron was one who was not too oppressive to his people, but left them enough of what they earned to enable them to grow in numbers and to furnish him with a large and devoted troop of soldiers on proper occasions. A good tenant was one who worked hard to increase the fertility of his lord's land, and who went out cheerfully to fight, perhaps to be killed, whenever his lord thought it desirable."

In the United States in the closing year of the nineteenth century "the ruling class consists of owners of the most wonderful wealth-producing machinery the world has ever seen. The subject class consists of the people who operate his machinery without owning it, and who receive for their labor a small fraction of the wealth they produce. Here and now a good member of the ruling class is one who refrains from any unusually oppressive acts against his workmen that would in-

cite to revolt and gives his surplus wealth freely to charitable societies that keep the distress caused by the wage system from becoming dangerously acute, and to educational institutions that teach the righteousness of capitalism."

"A good working man in America to-day is one who puts the most intense energy into his work for his employer's benefit, refrains from the use of beverages that might make his labor less efficient, begets and cares for enough children to keep up the supply of future laborers, but not enough to make part of their maintenance fall on the tax-payers, and, last but not least, always votes for the political party of his employer. A bad working man is he who shows any marked interest in higher wages or shorter hours; a 'walking delegate' who aims to unite his fellows in a demand for better conditions is only another name for a dangerous criminal; while a socialist, who dares to denounce the capitalist system, is, in the eyes of our ruling class and their dupes, a vile outcast, fit only for the gallows or the Gatling gun."*

E. Unterman maintains that thus far men, even under the influence of ethical ideals, only served the interests of economic or political powers.

"These statements do not imply that vast masses of men have not been swayed by ideal motives. They do imply, however, that if men were so

*Morality and Socialism. Chicago 1899. pp. 10-12. In the Int. Soc. Rev. Jan. 1908. p. 408. M. Shipley holds the same view.

swayed in great historical movements, they always served either a rising class or ruling class in the conquest or maintenance of the political or economic powers, and that ethical ideals were permitted to survive and spread only to the extent that they served such purposes. But such ideals were never permitted by any ruling class to quietly survive and spread, if that meant danger to the existing order. If the rulers did not succeed in suppressing them, it was because the economic evolution undermined the foundations of the ruling class and thus shifted the balance of power in favor of the rising classes, giving them a means of transmitting their ethics to coming generations. But it is a fact that the very ideals which once served a rising class have been and are to-day denied and violated, if they become useful in the struggle of a new rising class."*

Notwithstanding its alleged egoism, the morality of past ages can not be condemned by socialists as vicious or depraved. It was a necessary outcome of the economic conditions just as well as, in their opinion, the untainted sanctity of the cooperative commonwealth will be. It was, moreover, necessary for the preservation of the forms of society which corresponded to the successive modes of production prevailing in different periods of history, and these forms themselves were necessary stages in the historical evolution of the human

*Int. Soc. Rev. Aug. 1904. p. 71.

race under the sway of universal laws. Socialist writers themselves have set forth this view. Says Loria:

"Capitalistic property possesses, in fact, an historical justification, since, at a certain period of social evolution, it is the condition precedent to the association of labor, and, consequently, to civilisation itself. Inasmuch, then, as capitalistic property can only be developed through the unrestrained egoism of the privileged classes, the morality which is thus inspired, and which both encourages and sanctions this stage of things, does more than merely cater to the sordid interests of the proprietary classes. In a broader sense, these ethics are the theoretical expression of the supreme interests of civilisation, of which capitalistic egoism is but the blind tool."*

To quote from May Wood Simons:

"We can only deal with the fact that society has progressed through capitalism to a position far ahead of the seventeenth or eighteenth century. . . . More fundamental still, the actual control exercised over material environment is infinitely greater than under any other stage of society ever existing.

"Capitalism had a direct function to perform for the advance of society. . . . If capitalism meant advance socially, then the beliefs that, arising from it, reacted upon it and helped to maintain

*Economic Foundations of Society. p. 47.

it, were a fit code of morals for the time. As pointed out by Leslie Stephens in his 'Science of Ethics,' normally the most efficient society survives, and we may judge from the fact of its survival that it developed the conditions on which its efficacy depended."*

We must, therefore, conclude that human conduct, directed by the moral codes of slave, feudal, and capitalistic society, was not immoral, however egoistic it may have been, but merely belonged to a lower stage of moral development.

Section II

The Ultimate End in Final Society

After centuries of undisturbed sway, egoism is at last weakening, and the golden age of perfect and disinterested morality begins to dawn. Even now, although private interests are yet supreme among the propertied classes, social welfare is already the reigning motive of action in the minds of workingmen. Just as in the bosom of decaying capitalistic society a new form of social life is in preparation, so from moral degeneracy a higher morality begins to develop and approaches its birth. Such at least is the hope of socialists.

*Int. Soc. Rev. Dec. 1900. pp. 338, 339. See also ibid. Dec. 1902. p. 346.

"The individualist Ethic," says Bax, "is today rapidly evolving into its own contradiction, as its economic base is dissolving. While the man of the middle class can conceive of no goodness that is not centered in the individual—be it in his soul or in his pocket—the man of the working classes finds his individuality merged in the collective existence of the group of producers to which he belongs."*

Perfect morality, however, will universally flourish only when normal economic conditions shall have been generally introduced by the abolition of private property in the means of production, when class rule shall have ceased to exist, and equality among men shall have been firmly established by the rise of the co-operative commonwealth. As J. Dietzgen says:

"It is economic materialism only, it is but the communistic re-construction of society on the basis of material work which will bring about the true association of men. Only from the abolition of class rule, from the transformation of the selfish capitalistic organizations into co-operative instruments of production will issue the true brotherhood of man, the true morality and justice."†

It is amusing to read the speculations by which socialist philosophers essay to show how in the ultimate stage of evolution social welfare and social

*Ethics of Socialism. p. 16. See also Socialism in Theory and Practice, by Morris Hillquit. pp. 62, 63.

†Philosophical Essays. p. 160.

utility will be universally pursued as man's ultimate end and be regarded as the only standard of true morality. To begin with Bax:

"At last with the dawn of a new economic era, the era of social production for social uses, we shall have also the dawn of a new Ethic, an Ethic whose ideal is neither personal holiness nor personal interest, but social happiness—for which the perfect individual will ever be subordinate to the perfect society. The test of personal character will here be not self-renunciation in the abstract, but the possession of social qualities and the zeal for positive and definite social ends. This may be termed in a sense an absolute ethic. It is no longer naïvely objective like the Ethic of the primitive world, when the individual was unconscious of possible interests apart from the community, and still less is it naïvely subjective, the attention of the individual being no longer primarily directed towards the mortification of self, but rather towards the broad issues of social life and progress. He will recognise the call of duty to do and to forbear only in things which directly affect Society; all actions not having a direct social bearing being morally indifferent for him. In this new conception of duty, the individual consciously subordinates himself to the community, this time not to a community of *kinship* but of *principle;* not limited by frontier but world-embracing."*

*Ethics of Socialism. pp. 28, 29.

Previously Bax had identified morality translated into a higher plane with religion, which, as he said, consisted in a sense of oneness with the social body, in identification of self-interest with social interest. Now that its nature and idea is cleared up, he identifies perfect morality also with politics. He says:

"The separation of Ethics from Politics and of both from Religion, is finally abolished. In Socialism, Ethics become Political, and Politics become Ethical; while Religion means but the higher and more far-reaching aspect of that ethical sense of obligation, duty, fraternity, which is the ultimate bond of every-day society."*

J. Dietzgen expresses the end pursued and the moral perfection finally aimed at by social democracy in a very concise formula.

"The principle of morality is the principle of human association, and the principle of human association is progress. Social-democracy is nothing else, and desires nothing else, but social and co-operative progress, and that is the true moral perfection."†

The French socialist Gabriel Deville speaks of the new morality under socialism in the following terms:

"Under the régime of socialism, initiative and energy cannot promote personal interests alone,

*Ibid. p. 29.

†Philosophical Essays. p. 166.

while being more favorable than ever to those interests, they will necessarily be favorable to all. As soon as the material conditions necessary for the attainment of individual prosperity shall also be the conditions requisite for social prosperity, we shall see grow out of this harmony a system of ethics based on the newly acquired consciousness of social solidarity, and under this new morality the actions of the individual will have not only as its necessary though indirect result, but also as its guiding principle, motive and goal, the social or common interest, the greatest good of all."*

Ladoff takes pains to establish by argumentation that social happiness is the end and object of perfect morality, which is to prevail under socialism. Of the premises from which he proceeds the first is, that social happiness is the purpose and aim of modern ethics, the second, that modern ethics necessarily leads to socialism. As to the aim of modern ethics he says:

" 'Thou shalt do this, or abstain from that, because the Deity has ordered it. Woe to those who transgress his command. But those who obey shall be rewarded.' Such is in a nutshell the view of the past on practical ethics. To the advanced thinker of our sceptical age, however, such motives are puerile. *Human happiness on earth is the purpose and aim of modern ethics.* Indeed modern ethics

*Socialism, Revolution and Internationalism. Translated by R. Rives de La Monte. New York 1901. p. 50.

are unthinkable without the knowledge of the laws governing the relations between men as members of society."*

In confirmation he quotes several modern philosophers who place morality in the right social relations, such as Herbert Spencer, who maintains that "from a sociological point of view ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state in such wise that the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length and breadth"; Professor Dewey of Chicago, who affirms that morality is nothing but sociability; Professor Da Garmo, who calls the moral type of man the social type.

As to the relation between modern ethics and socialism he says:

"Rational ethics consists of two disciplines: the science or theory of conduct, and the art or practice of conduct. . . . The theory of ethics by the force of logic leads to Socialism in its broadest sense just as inevitably as the study of natural sciences leads to hygiene and prophylactic medicine. Still closer is the relation between the art of conduct and Socialism. As it is impossible for the human body to be and remain healthy in an anti-hygienic environment, practical ethics or moral health is an impossibility in a state of society whose institutions are built on an essentially immoral foundation and impregnated with the miasma of the animal strug-

*The Passing of Capitalism. Terre Haute 1901. pp. 51, 52.

gle for existence. In such a society ethics of necessity must be a snare and delusion, a hypocritical cant and a fruitless endeavor. Socialism alone will make right conduct possible by creating social institutions and conditions in the highest degree favorable to the development of the human mind and character."*

In an article written for the "International Socialist Review" Ladoff says on the same subject:

"The greatest modern world-movement—Socialism—is primarily an ethical movement. Socialists have to extirpate the individualistic morals the gross individualistic materialism of our age, and preach the noble morals, the lofty materialism of humanitarian aspirations."†

Chas. Kerr, now editor of the "International Socialist Review," defines moral or right conduct in the lower stages of social evolution as conduct which tends to the happiness and well-being of the ruling classes. Accordingly he sets up the common good as the moral standard even for socialism yet militant.

"In this great throbbing mass of life in which we must work, what is the moral thing, the right thing, for us to do, for us who hear the groans of slavery and who see the light of freedom just ahead? If we accept the moral standards that we find around us, we are riveting our own fetters.

*The Passing of Capitalism. Terre Haute 1901. pp. 52, 53.
†Int. Soc. Rev. Nov. 1904. p. 271.

Let us then reject them once for all. In the better social order that is coming, the action will be right, which is for the good of all. In the battle that is raging the right action for every worker and lover of justice is to do his full part, no matter at what temporary loss, to spread the light, to marshal the army, to shatter the last fortress and establish the reign of liberty over earth."*

J. Spargo, formerly editor of the "Comrade," and of the "Worker," speaks no less plainly:

"The very word Socialism indicates that we found our theories upon a belief in, and recognition of, social interests and obligations centered in those interests. Whatever advances the interests of society is right; whatever militates against those interests is wrong. We bring ethics back from the clouds of mythology to the world of men."†

Did space allow it, we might quote from many other authors who conceive similarly of socialist morality.

Those who profess humanitarianism as the new socialist religion are, of course, wedded to the same conceptions. P. E. Burrowes is most severe in denouncing every kind of egoism under the law of socialism. In a dialogue written for the "International Socialist Review" he puts the question: "So you will have no word at all in your philosophy for

*Morals and Socialism. p. 17.

†Where We Stand. New York. 3rd Edition. p. 19.

the conduct and beautifying of the private soul?" and gives the answer:

"Hardly a word, sir, save one, of advice to depersonalize itself speedily in will, habit and desire out of its phantom personality, and get into the truer, larger personality of society. To close, to step together, to live together; this will be the ego's science, when religion, civilization and society are uttered in one word, 'organization.' "*

Herron defines self-sacrifice and identification of self with society as the true religion and the climax of morality. Nevertheless he does not go to such extremes as Burrowes, but knows how to reconcile private and social interests. He writes:

"Most of our discussions about the antithesis between self-sacrifice and self-interest are idle definitions. In the end it is every man's personal good to sacrifice himself for a common good. The highest self-interest of the individual, his real joy and liberty, lie in pouring himself out in the service of his brothers; in throwing himself away for them, if need be. And so every man's true self-sacrifice lies in presenting the richest and noblest possible individuality to the world. True self-sacrifice and true self-interest are merely different names for the same principles of being—different names for self-realization, for wholeness and freedom of life."†

*Int. Soc. Rev. Jan. 1902. p. 489.
†Ibid. Feb. 1901. p. 504.

Herron in these words only repeats what Bebel has said long before in his "Woman."

"This antagonism of interests is removed in socialist society. Each unfolds his faculties in his own interest, and, by so doing, simultaneously benefits the commonweal. To-day personal gratification is generally antagonistic to the commonweal; the two exclude each other. In the new Order, the antagonisms are removed. *The gratification of the ego and the promotion of the commonweal, harmonize, they supplement each other.*"*

This interpretation of perfect morality comes very near to Loria's theory, according to which private welfare, harmonized with social well-being, is the ultimate end pursued by men also in final society. For, having said that "The morality of the final organisation simply consists in acts and abstentions from acts that make for social cohesion,"† he, later on, subjoins the following explanation:

"The ultimate ethical system is based upon self-interest; for in an economy composed of equal and freely co-operating individuals, the personal interest of each precludes all acts that are injurious to others and encourages deeds of kindness. Individual utility, which constitutes the only test of human actions at this stage of human evolution, accordingly determines a line of conduct conducive to social happiness. For so long as each individual

*Woman. p. 280.

†Economic Foundations of Society. p. 13.

follows his own advantage only in so far as it does not interfere with, but rather favours that of others, then the well-being of the individual tends towards social well-being, and the free exercise of each man's egoism suffices of itself to assure the greatest sum of collective happiness."*

For the better understanding of final morality, it will not be out of place to add a further explanation of what is meant in socialist philosophy by social or collective happiness, and what by the society whose well-being is to be had in view as the ultimate end, and to be regarded as the standard of morality.

Social happiness, as understood by socialists, is, of course, but temporal and earthly. For when the immortality of the soul is denied, when all existence beyond this visible universe is disowned, and all that is conceived as spiritual and supersensible is ridiculed as unreal and imaginary, then, indeed, any prosperity other than temporal must be renounced.

This, in fact, is done by socialist writers, so plainly and so generally, that in proof thereof we need not quote any particular passages from their writings.

But what goods and enjoyments are offered to man in this new terrestrial paradise?

J. Dietzgen calls the final and happy condition of society the salvation of the whole civilized human-

*Economic Foundations of Society. p. 43.

ity. But this salvation, as he says, consists "in the wealth of to-day which arose glorious and dazzling in the light of science;" and the redeeming wealth again consists "in the secrets which we have wrung from nature, in the magic formulas by which we force her to do our wishes and to yield her bounties almost without any painful work on our part, in the constantly increasing improvement of the methods of production."*

Ladoff gives us an insight into the happy condition of the co-operative commonwealth, beyond which there is neither a higher stage of evolution to follow nor a higher degree of social well-being to be attained. He tells us that socialism means nothing else than the reconstruction and management of all social affairs according to the principles of science, reason, and ethics; that it aims at the abolition of class distinctions and has in view all interests of men, moral, mental, æsthetical as well as economic; that its ideals are the ideals of humanity, the ideals of right living, of bodily health, of intellectual development, of a happy, harmonious, beautiful life on earth, of a life worth living.†

Ladoff only outlines the picture which Bebel in his "Woman" has drawn in vivid colors of the happy life soon to be realized in the socialist commonwealth.

Happiness in this paradise, as we shall subse-

*Philosophical Essays. p. 95.

†The Passing of Capitalism. p. 53.

quently see, will result from the complete natural development of the individual; from marriage whose bond is to be free-love; from the democratic organization of society, by which freedom and equal rights are secured to all; from normal economic conditions established by collective ownership in the means of production and distribution, by which all will be abundantly provided with the means of subsistence; and finally from public education and the promotion of arts and science, by which the highest intellectual attainments will be reached.

Happiness of this description socialists frequently profess to desire for the whole of civilized society, and to regard, when so desired, as the supreme standard of morality. But their profession is subject to a qualification. The civilized society whose welfare is aimed at turns out to be exclusively the socialist society, and this again, in the present order of things, is constituted exclusively by the proletariat—the working class. Concerning this limitation J. Spargo gives us a very plain and highly interesting explanation.

"Just as the injustice that is done to labor is the measure of the wrong of our present conditions, justice to labor must be the standard whence alone it can be righted. In the light of right of labor to the whole of its product the world must be re-created."

"But, it may be argued 'class interests' and 'social interests' are not identical: how, then, can the

interest of society as a whole be gauged by the interest of the working class? That is a perfectly fair question which we by no means wish to evade. Taking the position—the only logical position, it seems to me—that the interests of labor are fundamentally opposed to those of the exploiting class, and that between them, in the very nature of things, there can be no reconciliation, we do not attempt the impossible. Instead of that we say that all interests which conflict with ours, must, somehow or other, be eliminated. No matter how painful an operation that may be, it must be performed as a measure of self-preservation and protection. If a man suffers from cancer and calls a surgeon, the surgeon does not talk about the identity of interest of the cancer with that of the man's body. He doesn't try to find something that will help both at once. He well knows that such a thing would be ridiculous, and that if the cancer is not overcome, it will overcome the body. Therefore he tries to eliminate the cancer. Capitalism is the cancerous growth in the social organism that must be eliminated in the interests of the organism of a whole. Thus the interest of the producing class becomes the standard of ethical judgment. Nor is this a principle foreign to the science of ethics. In all ages it has been theoretically admitted at any rate. And, after all, is it not everywhere clearly apparent that the interest of its useful and necessary members is the true interest of the body? In the hive it is

always the bees' interests that are considered and not those of the drones. With the sum total of its experience for its bible, and its own well-understood interests for its moral standard the awakened proletariat will build a new earth in which vice and misery shall find no place, and in which the moral Sahara of to-day shall be a moral Eden where the sweet spirit of Comradeship shall blossom forth like the fabled rose of unfading beauty."*

In accordance with the view thus set forth by Spargo, before the co-operative commonwealth shall come into existence, the interests of the proletariat are to be considered as the real welfare of humanity and the true standard of morality. But the interests of the proletariat, which are identified with those of society, are the overthrow of capitalism and the seizure of political power by revolution. Whatever, therefore, leads to such a proletarian victory is morally good, whatever hinders it is morally bad.

This is the new morality which in our age is born with the socialist movement. It is indeed not yet the highest and most perfect morality, but the one which is directly leading to ultimate perfection, the best and only one that can be practised in the time of transition from capitalistic oppression to universal freedom.

Such is in fact the ethical position held by C. H. Kerr and other socialist writers. In the passage

*Where We Stand. New York. 3rd Edition. pp. 19, 20.

quoted above, he maintains that, in the battle which is raging, the right action for every worker and lover of justice is to do his full part to spread the light, to marshal the army, to shatter the last fortress of oppression and establish the reign of liberty over the earth.

P. E. Burrowes evidently entertains the same idea. For to his mind the good man is he, "who has social strength" and "is intelligently resisting, waiting and preparing to resist the obstruction of social democracy; and his goodness may be graded in proportion to the magnitude of the number of other men with whom, and in whose common interest he is making such resistance and preparation." In particular "resistance to capitalism and all its attendants affords the most welcome and fruitful field for developing divinity in the lives of men."*

Clearer than any other is the language of Robert Rives La Monte in defining the new morality, which the proletariat ought to practise in its present struggle.

"While the revolutionary proletariat have no respect for current morality, it is none the less true that they have in process of growth a morality of their own—a morality that has already emerged from the embryonic stage. The proletariat are to be the active agents in bringing to pass the social revolution which is to put a period to Capitalism and usher in the new order. During this transition

*Int. Soc. Rev. Dec. 1903. pp. 363, 364.

period and until the change is fully accomplished, they will be a distinct class with special class interests of their own. As fast as they become class-conscious they will recognize and praise as moral all conduct that tends to hasten the social revolution, and they will condemn as unhesitatingly as immoral all conduct that tends to prolong the dominance of the capitalist class. Already we can note manifestations of this new proletarian morality in that sense of class solidarity exhibited by the workers in many acts of kindness and assistance of the employed to the unemployed and more especially in the detestation in which the scab is held."

"The one hope of the world to-day is in the victory of the proletariat—aye, it is more than a hope, it is a certainty; but this victory can only be won by a proletariat permeated with the sense of solidarity; and the workingman imbued with this sense of proletarian solidarity will be a living incarnation of the new morality."*

Sufficiently acquainted as we now are with the end and purpose of socialist morality, we may safely proceed to inquire into the moral law, which must direct human conduct to this goal, and, by so doing, regulate it in its divers aspects.

*Socialism, Positive and Negative. Chicago 1907. pp. 63, 64, 69.

CHAPTER IV

THE MORAL LAW

SOCIALIST philosophers do not disown the existence of a moral law, but they most emphatically deny its origin from any higher authority either human or divine. From God they can not derive it, because they know of no divine Supreme Being. In this regard Kautsky quite correctly states their position.

Speaking in general of moral ideals he says:

"Only man can set himself ideals and follow them. Whence come these? Are they presented to the human race from the beginning of his time as an irrevocable demand of nature or an eternal Reason, as commands which man does not produce but which confront man as a ruling force and show him his aims which he has ever more and more to strive after? That was in the main the view of all thinkers of the 18th century, atheists as well as theists, materialists and idealists. This view took even in the mouth of the boldest materialism the tendency to assume a supernatural Providence, which indeed had nothing more to do in nature, but still hovers over human society. The evolution idea which recognized the descent of man from the

animal world made this kind of idealism absurd in a materialistic mouth."*

Nor did the moral law originate in any human authority, civil or ecclesiastical. For civil power is, in the eyes of socialists, but a superior force oppressing the dispossessed classes and aiming at no other end than the well-being of the possessing and ruling class. Ecclesiastical authority is fictitious and usurped, promoting egoism and subservient to civil power. An ethical law, moreover, which lays the human will under a moral obligation, that is, under a necessity consistent with freedom, is to the socialist an absurdity; for he acknowledges no free will in man. Law, therefore, can imply only a physical necessity.

As a necessary consequence it follows that consistently with socialist teaching the moral law originates in the nature of the material universe. Nor is there in this any incongruity if, as Dietzgen and Kautsky maintain, morality itself has an animal or bodily origin.

But if the moral law originates in the material universe, it must be discovered by the study of nature according to the inductive method, so that ethics itself becomes a province of the natural sciences.

This is no misrepresentation of the views held by the socialists in their moral science, but an exact

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 103, 104.

and comprehensive statement of their theory, borne out by its recognized exponents in every particular. Let J. Dietzgen first bear witness for its correctness.

"The ruling classes have always and everywhere shown the disposition to consider their own selfish morality as the general ethical law and have tried to impose it as such on the people."

"No divine oracle, no inner voice or pure deduction from the brain shall teach us moral truth or any truth. That ideological way leads only to a hankering after a supernatural, unchanging and unchangeable truth. A clear scientific result can only be won by induction; it is always based on verifiable facts; in our present case, on the established fact, that *men need and serve each other.*"

"Ideas, we again repeat this cornerstone of our philosophy, must be consciously based on experimental material, they must be won by induction if we desire to be clear about their meaning and import. And that applies to moral and political ideas no less than to scientific ideas."*

"Christian irrationality, which separates the soul from the body, separates also the moral from the physical progress. It removes morality from the sphere of life and action into the narrow closet of feeling, into the secret chamber of the heart. . . . The undue separation of the moral from the corporeal and of mental culture from material well-being is a theory which appears to be especially

*Philosophical Essays. pp. 158, 160, 163.

made for the benefit of the exploiters of the people. The bitter toil of the people is to be sweetened by moral sugar. . . . We social democrats, though distinguishing things and conditions by names and conceptions, are quite aware that in practice all things merge into one another, especially the physical and the moral."*

Concerning the identity of moral and physical law E. Untermann says very significantly:

"Where is the starting point of your ethics, you teachers of conventional morality? Where is the place at which 'evil' enters the universe? where is the moral principle applicable to man which is not at the same time applicable to all of nature? where and when did *sin* enter the cosmic process? If there is anything pertinent in your ethics, it is the golden rule. And what is there in that rule which did not exist in the relations of every particle of matter from time immemorial? Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you! But that is simply the so-called *conscious* expression of the fact that any atom of the universe is in the same boat with every other atom, and that an injury to one is an injury to all."

"The social relations of man are subordinate to this infinite interdependence of every atom in the world process, and we need no other ethical code, but the understanding of this process."

"What you must teach, therefore, is not ab-

*Philosophical Essays. p. 171.

stract ethical formulas, alleged to stand for all time to come, no mysterious juggling with *good* and *evil.* What is needed, and sufficient, and alone *ethical,* because alone vital and effective, is an understanding of the irresistible process of universal evolution, whether it be natural or social evolution."*

So, likewise Charles Kendall Franklin in his "Socialization of Humanity" conceives of morality as a special form of the necessary universal world-process.

"Through an analysis and synthesis of matter and energy as seen in physical, organic and social nature, I conceive the universe to be a process in the adjustment and readjustment of the two forms of energy constituting nature: gravitant energy constituting matter, and radiant energy constituting the conditions of matter; and that the universal process is accomplished by different methods in the expenditure of these two forms of energy along the line of least resistance. There are four forms of this law. First, as in physical nature . . . where the line of least resistance is determined by the blind conflict of contending energy. . . . Second, as in organic nature; where the line of least resistance is determined by mind; . . . third, as in morality, where the line of least resistance is determined through the moral sense, attaining a still greater degree of economy of energy by saving parts of the energy heretofore wasted by the indi-

*Int. Soc. Rev. Aug. 1904. p. 66.

vidual through selfishness, turning it to the advantage of society as a whole; fourth, as in perfect sociality, where the line of least resistance is determined by the social sense."*

Kautsky, identifying the moral law with the social instinct, sets forth a complete theory of its origin, its power, its changes, and its precepts. The following are his leading ideas.

The social instinct is already found in animals as an effect of their struggle for existence. For while to some animals isolation and division are advantageous, there are others who draw advantage from social life. Through division of labor their union becomes a body with different organs adapted to co-operate for their maintenance. As the animal so the social organism survives the better in the struggle for existence the more unitary its movements, the stronger the binding forces, the greater the harmony of the parts. In associated individuals such unity of will is so much the more assured the stronger the impulse is from which it springs.

Such impulses, while developing in the struggle for existence, form the conditions under which society exists and grows, and the virtues by which social life is rendered possible among animals as well as men.

"Among the species of animals in whom the social bond becomes a weapon in the struggle for life,

*Int. Soc. Rev. Nov. 1904. p. 272.

this encourages consequently social impulses which in many species and many individuals grow to an extraordinary strength, so that they can overcome the impulse of self-preservation and reproduction when they come in conflict with the same."

A row of social impulses form the requisite conditions for the growth of any kind of society. Such must be considered, altruism, self-sacrifice of the individual for the whole, bravery in defense of the common interests, fidelity to the community, submission to the will of society, obedience and discipline, truthfulness to society, ambition, sensibility to the praise and blame of society—all of which exist already in animal societies, many even in a high degree.

These social impulses are nevertheless nothing but the highest virtues; they sum up the entire moral code. At the most they lack the love for justice, that is, the impulse for equality. For its development there certainly is no place in the animal societies, because they know only natural and individual but not social inequalities. The lofty moral law, that the comrade ought never to be merely a means to an end, a law which the Kantians look on as the most wonderful achievement of Kant's genius, and as the moral programme of the modern era is in the animal world a commonplace. The development of human society first created a state of affairs in which the companion became a simple tool of others.

"What appeared to Kant as the creation of a higher world of spirits, is a product of the animal world."

To Kautsky's mind the moral law is an animal impulse and nothing else.

Hence, he says, "comes its mysterious nature, this voice in us which has no connection with any external impulse, or any apparent interest, this demon or god, which since Socrates and Plato, those moralists found in themselves who refused to deduce morality from self-love or pleasure. Certainly a mysterious impulse, but not more mysterious than sexual love, the maternal love, the instinct of self-preservation, the being of the organism itself and so many other things, which only belong to the world of phenomena and which no one looks on as products of a supersensuous world."

"Not from our organs of knowledge, but from our impulses comes the moral law and the moral judgment as well as feeling of duty and conscience."

The social impulse, the moral law, is not dependent on intelligence.

"With the stronger social feeling there need not necessarily be bound up a higher faculty of intelligence. In general every instinct probably has the effect to somewhat obscure the exact observation of the external world. The social instincts which do not show themselves as a rule so acutely and intensively, generally obscure much less the intellectual faculties. They can, however, influence them

very considerably on occasions. . . . The moral law in us can lead our intellect astray just as any other impulse. In itself it is neither a product of wisdom nor does it produce wisdom. What is apparently the most elevated and divine in us, is essentially the same as that which we look on as the commonest and most devilish. The moral law is of the same nature as the instinct for reproduction. Nothing is more ridiculous, than when the former is put on a pedestal and the latter is turned away with loathing and contempt."*

The social instincts and consequently also the moral law, as Kautsky goes on to explain, are subject to more numerous and more different changes in human than in animal society so as to reach in it a peculiar and higher development.

Since human society, in contrast to the animal, is continually changing, its members also are subject to continual changes even to the extent that their organs are transformed. But, "if the changes in society are able to transform the organism of man, his feet, his brain, how much the more are they able to alter his consciousness, his views of that which was useful and harmful, good and bad, possible and impossible?"†

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 90-103.

†Ibid. pp. 134, 135.

For Morris Hillquit the moral sense is identical with the social instinct. For its origin and development he accounts as follows:

"The moral sense is a product of the process of evolution

As causes which weaken or strengthen the social instinct in man Kautsky marks out language, war, property, competition, extension of society, and class division. Summing up the effects which these causes produce on it, he says:

"We have seen that the economic development introduces into the moral factors transmitted from the animal world an element of pronounced mutability, in that it gives a varying degree of force to the social instincts and virtues at different times, and also at the same time in different classes; that it, however, in addition widens and then again narrows down the scope within which the social impulses have effect, on the one side expanding its influence from the tiny tribe till it embraces the entire humanity, on the other side limiting it to a certain class within society."*

The same economic development which changes in men the social instinct alters also the tenets or

of man, gained in his early struggle for existence, precisely in the same manner as his intellectual qualities. It is a property of man in a state of society just as much as any of his physical organs."

"The moral sense once evolved, in the course of time became a permanent trait of the human being, an innate or intuitive feeling, and in this sense the Idealistic theories of ethics have a certain degree of reason and justification. 'The social instinct,' says Ernst Haeckel, 'is always a physical habit, which was originally acquired, but which, in the course of time becoming hereditary, appears at last innate.'" Socialism in Theory and Practice. pp. 50, 51.

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 174, 175.

precepts of morality—the moral code. The explanation given by Kautsky in this regard deserves attention.

"In the animal world we find only strong moral feelings, but no distinct moral precepts." For to address distinct demands to individuals, a language must first have been formed. But in man demands become precepts.

When demands have their origin in the social relations, they revive again and again, as long as the latter last, and repeat themselves so often and so regularly that they become a habit, which is finally inherited (as the tendency to peculiar kinds of hunting is inherited by sporting dogs), and which certain suggestions suffice to arouse not only in those who first contracted it but also in their descendants.

"Thus arise demands on the individual in society, the more numerous, the more complicated it is, which demands finally by force of habit become without long consideration recognized as moral commands."

As the social relations, or in other words, the social needs, are different under different social conditions, so also the moral precepts differ in the divers forms of society; and even in the same society, moral precepts undergo continual changes as conditions and needs vary in the course of time.

"The connection between the tenets of morals and the social needs has been already proved by so

many practical examples, that we can accept it as a general rule. If, however, this connection exists, then an alteration of society must necessitate an alteration in many moral precepts. Their change is thus not only nothing strange; it would be much more strange if with the change of the cause the effect did not also change. These changes are necessary, for that very reason, because every form of society requires certain moral precepts suited to its condition."*

In these ethical speculations, Kautsky develops some fundamental ideas which J. Dietzgen had laid down before him. To the philosopher of socialism morality, too, is a bodily instinct. The moral law in its generality is in one place enunciated by him in the following terms:

"Thou shalt subordinate thy immediate passions to general health and life, thy personal needs to the needs of society." In another place by the shorter formula:

"The moral world has but one command: permanent social progress, limitless social evolution."†

Concerning particular moral laws, their rise and change, and the evolution of morality he says:

"By this (inductive) method we find that the moral world generally consists of considerations dictated by the social needs of a given human organization. Then we find the undeniable fact that

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp.175-180.
†Philosophical Essays. pp. 167, 171.

social necessity develops with the progress of productive forces called civilization, that the social instinct of man grows, that human association becomes broader and deeper, that morality becomes more moral."

"Morality is based on the general need for social co-operation. With the growth of that need, morality and civilization grow."*

Particular moral precepts, though growing out of social needs, nevertheless can acquire an existence independent of society. Kautsky tells us how this may happen and what will be the consequence of it.

"The moral rules alter with society, yet not uninterruptedly and not in the same fashion and degree as the social needs. They become promptly recognized and felt as rules of conduct, because they have become habit. Once they have taken root as such, they can for a long time lead an independent life, while technical progress advances, and therewith the development of the method of production, and the transformation of the social needs goes on.

"It is with the principles of morality as with the rest of the complicated sociological superstructure which raises itself on the method of production. It can break away from its foundation and lead an independent life for a time."

Morality, like other ideological factors, can react on the economic and social life. But its influence

*Ibid. pp. 159, 170.

will be beneficial only as long as it meets the social needs from which it sprung.

If it is further developed and no longer under the control of society, its development will hereafter be merely logical and formal. Its rules and principles then will ossify, become a conservative element, an obstacle to progress, a means of intolerable restraint on social life, a matter of interest, and often of a very powerful interest. Then also physical compulsion will be necessary to enforce laws among those to whose needs they are no longer adapted or to whose interests they are opposed.*

If, as the socialist philosophers maintain, the moral law has an animal and organic origin or is identical with the physical laws of universal evolution, it evidently implies no necessity or obligation of a spiritual or moral nature, the observance or transgression of which could constitute merit or demerit. The binding force is merely a physical necessity consisting subjectively in a habit, impulse or feeling, objectively in needs and dependence on others. Hence men, like the social animals, are ultimately laid under the necessity of moral laws by their organic nature, by the habits they acquire and by the physical and social environment in which they live. Hence, too, conduct conformable or contrary to them is no longer imputable to man, be-

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 184-187.

cause it is not the result of his own determination, not the choice of his own will.

According to Kautsky the obligation or binding force of the moral law can not be anything else than the strength of the social instinct confirmed by habit. Bax regards obligation as the consciousness of the inadequacy of the individual and of his interests as an end to himself.

"We find that the meaning of the *ought* of 'conscience' of the moral impulse, moral sense, moral consciousness, or by whatever name it may be called, is nothing more or less than the *implicit or explicit consciousness of the inadequacy of the individual and his interests as an end to himself.* This consciousness is pre-supposed in the existence of human society at all. But although conscience, or the moral consciousness, is ultimate, the forms of its manifestation no less than its object, are determined by the conditions of economic and social evolution."*

In Labriola's opinion the dictates of conscience, the ethical rules, are not a general law prior to human conduct and regulating it, but, on the contrary, a result of it, an empirical fact, the index and summary of the ethical formation which individual men have undergone under the conditions of life.

"Ethics does not place itself nor does it engender itself. There is no such universal foundation of the ethical relations varied and variable, as that spirit-

*Ethics of Socialism. p. 26.

ual entity which has been called the *moral conscience,* one and unique for all men. This abstract entity has been eliminated by criticism like all other such entities, that is to say, like all other faculties of the soul. . . . The moral conscience which really exists is an empirical fact, it is an index or summary of the relative ethical formation of each individual. If there can be in it material for science, this cannot explain the ethical relations by means of the conscience, but the very thing it needs is to understand how that conscience is formed."*

An interpretation of conscience like this is evidently tantamount to a complete denial of any obligation to which man is subject and to which he must conform his conduct.

The view which socialists, like all other materialists and determinists, hold on the nature of crime, is another proof that they have done away with moral obligation and know of no other than mere physical necessity.

Crime is termed by R. Blatchford a consequence of heredity and environment. E. Untermann in a passage quoted above asks: "Where is the place where 'evil' enters the universe? where and when did 'sin' enter the cosmic process?" Enrico Ferri writes in the "International Socialist Review":

"Scientific study regards crime as the expression of a biological and psychological personality, acting in a physical and social environment."

*Essays on the Materialist Conception of History. p. 207.

"From the innumerable centuries of primitive society to the end of the nineteenth century, crime has always been regarded, judged, hated and attacked as an act of wickedness. But according to scientific facts and abstractions of anthropology and criminal sociology, crime is simply a natural phenomenon, more or less noxious and more or less pathological."*

But if the moral law is made void of obligation, what motive may effectively induce man to regulate his conduct in accordance with it, and what is it that may move and determine him to direct his actions to social well-being as the ultimate end and object of his life?

This is the last question we have to answer in the present discussion.

*Int. Soc. Rev. April 1902. p. 705.

CHAPTER V

THE MORAL MOTIVE

SANCTIONS superadded to law are powerful motives urging its observance. Every law, therefore, not only according to ancient jurisprudence, but also according to Christian ethics, must be upheld and enforced by rewards promised for its observance and punishments established for its transgression. Socialists admit that in times past sanctions had to supplement the moral law. They became, as Kautsky conceives, necessary, when moral precepts, ceasing to be founded on the real social needs, supported merely the interests of the possessing and ruling class to the detriment of the propertiless. Other socialist writers point out the several kinds of sanctions which were formerly in use for the purpose of enforcing laws. They were, we are told, in part civil, in part religious. Civil sanctions were enacted by political laws and carried out by main force, in order to keep the lower classes in subjection. Religious sanctions, proclaimed by priests, consisted in rewards to be obtained, and in punishments to be incurred, in a future immortal life. For the belief was then upheld among the people, that God as the author and avenger of the moral law was to inflict the heaviest penalties for diso-

bedience, and confer eternal bliss for humble subjection and sufferings undergone.

But in the future socialist society, where morality will reach its highest development, such sanctions will no longer be in force. Belief in God and immortality, classes and class interests, governments by the propertied will have disappeared, and exploitation of the poor by the rich will no longer be practised; for equal rights and equal economic conditions shall have been established among all members of the commonwealth. The nature itself of the new law forbids sanctions. For as the existence of free will is denied and law consists in physical necessity, its observance or transgression, because not imputable to men, is not an injustice liable to retribution. If this be so, what, then, is the motive of moral conduct? For without a motive man does not act morally. Two theories have been set forth to solve this problem. The first is that advanced by Loria.

In his opinion egoism will remain the motive of human action even in the final society, but will cease to be detrimental to right social relations, because equal economic conditions established among men will remove all motives for doing wrong.

"The morality of the final organisation of society," says he, "simply consists in the acts and abstentions that make for cohesion and social well-being. Individual egoism suffices as a motive, and no further sanction is necessary. By the very hy-

pothesis, all acts injurious to social cohesion and collective well-being, all forms of usurpation between man and man, turn immediately to the disadvantage of the agent himself, and this of itself is enough to show him that such conduct is contrary to his enlightened egoism."

"From whatever side we look at the matter, abundant proof is offered that individual egoism of itself suffices to determine a system of morality, assuring social well-being, and corresponding to the highest ideal of virtue imaginable."*

Loria attempts to substantiate this statement by the following reasons:

"Under any economic system where men are free and equal, usurpation is both irrational and anti-egoistic, since it is bound to provoke a corresponding reaction rendering it harmful to the agent himself; but where the economy is associative in character the injury is especially marked."†

"So long as economic conditions of themselves dissuade the individual from dealing detrimentally with his fellows, his very powerlessness of doing harm and the personal injury incurred by a malevolent act, together cause a love of the good and a horror of evil to grow up in his mind. Thus the observance of pity and justice, though in reality imposed by egoism, gradually suffers the recollection of its origin to be lost and assumes an ideal char-

*Economic Foundations of Society. pp. 13, 15.
†Ibid. pp. 13, 14.

acter which makes of it a virtue worthy of being practised for its own end and independently of the utility of its effects."*

Ingenious as these views of Loria and of a few other writers might seem to be, the great majority of socialists disavow them and adopt another theory of the moral motive that will operate in final society. However great the sway of egoism may have been in ages past, in the co-operative commonwealth, they tell us, the love of social well-being will become dominant and will of itself lead up to the purest and most elevated morality. The social instinct, then fully developed, will universally generate in men unselfishness, self-renunciation, and obedience to moral precepts by which private interests are subordinated to public, and conduct is directed to the attainment of social happiness. Should it in particular cases not be sufficient to produce such generous dispositions, it will be supported, not by compulsory sanctions, but by public opinion. As Kautsky says:

"The classless society needs no such compulsory weapons. Certainly even in it the social instincts do not achieve the observance by every individual of the moral code; the strength of the social impulses is very different in the different individuals, and just as different as that of other instincts, those of self-maintenance and reproduction. The first do not always win the upper hand. But as means of compul-

*Ibid. p. 44.

sion, of punishment, of warning, for others, public opinion of the society suffices in such cases for the classless society. This does not create in us the moral law, the feeling of duty."

"But public opinion works in a classless society as a sufficient weapon of policy to secure the public obedience to moral codes. The individual is so weak compared to society, that he has not the strength to defy their unanimous voice. This has so crushing an effect that it needs no further means of compulsion or punishment, to secure the undisturbed course of social life."*

But how is it that, while from the barbaric age up to this day egoism has had its fullest sway, it will at once die out, to make room for perfect unselfishness and heroic disinterestedness in the coming socialist society; that human nature heretofore utterly corrupted will in a short time come to be changed and regenerated so as to become the very incarnation of virtue and morality?

Socialist philosophers are at hand with the answer. Selfishness, mean egoism, ignorance, oppression of others, disregard of public welfare are the natural offshoot of the economic conditions thus far prevailing, of private property, of class struggle, of the oppression and exploitation of the propertiless by the possessing and ruling class, supported by law and government and fostered by the Church.

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 188, 189.

The normal development of social instincts, on the contrary, devotedness to the common welfare, peace, concord, mutual love, appreciation of science and arts, enlightenment of a superior kind will be the natural effects of future social conditions, in which all shall be free and of equal rights, provided with the necessary means of subsistence, not oppressed by labor, and given the best chances for education. Under such conditions and in such a social and physical environment, the innate perfections of human nature, thus far stunted and nipped in the bud in capitalistic society, will unfold like flowers in the sunny springtide and develop into the fairest beauty. Morality will then reach its highest grade by a necessary evolution from man's social nature ennobled and regenerated.

Marx has spoken of the changes which the human character will undergo in the happy days of the future commonwealth. Bebel frequently enlarges on them in his "Woman," while at the same time he attributes the degrading egoism now obtaining to the evil influence of capitalism. Kautsky gives us a glimpse at the moral elevation in the socialist society when he says:

"Socialism abolishes need and surfeit and all that is unnatural, and makes man joyous of life and beauty, and capable of pleasure. And, in addition, it brings freedom of scientific and artistic creative activity for all."

"May we not assume that under these conditions

a new type of mankind will evolve which will surpass the highest type which culture has produced up till now? An overman, if you please, not as an exception, but as the rule; an overman compared with his ancestors, but not with his fellow-men; an elevated man who seeks his satisfaction not in being great among crippled dwarfs but great among great, happy with the happy, who draws his strength not by raising himself on the bodies of the crushed, but by gaining courage through the union with men of similar aspirations, the courage to venture on grappling with the highest problems.

"Thus, we can expect that a kingdom of strength and of beauty will arise which will be worthy of the ideals of our loftiest and noblest thinkers."*

E. Ferri in his "Socialism and Modern Science"† finds in the change of the human character by the new economic conditions the solution of nearly all objections raised against the promised happiness in the co-operative commonwealth.

American socialist authors concur in these views. From our former treatise, the "Characteristics and the Religion of Modern Socialism," Part II, Chapters V and VI, we already know what heroic self-renunciation and spirit of self-sacrifice G. D. Herron expects to hold sway in future society. Other writers essay to show how in final society a new

*On the Morrow of Social Revolution. Translated by J. B. Askew. London 1903. p. 43.

†See in particular, pp. 110-125.

morality and a new character will be developed by the influence of economic conditions, by natural selection and biological mutation.

Charles Kerr, after asserting that under socialism morality will be the usual thing and immorality the rare exception, meets the objection that human nature can not be changed. To solve it he says:

"Let us examine briefly the natural impulses of this human nature of ours, and see what they lead to under the conditions we are suffering. Most important of these impulses are the desires for good food, comfortable clothing and shelter, beauty of art and nature, pleasant odor and pleasant sounds, social intercourse, friendship and love. Also to be considered is the natural impulse, which we may call laziness for lack of a better term, to expend no more energy than is necessary for the attainment of any given desire. . . . But with private property in machinery and land abolished, and with production carried on in common for the common good, each member of society will be able to gratify nearly all these desires by a few hours of social labor each day, while if he should try to shirk this labor he would find much more exertion necessary in any other way. Thus the same natural impulses which now lead men to plunder each other will under socialism lead them to help each other. Then for the first time the golden rule 'Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them,' will become a possible and natural way

of living, instead of something to preach on Sundays and to explain away on week days."*

In a paper on "Weismannism and Socialism" Hermann Whittaker prognosticates selection, as it will work in future society and affect the human character.

"When this final triumph of organization (the harmonization of the systems of production and distribution) shall have been accomplished, a new form of direct social selection will replace the old injurious, indirect selection. With freedom, security in the means of livelihood, and equal opportunity, the premium of brute force and cunning will be withdrawn and the human personality will work out its survival. Personality will become a keen selective principle, based not on over-population and competition, but on the self-destruction which comes from drunkenness and disease; whose degraded offspring will perish, or feed the ranks of the degenerates to be properly segregated and ended.

"With education and opportunity, higher forms of human character will increase and survive, and with the independence and freedom of woman, sexual selection will become a refined and powerful agent of progress. The blind god of chance will be dethroned, and a conscious humane social selection, inflexible in decree but gentle in methods, replace the present imperfect process, and the individual

*Morals and Socialism. pp. 13, 14.

struggle of man and man will be transformed into a collective struggle against the forces of nature."*

Similarly Murray E. King derives the moral perfection and beauty of socialism from the natural law of social selection.

"The saving grace of socialism lies in the substitution, as a natural law, of the law of social selection in which the best survive, in place of the law of commercial and military selection in which the strongest survive."†

As to the changing of human nature through the influence of perfect economic conditions J. M. Work is quoted by the "Worker" as saying:

"After the first stages of Socialism have been passed, after the primary objects of Socialism have been attained, after property and exploitation have been abolished, and after economic justice has been secured, it is expected that Socialism will gradually develop in its ideal beauty, that men will gradually lose their lower instincts, that they will become more interested in making the human race happy than in making themselves happy. In short, that selfishness will, to a very large degree, give away to unselfishness. In order to attain this advanced or ideal stage of Socialism, human nature will have to be changed. It will have to evolve to a higher stage of development. And Socialism will provide

*Int. Soc. Rev. March 1901. pp. 522, 523.

†Ibid. Dec. 1904. p. 338. See also Int. Soc. Rev. May 1902. p. 782. Sept. 1905. p. 175.

the conditions wherein it will be easy for human nature to make that change."*

The predictions concerning the final socialist society, as contained in the above quotations, express great hopes for the moral regeneration of mankind and open a splendid view into a better and happier world. But is there any prospect of their realization? Will the economic conditions aimed at by socialism ever be established in human society? and if, indeed, they could be established, is it likely that they could remedy the social evils under which we now labor, and, by transforming human nature, raise out of the present disorder a new paradise of beauty, happiness, and innocence?

We can not here enter on a discussion of such probabilities, but we shall consider them in another part of our treatise. For the present we shall give but a summary review of the basis of morality as laid down in socialist philosophy.

Morality is there considered a bodily or animal quality, and of animal origin; for it is common to brute and man, being in both of the same kind, and higher in man only in degree. And so, too, the moral act is not spiritual, but organic, not put forth with rational deliberation and freedom, but with natural necessity. Moral goodness or badness is not absolute, eternal, and necessary, but by its very nature relative and variable according to time and circumstances, so much so that the very same ac-

*The Worker. Aug. 19, 1905.

tions are good in one place and bad in another, right in a lower stage of economic and social development, and wrong in a higher. The end of man with reference to which actions are termed good or bad, consists, according to the opinion of some, in individual temporal well-being harmonized with general well-being, according to the opinion of others, in social or common welfare as attainable during our earthly existence, united with conscious furtherance, however, of personal interests. Yet, whether conceived in one way or another, the ultimate end and purpose of morality has not been known and pursued thus far; for throughout all the civilized ages egoism, supported by State and Church, reigned supreme, aiming only at the welfare of the possessing, and working the oppression of the laboring classes. The true end of man is being recognized since the proletariat, awakened to self-consciousness, is beginning to struggle for emancipation, and it will be achieved only when, through the introduction of socialized ownership in the means of production, the final or socialist society will have come into existence.

The moral law, by which actions and conduct are directed to the common welfare, is not different from the natural law which governs the world-process, the general evolution of the visible universe. Hence, moreover, it lays no obligation in the proper sense on the human will, but subjects it to physical necessity. As such it is identical with the

social instinct which was first evolved in brutes by the survival of the fittest, and later on inherited and further developed by man. The special moral precepts, making up the moral code, arise from social needs under the varying economic conditions prevalent in each historical epoch. When, as was often the case in times past, they cease to correspond to the real social needs and aim at oppression of the dispossessed classes, they need the support of sanctions, rewards and punishments, temporal and eternal, in order to hold the oppressed classes to their observance or deter them from their violation. But, after the introduction of normal economic conditions in final society, they will be observed spontaneously and from no motive of retribution dealt out to the virtuous or the wicked. For then the social instinct, having reached its fullest development, will deaden all selfishness and enliven devotedness to social welfare to such an extent that with universal temporal happiness the highest degree of morality will also be reached.

If, however, as Loria conceives, man's ultimate end consists in individual well-being, and egoism is the necessary motive of action in all stages of evolutions, then laws and sanctions varying with times and circumstances are necessary so long as oppression and inequality obtain among men. But as soon as equality in economic conditions is established in society, not only will compulsion but even moral precepts become superfluous, because those actions

will then conduce to personal happiness which are likewise subservient to social well-being.

R. Rives La Monte sums up the basic principles of socialist morality in a poem, which is clearer and more drastic in language than any philosophical reasoning can be. The reader may be pleased to see it reproduced here.

"What are 'wrong,' 'right,' 'vice,' 'virtue,' 'bad,' and 'good'?
Mere whips to scourge the backs that naked bear
The burden of the world—bent backs that dare
Not rise erect, defy the tyrant 'Should,'
And freely, boldly do the things they would.
In living's joy they rarely have a share;
They look beyond the grave, and hope that there
They'll be repaid, poor fools, for being good.
To serve thy master, that is virtue, Slave;
To do thy will, enjoy sweet life, is vice.
Poor duty-ridden serf, rebel, forget
Thy master-taught morality; be brave
Enough to make this earth a Paradise
Whereon the Sun of Joy shall never set."*

*Socialism, Positive and Negative. p. 57.

PART II

The Ethics of Individual Life

CHAPTER I

INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF MORALITY

To REGULATE all human conduct, individual as well as social, is the proper province of ethics. True, social life concerns the moral philosopher in a particular manner. The welfare of society, because it coincides with the well-being of mankind as a whole, deserves his special attention, and the social relations, manifold and intricate as they are, require his most careful consideration. But for all that individual life can not be overlooked by him. It has its end and purpose just as well as society; according to this end it must be ordered, and in the effectiveness of this order consists its beauty and its moral perfection.

Theistic philosophy has regulated the life of individual man first by subjecting his lower faculties to reason, which is supreme in him, and then by subordinating reason itself to God, the Supreme Good and the Supreme Lord.

But here we meet at once with a decided opposition on the part of socialist philosophers. Rejecting any relation of man to God, and any subjection of man's lower faculties to reason as their law, they disavow moral precepts for individual life. Thus they arrive at the conclusion that, while social conduct alone is within the province of ethics, the self-regarding actions, which constitute individual conduct, are not even capable of morality.

Their statements in this regard are very plain.

"Ethics and morality," says Bebel, "are the expression of conceptions that regulate the relations of man to man and their mutual conduct."*

J. Dietzgen says concerning the labor of the scholar:

"We call all these actions virtue and morality, because they have a collective or *social* value, which proves the correctness of our definition of morality."†

A. M. Simons in a critique of Professor A. W. Small's "General Sociology" affirms that there can be no other kind of ethics than social ethics."‡

*Woman. p. 322.
†Philosophical Essays. p. 164.
‡Int. Soc. Rev. Feb. 1906. p. 452.

Ladoff is still more explicit when he says:

"There is and cannot be any such thing as 'personal morality.' Personal morality is a contradiction in terms (contradictio in adjecto). Morality is essentially a social term."* Morris Hillquit fully agrees with the authors just quoted, when he says:

"It is pretty generally agreed that the conduct of which ethics takes cognizance is not the conduct of associated human beings acting as such (for that properly belongs to the domain of politics), but the conduct of the individual. At the same time, however, it is not individual human conduct that falls within the sphere of ethics. . . . To be ethical or unethical, human actions must have some bearing on beings other than the actor himself; they must be tested by their social effects. A number of authorities extend the operation of ethics to conduct towards oneself and one's fellow-men; philosophers of the theological school include conduct towards God within the purview of ethics, while the thinkers of the evolutionary biological school with Spencer at the head, classify ethical conduct as conduct towards self, offspring and race. But on closer examination, it will be found that the addition of all factors other than the purely social factor, is meaningless or confusing. Ethics remains indifferent to the conduct

*Ibid. Feb. 1905. p. 449.

of the individual towards himself, as long as that conduct does not directly or indirectly affect the well-being of his fellow-men or the human race.*

Morality must, indeed, be conceived as essentially social, if it is supposed to consist in the relation of the action to social welfare as man's ultimate end, and if the moral law directing human conduct is placed in the social instinct. It must be conceived as such also, if it is placed with Loria in actions and abstentions that make for social cohesion and social well-being. But if morality is essentially social, then actions which further or hinder the commonweal are morally good or bad, and actions which bear no relation to it, but are merely self-regarding, are morally indifferent, neither moral nor immoral.

Socialist writers specify the actions which are to be considered as self-regarding, and as lying outside of the sphere of the moral law.

Bax speaking of sexual matters says:

"Society is directly concerned with the (1) production of offspring, (2) with the care that things sexually offensive to the majority shall not be obtruded on public notice, or obscenity on 'young persons.' Beyond this all sexual actions (of course excluding criminal violence or fraud) are matters of a purely individual concern. When a sexual act

*Socialism in Theory and Practice. pp. 37, 38.

from whatever cause is not and cannot be productive of offspring, the feeling of the majority has no *locus standi* in the matter. Not only is it properly outside of the sphere of coercion, but it does not concern morality at all. It is a question simply of individual taste. The latter may be good or bad, but this is an æsthetic and not directly a moral or social question."*

Bebel goes yet farther.

"Under the proviso that he inflict injury upon none, the individual shall himself oversee the satisfaction of his own instincts. *The satisfaction of the sexual instinct is as much a private concern as the satisfaction of any other natural instinct.* None is therefore accountable to others, and no unsolicited judge may interfere. How I shall eat, how I shall drink, how I shall sleep, how I shall clothe myself, is my private affair—exactly so any intercourse with a person of the opposite sex. Intelligence and culture, perfect individual freedom—qualities that become normal through the education and the conditions of future society—will guard everyone against the commission of acts that will redound to his injury. Self-training and the knowledge of their own being are possessions of the men and women of future society to a degree much above the present. The simple circumstance that all bashful prudery and affectation of secrecy regarding natural matters will have vanished is a guarantee of a more natural

*Ethics of Socialism. p. 126.

intercourse of the sexes than that which prevails to-day."*

The moral basis laid by socialist philosophy proves too narrow to draw private conduct within the sphere of morality.

*Woman. pp. 343, 344.

CHAPTER II

EVILS FROM WHICH INDIVIDUAL LIFE MUST BE FREE

THOUGH personal conduct is thus considered outside the sphere of morality, still socialist philosophers give advice and direction concerning it. They must, indeed, do so. For society is dependent on the right and normal development of individual life, just as the body is dependent on the health of its particular organs, or as Marx in the communistic manifesto says, the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all.

Their advice is usually not so rigoristic as that of P. Burrowes, who has hardly a word for the conduct and the beautifying of the private soul, except that he counsels depersonalization in will and habit. Such rigor would be ill-suited on their part; for it would be a death-blow at personal dignity and independence, in plain contradiction to the liberty and equality so strongly asserted by them. It is, on the contrary, their purpose to render individual life as free and pleasant as possible. Bebel, Bax, Kerr, and Untermann have pointed out both the evils from which it must be exempted, and the course which its normal development must follow.

First of all there ought to be in individual life

no unnecessary or useless self-sacrifice, no asceticism, no impediment to full development that can be removed by resistance.

As to unnecessary self-sacrifice, Chas. H. Kerr writes:

"Self-sacrifice for the sake of a great cause is the surest way to your happiness, and the struggle of the working class for freedom which is now coming to an end is the greatest of all causes, for it will put an end to nearly all misery in the world. But self-sacrifice for the sake of self-sacrifice or for the comfort of some person who is too stupid to be thankful for it—this injures the one who makes it and helps no one.

"I know one kind of woman who always waits on her husband and children, gives up every possible pleasure to add to their comfort, wears old clothes that the rest of the family may be well dressed, and I have noticed that she wears out her life so that she cannot give happiness or strength to anyone, while her husband and children grow into taking all her self-denial as a matter of course, so that she does not get half the love and tenderness that her heart is hungry for.

"I know another kind of woman who is as loving and womanly as the first, but who is thoughtful enough to see that she must be happy herself if she is to make those she loves happy, and that she will consult their best welfare if she expects from them just as much regard for her happiness as she shows

for theirs. Love must be equal to bring a joy that lasts."*

Bax combats asceticism.

"The New Ethic of Socialism has no part or lot with asceticism. In the first place, it grudges the amount of energy required to be expended by the individual in his effort to acquire the 'self-discipline,' so-called, which is only another name for the moral tight-rope-dancing which the Ethic of inwardness postulates as its end. It despises the introspectionist's love of striking an ethical attitude. The mere discomfort or the sacrifice of the individual *per se* is for it no virtue, but a folly, unless it be part of the means to a *clearly defined* social end. We italicise the words *clearly defined,* since, as above indicated, it is possible to smuggle in, under some vague, high-sounding phrase, such as those already given, the old theological Ethic, asceticism included."†

"Once more, I repeat, let us make no mistake, all asceticism, all privation, is in itself an unmitigated evil. It is doubtless true that there are occasions when it is our duty, living in a period of struggle, to deprive ourselves, to sacrifice ourselves, for a better society. But even this privation, this sacrifice, is in itself an evil. It only becomes a good if it is undergone with the purpose of putting an end to the sempiternal privation and sacrifice which

*The Folly of Being Good. pp. 15, 16.

†Ethics of Socialism. p. 21.

civilization imposes on the majority of our fellow creatures."*

E. Untermann wants the removal of impediments to full development.

"The ethics of historical materialism teach freedom, not submission. They do not teach self-denial, but self-control. They demand and strive for every opportunity that will develop all the qualities essential to a full life. The old ethics say: 'Resist not evil.' The new ethics cry out: 'Resist every element in your environment which is an obstacle or a danger to your fullest development."†

After having thus removed what they consider as chief evils and essential impediments to personal well-being, socialist philosophers come to determine the norm according to which development of individual life must proceed.

*Ibid. pp. 145, 146.
†Int. Soc. Rev. Aug. 1904. p. 72.

CHAPTER III

NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE

THE normal development of the individual must be natural, that is, in accordance with his nature. But man, as socialist philosophers conceive him, is merely an animal without any spiritual or supernatural element in him, evolved from the brute, and, as Engels says in his "Anti-Duehring," even in his higher stage of evolution not free from brutish instincts or bestiality. To this nature human development must correspond, if it is to be natural; it must be the development of the animal in man, and proceed according to the law and necessities inherent in animal nature and organic life in general. Bebel very forcibly insists on naturalness of this kind.

"In order to be clear on the causes and development of good or bad qualities, whether with the sexes or whole peoples, the same methods must be pursued that modern natural science applies in order to ascertain the formation and development of life according to genus and species, and to determine their qualities. They are the laws that flow from the material conditions for life, laws that life demands, that adapt themselves to it, and finally become its nature.

"Man forms no exception to that which holds good in Nature for all animate creation. Man does not stand outside of Nature: looked at physiologically, he is the most highly developed animal—a fact, however, that some would deny."*

The model of natural development which brought out in man the highest physical and intellectual qualities, the model which we ought to imitate in our age, in order to regenerate and elevate the human race, is found in classical antiquity, in ancient Greece and Rome. Bebel and Stern in Germany, Kerr† in America, call our special attention to this great example set for us. We read in Bebel's "Woman":

"Thousands of years ago, although wholly ignorant of modern science, the ancients had on many matters affecting man, more rational views than the moderns; above all, they gave practical application to the views founded on experience. We praise with enthusiastic admiration the beauty and strength of the men and women of Greece; but the fact is overlooked that, not the happy climate, nor the bewitching nature of a territory that stretched along the bay-indented sea, but the physical culture and maxims of education, consistently enforced by the State, thus affected both the being and the development of the population. These measures were calculated to combine beauty, strength and

*Woman. p. 118.

†The Folly of Being Good. pp. 5, 6.

suppleness of body with wit and elasticity of mind, both of which were transmitted to the descendants. True enough, even then, in comparison with man, woman was neglected in point of mental, but not of corporal culture."

Bebel, then, in particular proposes as a model Spartan education with all its coarse sensuality, which modesty forbids to describe in detail.*

Normal development, furthermore, requires that all appetites of man be gratified and all his faculties be exercised. Bebel lays special stress on the gratification of the sexual impulse, not only as a necessity of nature, but also as an indispensable condition for bodily and mental health. Celibacy is condemned by him as a cause of disease and serious disturbances and, under certain conditions, even of insanity and death.†

At last by normal development the lower faculties must be so trained as to be made helpful to the exercise of the higher mental powers. This subordination, however, we should not understand as meaning a distinction between a bodily and spiritual element in man; for, as we just heard Bebel explain, sense and intellect are equally organic faculties, and animal and mental desires are the effect of the one combined organism. But how is this subserviency of the body to the mind obtained, according to socialist psychology?

*Woman. pp. 118, 119.
†Ibid. pp. 79-82.

Bax has devoted special studies to the solution of this question. He finds first that the suppression of bodily wants prevents the development of a higher life, be it moral, intellectual, or artistic.

"The continued struggle against natural wants, to live on next to nothing, to bear the greatest privations, in itself draws off vast stores of moral energy which is wasted on mere suppression. But if the victory is gained, if the man does not succumb in the process, if his devotion to the higher aim, of whatever nature it may be, is so exceptionally great as to carry him through, what has he gained and what has he lost? He is purified through suffering, says the Christian. But in how many cases he metaphorically leaves his skin behind in the process; in how many cases he has lost an essential part of himself, those know who have had much intercourse with or who have studied the exceptional men who have successfully struggled with adversity, and who have observed the souredness, the one-sidedness, the twistedness, so to say, of the character thence resulting. No one can fail to admire and to honor the strength of purpose which enables man to pursue a high aim in the midst of privations; but no one who looks at the matter without prejudice and in the light of broad human interests, can honestly say that the man is *better as* man for privations through which he is come, even though he has accomplished his life work in spite of them."*

*Ethics of Socialism. p. 140.

Secondly, the satisfaction of the bodily wants is a necessary means to accomplish higher aims and to develop intellectual life.

"So long as they (bodily wants) remain a desideratum for the majority of mankind, the majority of mankind will regard them as the one end of life —notwithstanding the precept and example of the heroic ascetic who despises such low concerns. Let the mass of men once have free access to the means of satisfaction, and they will then for the first time feel the need of higher objects in life.

"As a matter of fact, it is a trite observation that all the 'higher life' of the world has been carried on by those classes who have been free from the presence of material wants, not by those who have been deprived of them or have renounced them. What did the really consistent Christian ascetics— the St. Anthonies of the fourth century for example —accomplish beyond seeing visions, performing astounding feats of self-privation, etc.? Were they more than moral mountebanks? Do we not find, on the contrary, that the monks who really led the intellectual life of the middle ages, who were historians, philosophers, artists, spring from the wealthy Benedictines and other orders whose discipline was 'lax,' who kept a well-filled refectory, and whose morality was said to be questionable? So long as monasticism remained ascetic, intellectual life within the monasteries was impossible. Bodily cravings occupied men's whole attention.

"Another and still more striking instance of how the fact of every possible sensual enjoyment being within reach forces the mind to seek satisfaction in something, which if it is not intellectual is at least non-sensual, is that of the *tyrannos* of the ancient city, or the wealthy noble, the provincial governor, the pro-consul, the prefect of the Roman Empire. No one can adequately conceive now-a-days of the luxury and sensual pleasure in which such characters as these literally weltered."

"The true *telos* of human life, the 'rational activity' of Aristotle, 'the beautiful, the good, the true' of the young man who is taking to literary composition, may be compared, not to speak it profanely, to the odd trick in whist, which, though it is the object of the hand to win, yet presupposes the winning of six other tricks. Now the amateur of the 'goody-goody' morality—the perfectionist of individual character—thinks to make the odd trick without having completed his regulation half-dozen. The socialist is rather concerned that the human race as a whole, should each and all 'make' the first six tricks, called respectively, good and sufficient food and drink, good housing, good clothing, fuel, untaxed locomotion, adequate sexual satisfaction, knowing that before these are scored the 'odd,' which is the final purpose of the 'deal,' will be impossible."

"One can scarcely conceive the nobler life which will result from generations of satisfied (rather

than repressed) animal desires, once they are the lot not of this or that class, but of all. With food, drink, and other creature comforts to be had for the asking, they will cease to occupy the attention of human beings to an extent previously unknown in the world's history. Then for the first time will the higher aspirations and faculties of man have free play, the 'something more,' the 'odd' trick, which is the real goal of human life, will assume a new character, and be pursued with an energy rivalling that hitherto devoted to personal gain, ambition or glory, since the path to these things, at least in the old sense, will have been closed for ever."*

The features drawn up in the preceding lines hold up to our view individual life as socialist philosophers promise it to the working class in the new social order, which in a not far future is to be established on earth. It lies, as we have seen, outside the sphere of morality and is for this very reason under no law or moral precepts. It has no duties implying obligation either toward God, or self, or others as long as its actions do not bear on them. Not even the dictates of conscience can restrain it; good taste and liberal education are its only advisers. Its freedom and independence is absolute.

But with all that it is but animal, though in the highest stage of evolution. To be normally developed as such, all its animal desires, all its bodily wants and instincts, and in particular the sexual,

*Ethics of Socialism. pp. 142-147.

must be fully satisfied. No self-discipline or self-denial must be practised, no privation must be undergone, no sacrifices be made, those alone excepted which are necessary for a clearly defined social end. Sensual gratification must be full, unrestricted, and unrestrained. And that it may be such, the future socialist society will furnish ample means and opportunities.

Nor is man's dignity in any way lessened or lowered on account of unrestricted sensual gratification. For the sensual and sexual instincts rank as high as the moral instinct, as high as the intellectual and rational faculties. Nay, the latter can develop their highest activity, realize a superior degree of human culture, only when the fullest enjoyment is granted to the senses.

But how shall we judge of individual human life thus constituted, *animal,* and sensual without restraint, and yet highly cultured and intellectual? From the materialistic point of view, as taken by socialists, the full and unrestricted satisfaction of all animal instincts can not be objected to as wrong or incongruous. For if man is but an animal, the highest of the mammals, as Herbert Spencer would say, his sensual cravings and desires may, indeed, be fully satisfied; nor is there any reason why in satisfying them he should be subject to any higher law demanding self-denial and self-discipline. And not only is this consistent teaching, but it may also prove the most attractive feature of socialist ethics.

When, by spreading broadcast an atheistic and materialistic literature among the masses, religion shall have become extinct; when the moral law, sanction, and retribution shall have been done away with as mere fictions, and all hope for happiness in a future and immortal life shall have been given up as vain and deceitful: then the working classes, smarting under hardships and privations, will gladly accept a moral code which allows them the unrestrained gratification of their lower instincts, and clamorously welcome a new form of society, which holds out to them all the sensual pleasures enjoyed before their eyes by the luxurious Crœsuses of our industrial era.

But there is no logical consistency in the contention of socialists that unrestricted sensuality will lead to higher intellectual and moral culture. There are in human nature intense and vehement passions, the most impetuous of which is the sexual appetite, passions which do not harmonize with reason, but revolt against its dictates, because the spheres of sense and reason do not coincide, but are discordant in many regards. To deny this would be directly to contradict the experience of all history. Granting passions, which are naturally strong and powerful, full satisfaction, exempting them from every restriction, denying them nothing they crave, still increases their power and vehemence; for thus to their natural inclination the force of habit is added like a second nature. It is the task

of man to control passions by his reason and the power of his will, and in the accomplishment of this task consists his dignity and pre-eminence, his real culture and moral greatness. But it is a difficult task requiring the utmost effort and energy, so difficult, indeed, that comparatively few men succeed in obtaining a perfect control and mastery, difficult even when passions have only their natural strength and vehemence, but infinitely more so, when they have been intensified and have grown over-strong by the force of habit.

How does socialist philosophy support reason in maintaining its superiority over such rebellious subjects? Its ethics debars the rational will from all the higher motives, such as beauty of virtue, the sublimity of the divine perfections, the hope of happiness in an immortal life and union with the deity; withdraws it from the influence of a superior law which binds it by obligations and lays it under moral necessity; encourages it by no promise of rewards and deters it by no threat of punishment. It forbids man to restrain his passions by self-denial and self-discipline, thus to diminish their power and break their violence; and commands him, on the contrary, to yield to them, to foster, and to gratify them. By so doing, it weakens his will, dissipates his energy in combat, while at the same time it allows the habit of complying with their behests to strengthen continually. Is it not a psychological necessity under such conditions,

that reason shall succumb and passion rule supreme?

Beyond all doubt, an excited passion, especially when intensified by habit, solicits gratification from the will with far greater power than virtue or social well-being have to induce to the performance of labor, or the undergoing of hardships. For the gratification of a passion is a present and palpable good of a concrete nature; virtue or social well-being, a future good of an abstract kind; the former is enjoyment, the latter a painful self-sacrifice. But a will, weakened by habitually yielding to sensual impulses and sustained by no higher and ideal motives, instead of being disposed to struggle at the cost of great sacrifices for the spiritual and social good, is most strongly inclined to seek and embrace sensual gratifications, which, free from hardship and full of pleasure, are for it the most powerful allurement. Do not history and experience confirm and illustrate this statement? Did not the Greeks and Romans, held up by the socialists as models of intellectual and moral development, perish in their luxuries by vice, corruption, effeminacy, immorality? *Vice versa,* are not the capitalists, abhorred by these very same socialists as monsters of vice, injustice, immorality, and even ignorance? And yet they have the most abundant means of gratifying their passions and animal impulses, and, to a great extent, make a free and widely extended use of their opportunities.

CHAPTER IV

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

THE conclusions arrived at show individual morality under socialism in a very dark light. But we have still to add to the gloomy picture. We have thus far spoken only of actions regarding self, and found that socialist ethics places them outside the sphere of morality. But individual conduct also comprises actions which regard others, in so far as they are independent of us, or do not form with us a social organism. Has socialist ethics any precepts to which such actions are subject? As to our conduct regarding those not organically united with us, Kautsky answers clearly in the negative. The reason he alleges for his contention is that during the struggle of existence the social instinct holds good as a moral law only in the intercourse with members of our own social organization.

"The man who is not a member of the same society becomes a direct enemy. The social impulses do not only not hold good for him, but directly against him. The stronger they are, the better does the tribe hold together against the common foe, so much the more energetically do they fight the latter. The social virtues, mutual help, sacrifice,

love of truth, etc., apply only to fellow tribesmen, not to the members of another organization."*

This doctrine as expounded in Kautsky's "Ethics and Materialist Conception of History" is not altogether new. He had set it forth in the "Neue Zeit," where on Oct. 3, 1903, he said in an article:

"One of the most important duties is that of truthfulness to comrades, towards enemies this duty was never considered binding."

At that time much resentment was excited against him, as he himself relates, because his "statement was interpreted as if he had attempted to establish a special social democratic principle in opposition to the principles of the eternal moral law which commands unconditional truthfulness to all men." Whether this interpretation was right or wrong, we may judge from the well-attested fact that in a socialist meeting at Hamburg a motion made to disavow Kautsky's proposition was lost.†

Consequently until the future society, embracing all civilized nations, shall be established on earth, all those actions which regard members of another than our own social organization are beyond the control of the moral law. Nor are there in the present civil order any duties toward the possess-

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. pp. 156, 157.

†Ibid. p. 157. Der Sozialdemocrat Hat das Wort. By Dr. Engelbert Kaeser. 3rd Edition. Freiburg 1905. p. 190. Stimmen aus Maria Laach. 1906. Heft. iv. p. 380.

ing classes, the capitalists, for these, too, must be looked at by socialists as enemies; not as members, but as a cancer of the social organism which must be eliminated for the benefit of the whole.

Kautsky's principle reaches still farther in its applications. There are actions which though they regard others who are socially united with us, still have reference to them not as members of our own organization, but under the altogether individual aspects of their private and personal life, freedom and activity. How are actions of this kind to be regulated? Evidently not by the social instinct and regard to social well-being, because they are outside the social sphere. Their rule or standard is the consideration of man's individual dignity and personality. They are consequently, according to socialist utilitarianism, likewise exempt from moral precepts and lie beyond the boundaries of morality. Undoubtedly Bebel looks in this light upon the sexual relations.

The question of duties suggests the question of rights, for rights are inseparably bound up with duties. Duties confer on those on whom they are imposed the right of fulfilling them, and rights, while they give their subject or possessor the power of claiming things as his own, lay others under the inviolable obligation of respecting his demands. Thus correlated and connected, rights and duties constitute the sacred order of justice, than which there is none more necessary for the enjoy-

ment of peace and the harmony of freedom. Marx himself has openly acknowledged the connection of rights and duties. The declaration of principles put forth by the "International Workingmen's Association" in 1864, in the words of Marx and Engels, contained the clause: "No rights without duties, no duties without rights."

Bearing in mind this relation between rights and duties, we are compelled to put the question: Do socialists, after they have denied individual duties, recognize individual rights? In other words, do they admit rights conferred not only on bodies politic, but also on individuals, or do they recognize an order of justice existing not only among the members of society as such, but also among individuals, guaranteeing their personal life, freedom, and property?

Putting this question we do not mean to ask whether there are positive rights which have been created by human authority for the benefit of individuals and, therefore, may be abolished by it again, but whether there are natural rights, necessary and universal, which are prior to positive enactments, as the individual is prior to society. For when natural duties have been negatived, the existence also of natural rights must be questioned.

There are socialists who directly and emphatically deny natural rights to individuals. R. Rives La Monte stanchly affirms:

"It must be confessed that the revolutionary

worker has absolutely no respect for natural rights, including the right of property as such."*

Austin Lewis likewise is of the opinion that socialists must deny individual property rights and assigns as the reason the workingman's insufficiency for individual existence, independently of association.

"It (the working class) has no interest in the theory which recognizes the power of the individual to make individual contracts. Its members are helpless when they come to make contracts as individuals. They are powerless, except as members of organized groups, into which they have been forced not because of any wisdom or foresight on their part, but because their work has thrown them pell-mell into factories and workshops where they have been compelled to associate. They have been obliged to develop a class consciousness and solidarity by reason of this association to which they are driven by the conditions under which they labor. . . . They have no interest in the maintenance of property rights, which the law recognizes, because they have no property. They simply possess their labor-force which they sell from day to day. The price which they obtain for that labor-force is not dependent on their strength or skill as individuals, generally speaking, but simply on the power of their associations, upon the strength which they

*Socialism Positive and Negative. p. 164.

are able to bring to bear on their employers by and through their organizations. The very nature of their work, moreover, is inimical to the individualistic idea. They labor not in their own strength, but by virtue of the strength of their associated fellows. Their product is not their own product but the product of their associated effort. The rewards of their toil are not the rewards of individual effort, but the terms which their associated strength has managed to wring from the possessors of the machine without which they are not able to earn a living. The ownership of these by individuals, real or fictitious, in accordance with the laws of private property, upon which rests the present social structure, separates them from the ownership of themselves. They recognize in the legally established rights of private property, the force which deprives them of their own existence as individuals, for when they sell their labor power they sell themselves."

"Hence as the philosophy underlying the present republic is a philosophy of individualism, so the philosophy underlying the revolutionary movement is one of association, a philosophy which has received the name Socialism."*

Kautsky, going still farther, maintains that the individual man is in his whole nature dependent on society.

"We have seen that the animal organism itself

*Int. Soc. Rev. April 1907. pp. 617, 618.

possesses all the organs which it requires for its own existence, while the human individual under the advanced division of labor cannot live by itself without society—the Robinson Crusoes, who without any means produce everything for themselves, are only to be found in children's story books and scientific works of Bourgeois economists who believe that the best way to discover the laws of society is to completely ignore it. Man is in his whole nature dependent on society, it rules him, only through the peculiar nature of this is he to be understood."*

If the individual man is insufficient to live and to act by himself, if in his whole nature he is dependent on society, he can no longer be considered a person; and if he is no person, he can not be a subject of rights.

Lafargue regards the order of justice as a merely human institution enacted by positive laws of the capitalistic state. As he sets it forth, the idea of justice is ultimately founded on the sentiment of equality and the instinct of self-preservation. From the latter rise: first, the passion of vengeance, which "impels man and animal to resist when they receive a blow, and to respond to it mechanically, if fear does not put them to flight"; and, secondly, the prehensile instinct "which impels the savage man like the animal, his ancestor, to take possession of the objects he needs." Instinct and passion, how-

*Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. p. 132.

ever, need to be curbed. Vengeance was repressed and regulated by the law of retaliation, and thus rose in the brains of men the idea of retributive justice, "which has for its mission to proportion as exactly as possible the compensation for damage." The subjection of the prehensile instinct, which engenders the idea of distributive justice, was effected by property with the help of law and religion. But the right of property went too far in its action; it substituted itself for man, set aside the prehensile instinct and established inequalities. Thus it came to pass that justice destroyed the equalitarian spirit and sanctioned the enslavement of man.

Justice, which thus grew up in society based on private property, shall disappear again in the socialist commonwealth, the ideal of social organization. As Lafargue says:

"The Communist Revolution, by suppressing private property and giving 'to all the same things' will emancipate man and will bring to life the equalitarian spirit. Then the ideas of justice, which have haunted human heads since the establishment of private property, will vanish—the most frightful nightmare which ever tortured sad civilized humanity."*

The denial of natural individual rights by the authors just quoted is a necessary consequence of the principles fundamental to socialist ethics.

*Social and Philosophical Studies. pp. 92-134.

It follows logically from the absence of individual duties; for where there are rights there are also duties, owing to the necessary connection between the former and the latter; it follows from the admission of the social instinct as the natural moral law and of social welfare as man's ultimate end, for neither the one nor the other can be the basis of such individual freedom and independence as are guaranteed by rights; it follows from the nature of right itself, which is essentially a moral power, whereas socialism as a materialistic theory knows of no other than physical laws and forces; it follows from the denial of necessary and unchangeable truths and principles, laws and institutions, a denial necessarily implied in evolutionary philosophy and in particular in the materialistic-dialectic method embraced by socialism.

But for all that natural rights are claimed for the workingman by socialists not only individually and privately, in their writings and speeches, but also collectively and publicly in their platforms and programs. The declaration of principles issued by the International Workingmen's Association in 1864 contains the following paragraph:

"The first International Labor Congress declares that the International Workingmen's Association and all societies and individuals belonging to it recognize truth, right and morality as the basis of their conduct toward one another and their fellowmen without respect to color, creed or na-

tionality. This congress regards it as the duty of man to demand the rights of a man and citizen, not only for himself, but for everyone who does his duty. No rights without duties, and no duties without rights."

The "Worker," in its issue of Aug. 17, 1907, remarks that this declaration of principles has formed the backbone, the basic timber, as it were, of nearly every socialist platform that has since been penned. In fact, all programs adopted by socialist conventions, in the strongest possible terms, claim rights for every individual man independently of any positive law: the right to live and to exist, the right to acquire the means of existence, the right for all of equal opportunities to develop, and above all the right to the product of one's own labor.

Marx, the founder of scientific socialism, is also the stanchest defender of the individual worker; he most enthusiastically raises his voice for justice and thunders against the injustice of capitalism. His words re-echo to this day in nearly all pamphlets and books edited by socialist writers, in nearly every speech or harangue delivered from a socialist platform.

Nor is this assertion of rights merely incidental to socialism; it is, we might say, its vital principle. Without it the whole socialist movement would have no life and vigor, nay, not even a reason for existence; it could neither start, nor progress and

increase, nor would it have a definite goal and purpose.

Here we have the affirmation at once and the negation of natural rights owned by individual man, both of them necessary and legitimate conclusions from principles fundamental to modern socialism. We must leave the reconciliation of these contradictories to socialist philosophers. They may perhaps succeed in bringing it about by their Hegelian dialectics, according to which being and not being are identical. In accordance with the rules of common Logic we find a reconciliation utterly impossible. Nor is there an irreconcilable contradiction only in conclusions—there is one also in principles; for only contradictory premises can contain contradictory illations. This shows socialist ethics at its worst, at least as far as its doctrine on individual duties is concerned—a maze of contradictions from its first principles down to its last conclusions.

PART III

Ethics of the Family

CHAPTER I

THE FAMILY BEFORE THE TIME OF CIVILIZATION

SECTION I

The Idea of Society

SINCE man is naturally constituted a social being, societies of various kinds have always existed in the human race. Two of these, however, deserve our special attention both on account of their universality and of their origin. For they are so general and widely extended, that they embrace all men and are found in all places, among all nations, and in all ages; and, for this very reason, they can be so little considered as human inventions, that their origin must ultimately be traced back to nature itself. One of these is the family, in which we are brought into existence, attain our first development, and are provided with the means conducive to the sustenance of our daily life and the satisfaction of our ordinary and immediate needs. The other is the State, which maintains peace, order,

and justice among the families and furnishes them the external means which are necessary for happiness during their earthly existence, yet which can not be attained by their unassisted activity.

According to the old theistic teachings a society, taken in its strict sense, is a lasting union of several or many persons for the purpose of obtaining a common end by the use of common means. Such a society essentially needs a bond which, notwithstanding the individual freedom and divergent tendencies of its members, firmly holds them together so as to give to their union and co-operation steadiness and consistency. Since, however, the union of free wills is moral and spiritual, the bond uniting them can not be merely physical or material, but must be of a moral nature, laying them under such necessity as will not destroy their freedom. Accordingly, it consists in mutual rights and obligations; in the right on the part of the community to demand from the members co-operation, as far as it is necessary for the attainment of the common end, and in the corresponding obligation on the part of the members to comply with this imperative demand; and, *vice versa,* in the right of the members to require a proportionate share in the common good achieved by co-operation, and a strict obligation on the part of the community to deal with them accordingly. It is by such rights and obligations that society is intrinsically constituted and established on a firm and imperishable

basis. There is, moreover, an authority needed, which constantly directs and harmonizes co-operation, adapts it to the common end, determines the means to be used at given times, distributes the offices and functions to be performed, stirs up or compels the members to activity and obliges them to sacrifice personal for public interests. As in the animal body there are individual nerve centers which stimulate the organs to activity and regulate their operations, and a general center which co-ordinates and unifies the divers functions, so in the social organism there must be a head to effect unity among the members and harmony throughout their entire activity.

This holds good in general of all societies, whether they be instituted by nature and made a necessity for the human race, or be freely entered into and framed by men. In the former, however, both the juridical relations constituting the bond of union and the authority directing the social co-operation are of a higher order. They are established by God Himself, as the author of nature, through an inviolable, necessary, and unchangeable law. Such societies are the family and the State.

Socialist philosophy must regard society so constituted as an impossibility, though it can not reject its definition as commonly given and received since olden times. For it admits no divine Creator of human nature, no divine Founder of a social union, no natural law binding men in conscience,

no authority divinely established, no social rights and duties prior to associations founded by men themselves. Society, according to it, is ultimately founded on the insufficiency of individual animals and men, comes into existence in the struggle for existence by the survival of the fittest, is held together by the social instinct as its bond, and is gradually developed and organized under the influence of economic conditions and social needs.

Under these presuppositions it is difficult to conceive how socialism can build up human society, domestic and civil, on a solid and rational basis. The members which constitute society are regarded by socialists either as deprived of individual rights, because they can have no existence unless organically united, or as individually free and independent. In the former supposition society is the work of nature itself, or a necessary result of circumstances and conditions, developed in the course of history. But according to socialist philosophy nature is but self-existent matter eternally evolving, and the historical development of mankind, because it is not under the direction of a Divine Providence, constitutes but the last stage of the necessary world-process governed by universal physical laws. Hence society is not framed with wisdom and intelligence, nor does it rest on any laws of reason as its bond of union. It exists and is held together by physical necessity, at least during certain periods, but has no rational basis.

On the supposition—whether consistently made or not, we do not here inquire—that the members constituting society are persons endowed with individual rights, free and independent, it follows that they must frame and build up the social body by their own will and determination; for nobody is physically necessitated to enter into union with his fellow-men, and nobody is compelled to give more assistance to others than he is willing to render, and when they have freely built up society, they may again dissolve it at their pleasure. There is no law above them or in them that could restrain their supreme and autonomous will from undoing its own acts or oblige them to keep a promise they have given or fulfil a contract they have agreed upon. But this granted, society would be destitute of any solid basis.

One question remains yet to be solved, that of authority and governmental power. Will socialists deny its necessity? If so, they either do away with the unity of social co-operation for a common end, or suppose that the social instinct, fully developed and strengthened under normal conditions, will with irresistible necessity prompt all the members of society to harmonious action. This latter idea seems to be espoused by Kautsky.

If, however, the necessity of authority is admitted, whence is it to be derived? No God, no Creator and Supreme Lord being acknowledged, it must be a creation of man himself. Considered

as such it can not be anything else than the will of the majority of the members constituting society. But this collective will of the majority, supreme and sovereign as it is, turns out to be an absolute tyrant. With no power to bind any one in conscience or lay him under moral obligation, it can compel the members of society to obedience only by sheer physical force or by the infliction of harm and disgrace through public opinion. Yet though thus restricted in one way, it is absolute and unlimited in another respect. For, being subject to no higher law and power, it may command or forbid whatever it pleases and compel the dissenting minority to obedience by whatever violence it chooses; it may exercise compulsion of whatever kind, and yet not be guilty of oppression. What is of no less importance, this will itself of the majority can never give unity and stability to society, since it changes according as contending parties—now the one and now the other —hold the ascendency. Nor can it consolidate peace and order; for as it rises out of contention and struggle, in which all possible methods, honest and dishonest, are alike employed, it justifies revolution when raised to power, and calls forth ever new disturbances when exercising its rule.

In many respects, then, socialist philosophy proves insufficient to build up a solid basis for social life. It is wanting in essential elements; and

as we proceed in the ethics of particular societies, we shall notice the consequences of its inadequacy at every step.

Section II

The Idea of the Family

The family, according to theistic views, is an organic or compound society made up of two elementary societies, the conjugal and the parental. The former is defined as the union of male and female, involving their living together in undivided intercourse, or more precisely, as the lasting union of two persons, male and female, for the purpose of propagating and educating the human kind. The parental society is the lasting union of parents and offspring in behalf of education. Both these societies are instituted by nature, because propagation and education naturally need the social cooperation of husband and wife, father and mother, and therefore are constituted and governed by natural rights and obligations.

The object of conjugal society or marriage requires its indissolubility; the equal personal dignity of its members postulates their equality in essential rights; the nature of their union implies mutual love, friendship, and faithfulness; the unity and harmony of action necessary for the achievement of the common end demands obedi-

ence of the wife to the husband, not like that of a slave to the master, but rather like that of a mate to a friend and of a member to the head.

Parents are under the strict obligation, laid on them directly by the Author of nature, to impart to their children physical, intellectual, and moral education, and to devote their entire energy to the accomplishment of this task; but they are at the same time clothed with sacred and inviolable authority over them.

Christianity has not only enhanced the sacredness of marriage, but has also strengthened its indissolubility, ennobled the motives for mutual love between husband and wife, sustained and defended the dignity and liberty of the latter, and condemned the overbearing arbitrariness of the former as it prevailed in pagan antiquity. It likewise urges parents by laws and commandments to take care of the education of their children, elevates and sanctifies their natural love for their offspring, guides them in training it in moral and civic virtues, and heightens their influence and authority.

In accordance with socialist teachings, the family is not an institution of nature, but the outcome of economic conditions prevailing in the successive periods of history. It does not commence with the existence of the human race, but develops gradually and reaches its ultimate and ideal perfection in the co-operative commonwealth; nor is

it subject to any higher authority and unchangeable law, but depends for its stability on property relations and the mutual inclination of husband and wife.

The origin and evolution of the family, and of marriage in particular, is related and critically discussed chiefly in Engels' work "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" (edited first in 1884, translated into English by E. Untermann, and published by C. H. Kerr and Company, in Chicago, 1902). Engels bases his conclusions on Louis Morgan's "Ancient Society" and on critical notes left by Karl Marx. He himself says in the preface:

"The following chapters are, in a certain sense, executing a bequest. It was no less a man than Karl Marx who had reserved to himself the privilege of displaying the results of Morgan's investigations in connection with his own materialistic conception of history—which I might call ours within certain limits. He wished thus to elucidate the full meaning of this conception. For in America Morgan had, in a manner, discovered a new materialistic conception of history, originated by Marx forty years ago. In comparing barbarism and civilization, he had arrived, in the main, at the same results as Marx. . . . My work can offer only a meager substitute for that which my departed friend was not destined to accomplish. But in his copious extracts from Morgan, I have

critical notes which I herewith reproduce as fully as feasible."*

Socialist writers and speakers unanimously recommend this book of Engels as the classical work, from which the genuine teachings of socialism must be learned. According to a remark of the publisher, it is one of the most notable works of the man who shares with Marx the honor of being the first to formulate the principles of socialism, a work which no student of social science can afford to overlook; according to the "Appeal to Reason," it is one of the textbooks from which to gain the understanding of the socialist position on marriage; according to the "Comrade," it is a book that has long been regarded as one of the "classics" of socialist philosophical literature;† according to the "International Socialist Review," it is a supplement to Marx's "Capital," one of the two or three great socialist classics that must find a place in the library of every one who hopes to master the real fundamental philosophy underlying socialism.‡

Bebel's "Woman" also rests mainly on Morgan's work as explained and supplemented by Engels. Bebel himself says:

"A material lifting of the veil, formerly spread

*The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Preface. p. 9.

†See Goldstein. Socialism. Boston 1903. pp. 190-192.

‡Int. Soc. Rev. Oct. 1902. p. 248.

over the history of the development of our race, has been effected through the investigations made, since Bachofen, by a considerable number of scientists, like Tylor, MacLennan, Lubbock and others. Prominently among the men who joined these was Morgan, with his fundamental work, that Frederick Engels further substantiated and supplemented with a series of historical facts, economic and politic in their nature, and that, more recently, has been partly confirmed and partly rectified by Cunow. By means of these expositions—especially as clearly and lucidly presented by Frederick Engels, in his support of Morgan's excellent and fundamental work—a mass of light is shed upon hitherto unintelligible, partly seemingly contradictory phenomena in the life of the races and tribes of both high and low degree of culture. Only now do we gain an insight into the structure that human society raised in the course of time. According thereto, our former views of marriage, the family, the community, the State, rested upon notions that were wholly false; so false that they turn out to be no better than a fancy-picture, wholly devoid of foundation in fact."*

*Woman. pp. 11, 12.

Section III

The Primitive Forms of the Family

Engels and with him Bebel distinguish in the evolution of the family three epochs and, consequently, also three forms corresponding to the principal stages of human development.

"We have," he says in a recapitulation, "three forms of the family corresponding in general to the three main stages of human development. For savagery group marriage, for barbarism the pairing family, for civilization monogamy supplemented by adultery and prostitution. Between the pairing family and monogamy, in the higher stage of barbarism, the rule of man over female slaves and polygamy is inserted."*

Savagery and the sexual relations under it are characterized by Engels as follows: Savagery is the time of predominating appropriation of finished natural products, human ingenuity mainly inventing tools in assisting this appropriation. Its lowest stage is the prehistoric time, when human beings, living on trees and feeding on fruits, still dwelt in their original habitation, the tropical and subtropical forests, and began to form articulated speech. Its highest stage is marked with the invention of bow and arrow, making venison a regular part of daily fare, and with the beginnings

*The Origin of the Family. etc. p. 90.

of village settlements and control of food production.*

The first and original form of the family corresponding to savagery, at the time of transition from animal to man, was the *group family,* that is the family comprising a whole tribe, in which every woman belonged to every man, and every man to every woman; or the *group marriage,* in which whole groups of men and whole groups of women belonged to one another. Sexual intercourse was then absolutely unrestricted within the same tribe or group.†

However, as evolution proceeded, one restriction after the other was introduced. First ancestors and descendants were excluded from the rights and duties of marriage, while "brothers and sisters, male and female cousins of the first, second and more remote grades, were all mutually brothers and sisters and for this very reason mutual husbands and wives." The sexual relations thus established constituted the *Consanguine family.* Of this as well as the group family even the crudest nations of history do not furnish any proof, but the forms of marriage known to us point to them as preparatory stages of development.‡

The next restriction introduced in the course of time excluded from sexual intercourse brothers

*The Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 27, 28, 34.
†Ibid. pp. 42, 43.
‡Ibid. pp. 44, 45.

and sisters on the mother's side, and later on also male and female cousins of the second and still remoter grades. This exclusion was made permanent by natural selection. In this or a similar manner developed that form which Morgan styles the *Punaluan family*. "Its fundamental characteristic was mutual community of husbands and wives within a given family with the exclusion of the natural brothers or sisters first, and of the more remote grades later."*

"In all forms of the group family it is uncertain who is the father of a child, but certain who is the mother." "Descent, therefore, can only be traced on the mother's side, and hence only female lineage can be acknowledged." This exclusive recognition of descent from the female line and the hereditary relations therefrom arising constitute the "maternal law." The Punaluan family group gave rise to the *gens,* that is, to a definite circle of consanguineous relatives of female lineage who were not permitted to marry one another.†

Engels can not find anything shocking or immoral in the unrestricted sexual intercourse of the group family. For, as he thinks, it was necessary for the formation of large and permanent groups, in which alone the transformation from beast to man could be accomplished; it was the original

*Ibid. pp. 46, 48.
†Ibid. pp. 49, 50.

form of the family and it is still in practice, and meant nothing but the absence of restrictions, invented later on by jealousy and introduced by custom. Incest is in his eyes nothing but such a later invention.*

Bebel likewise clears these sexual relations from immorality. He says in his "Woman":

"The form under which the relations of the sexes appear and the situation of the family is raised, depends rather upon the social conditions, upon the manner in which man controls his subsistence. The form changes with the changed degree of culture at each given period."

"The study of primitive history leaves now no room for doubt that, at the lowest grades of human development, the relations of the sexes is totally different from that of latter times, and that a state of things resulted therefrom, which, looked at with modern eyes, appears as monstrous, and as a sink of immorality. Nevertheless, as each social stage of human development has its own conditions of production, so likewise has each its own code of morals, which is but the *reflection of the social condition.* That is moral which is usage, and that, in turn, is usage which corresponds with the innermost being, *i.e.,* the needs of a given period."†

Engels, relying on Morgan's discoveries, re-

*The Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 42-44.
†Woman. p. 16.

lates the subsequent evolution of the family as follows:

Whilst the group marriage attained its highest development in the Punaluan family, savagery reached its upper limit and began to evolve into barbarism. Barbarism is "the time of acquiring the knowledge of cattle raising, of agriculture and of new methods of increasing the productivity of nature by human agency." It begins with the introduction of the art of pottery, and ends with the melting of iron ore and the merging into civilization by the invention of letter script and its utilization for writing records.

In its last stage we find the Greek heroes, the Italian tribes before the foundation of Rome, the Germans of Tacitus, the Norsemen of the Viking age.*

From the economic conditions of barbarism grew out the *pairing family*. To quote Engels:

"A certain pairing for a longer or shorter term took place even during the group marriage or still earlier. A man had his principal wife among many women and he was her principal husband among others. Such a habitual pairing would gain ground the more the gens developed and the more numerous the classes of 'brothers and sisters' became who were not permitted to marry one another. . . . By this increasing complication of marriage restrictions, group marriage became more and more

*The Origin of the Family. etc. pp. 32-35.

impossible; it was displaced by the pairing family."*

"The development of the family, then," as Engels infers, "was founded on the continual contraction of the circle, originally comprising the whole tribe, within which marital intercourse between both sexes was general. By the continual exclusion first of near, then of even remoter relatives, including finally even those who were simply related legally, all group marriage became impossible. At last one couple, temporarily and loosely united, remained, that molecule the dissolution of which puts an end to marriage."†

The traditional communistic housekeeping and supremacy of woman in the house still continued in the pairing family.

"The pairing family, being too weak and too unstable to make an independent household necessary or even desirable, in no way dissolves the traditional communistic way of housekeeping. But household communism implies the supremacy of women in the house as surely as exclusive recognition of a natural mother and the consequent impossibility of identifying the natural father signify high esteem for women, *i.e.,* mothers."‡

Owing to the rise of new economic and social conditions, the pairing family underwent changes

*The Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 56, 57.
†Ibid. pp. 58, 59.
‡Ibid. p. 60.

which gradually led to the monogamous family, not in the countries of the New World, before its discovery and conquest by Europeans, but in the classical countries of the Old World.

In the latter, the domestication of animals and the breeding of flocks had developed a hitherto unknown source of wealth and created entirely new social conditions.

With their herds of horses, camels, donkeys, cattle, sheep, goats, and hogs, the advancing nomadic nations had acquired possessions demanding only the most crude attention and care, in order to make them propagate themselves in ever-increasing number and yield the most abundant store of milk and meat. All former means of obtaining food were now forced to the background. Hunting, once a necessity, now became a sport.

Moreover, at this time also slavery was introduced.*

But who was the owner of this new wealth? "Undoubtedly," answers Engels, "it was originally the gens." Gradually, however, he goes on to explain, it passed over first into the possession of the family and then into the ownership of the natural father as its chief. Under these new conditions he was placed at the side of the natural mother.

"According to the division of labor in those times, the task of obtaining food and the tools necessary for this purpose fell to the share of the

*The Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 66, 67.

man, hence he owned the latter and kept them in case of separation, as the woman did the household goods. According to the social custom of that time, the man was also the owner of the new source of existence, the cattle, and later on the new labor power, the slaves."

Still his children could not inherit his property; for according to the original custom only the gentile relatives were inheritable. But by the maternal law, that is, while descent was traced only by the female line, his own children did not belong to his gens, but to that of the mother.

By the superior position, however, which he had acquired through his wealth, the man succeeded in abolishing the traditional law of inheritance.

"In the measure of the increasing wealth, man's position in the family became superior to that of woman, and the desire arose to use his fortified position for the purpose of overthrowing the traditional law of inheritance in favor of his children. But this was not feasible as long as maternal law was valid. This law had to be abolished, and it was. This was by no means as difficult as it appears to us to-day. . . . The simple resolution was sufficient, that henceforth the offspring of the male members should belong to the gens, while the children of the female members should be excluded by transferring them to the gens of their father. This abolished the tracing of descent by female lineage and the maternal right of inher-

itance, and instituted descent by male lineage and the paternal right of inheritance. How and when this revolution was accomplished by the nations of the earth, we do not know. It belongs entirely to prehistoric times."*

The introduction of paternal law changed the relations between the members of the family heretofore existing.

"The downfall of maternal law was the historic defeat of the female sex. The men seized the reins also in the house, the women were stripped of their dignity, enslaved, tools of men's lust, and mere machines for the generation of children."

The first effect of the established supremacy of man was the organization of a certain number of free and unfree persons into one family, under the paternal authority of the head of the family. The ideal type of this form of household was the Roman family, which designated a "new social organism the head of which had a wife, children, and a number of slaves under his paternal authority and according to Roman law the right of life and death over all of them."

"In order to secure the faithfulness of the wife, and hence the reliability of paternal lineage, the women are delivered absolutely into the power of the men; in killing his wife, the husband simply exercises his right."†

*The Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 67-69.
†Ibid. pp. 70, 71.

This form of the family shows the transition from the pairing family to monogamy.

Bebel avers the same organization of the group and pairing family as Engels: promiscuity, maternal law, supremacy of woman, community of property and of women at first, later on restrictions of sexual intercourse, introduction of private property, the establishment of the paternal law and the absolute rule of man.*

He speaks in particular with great warmth of the supremacy of woman.

"In the days (of the Punaluan Family) 'matrimonium' and not 'patrimonium,' 'materfamilias' and not 'paterfamilias,' were the terms used; and the native land is called the 'dear motherland.' As with the previous family-forms, so did the gens rest upon the community of property, and had a communistic system of household. The woman is the real guide and leader of this family community; hence she enjoys a high degree of respect, in the house as well as in the affairs of the family community concerning the tribe. She is judge and adjuster of disputes, and frequently performs the ceremonies of religion as priestess. The frequent appearance of Queens and Princesses in antiquity, their controlling influence, even there where their sons reigned, for instance, in the history of Egypt, are results of the mother-right. Mythology, at that epoch, assumes predominantly female characters:

*Woman. pp. 14-25.

Astarte, Ceres, Demeter, Latona, Isis, Frizza, Freia, Gerdha, etc. Woman is considered inviolable; matricide is the blackest of all crimes: it summons all men to retribution. The blood-feud is the common concern of all the men of the tribe; each is obliged to avenge the wrong done to a member of the family community by the members of another tribe. In defence of the women the men are spurred to the highest valor. Thus did the effects of the mother-right, gyneocracy, manifest themselves in all the relations of life among the peoples of antiquity—among the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, before the times of the Heroes; among the peoples of Italy, before the founding of Rome; among the Scythians, the Gauls, the Iberians and Cantabrians, the Germans of Tacitus, etc. Woman, at that time, takes in the family and in public life a position such as she has never since taken. Along these lines, says Tacitus in his 'Germania': 'They (the Germans) even suppose somewhat of sanctity and prescience to be inherent in the female sex; and, therefore, neither despise their counsels, nor disregard their responses.' "*

"With the rule of private property, the subjection of woman to man, her bondage, was sealed. Then came the time of disregard, even of contempt for woman.

"*The reign of the mother-right implied com-*

*Woman. p. 24.

*munism; equality for all; the rise of the father-right implied the reign of private property, and, with it, the oppression and enslavement of woman."**

Engels' and Bebel's statements re-echo in all socialist literature, when the origin and evolution of the family is spoken of, or the greatness of the modern woman is rested on an historical basis.

Paul Lafargue infers the practice of incest in primitive times from ancient mythology and religious customs.†

Loria accounts for the transition from primitive promiscuity to the earliest family-forms by the necessity of organized labor, and for the abolition of the mother law by the dependence of woman on the labor of man in procuring her subsistence.

"The transition from primitive promiscuity to that earliest form of familial aggregation, known as the maternal family, was brought about by an increase of population and the consequent need of augmenting the means of subsistence through organized co-operative labor. This necessity of forming an association of labor, however imperfect, inspired in the mind of the primitive man the idea of uniting into distinct groups individuals, who had up to this time been in the habit of wandering at will from place to place. These groups were constituted, and at the same time circum-

*Woman. p. 30.

†Social and Philosophical Studies. Translated by Chas. H. Kerr. Chicago 1906. p. 58.

scribed, by forbidding intermarriage among their members, and by compelling the women of each group to select their husbands from a foreign group. Within the familial clans thus constituted, the children always belonged to the clan of the mother, and consequently to a different clan from that of the father.

"In this way individuals belonging to different clans, but all collected around the same maternal head, were able to establish a primitive labor association. The maternal family was thus the first means employed to concentrate the labor of several individuals upon a definite territory."

But this prehistoric method of associating labor soon gave evidence of multiple defects. It failed to produce unity and harmony among men belonging to different clans and owing obedience to different powers.

Moreover, when subsistence could no longer be procured except by labor, the younger and weaker members of the family, finding it impossible to produce enough for their needs, were forced to recognize that their very life depended upon the labor of the older and stronger members of the group. Man, thus, naturally acquired an economic and therewith also a legal power over wife and children, who owed to him their existence. Henceforward the supervision of the family became the privilege of the father. The husband, having obtained a despotic right, now prevented his wife

from having any further intercourse with other men and subjected her to his authority in all acts of her life. Over his children likewise the father exercised a limitless *patria potestas.*

"Now the sovereignty exercised by the father over the members of his family is in reality but an extension of the prevailing economic relation between property and labor, and for this reason it is bound to become modified as this economic antithesis is softened."*

May Wood Simons writes of the prehistoric woman:

"She stood at one time at the head of the matriarchal family and from her her children took their names and through her reckoned their descent."

"With the introduction of private property the headship of the family was transferred from the mother to the father. This marked the first great economic and social change for woman. It meant that she now became a secluded being, entirely dependent on man for subsistence, and since her life in the open air was gone, she was no longer his physical equal. She ceased to be actively engaged in industry, and child-bearing was henceforth her chief occupation. The opinion, therefore, began to prevail that this was her sole function to perform in society."†

With great enthusiasm W. A. Clark sounds the

*Economic Foundations of Society. pp. 87-89.

†Woman and the Social Problem. Chicago 1899. pp. 78.

praises of early womanhood in a booklet entitled "Woman, Man and Poverty." We read:

"The absolute truth about woman is almost unbelievable, but it must be met and honestly dealt with."

"We now know something of the laws, customs and religions of early peoples. The records they left were made when women ruled at home, in religion and in State. It was a form of society known as the Matriarchate, or Mother-rule. Its origin was due to the fact that still earlier peoples yielded to the mother the supreme control over her children. In the first state of primitive man, the relationship between father and child was not known; the right of the mother to her child was therefore most natural. Children took their mother's name; drew the first inspiration of humanity from Mother's Holy Love, and upon that was based the first conception of the family. The father, having no part in the family, remained a wanderer, leaving the mother in absolute control. This precedence of the mother extended to the primitive State, and indicated the form of religion.

"Mother was the first deity, because woman was looked upon as the higher giver and sustainer of all life. The records show that where a god or goddess were worshipped together, they were mother and son, and the mother or goddess was in the prominent place."*

*Woman, Man and Poverty. 2nd Edition. Kansas City, Mo. pp. 8, 9.

"From the records we learn that under the Mother-rule there was a free society; but as soon as man, by his superior animal strength, began to dominate over woman and her children, the germs of human slavery were sown. Furthermore, we learn that, since the Patriarchate, or man-rule began, human life was counted for naught. Innocent babes have been sacrificed to appease what was supposed to be an angry god. As a matter of course, such a god was masculine, for under the Mother-rule no living sacrifice was made—lambs and doves were not slaughtered to pacify a bloodthirsty god. The god, who craved the blood of a creature he was said to have made, was not known until some man wanted to justify himself for having murdered a fellow-man."*

The author professes adhesion to socialism in the last two sentences of the booklet when he says:

"On investigation it will be seen that only through Socialism can we establish the economic independence of Woman, Man and Child. And that will be the end of exploitation, which is the father of poverty."†

In these strange prehistoric discoveries, no less humiliating for man than flattering to woman, we are struck by one feature in particular. The real foundation of woman's divine pre-eminence and

*Woman, Man and Poverty. 2nd Edition. Kansas City, Mo. pp. 12, 13.

†Ibid. p. 28.

native claim to authority is found to lie in primitive promiscuity, in her more or less restricted polyandry at a time when the human race is said to have been scarcely yet above the level of its brute ancestors. Is it possible that in our enlightened era a decent woman could glory in such a title of nobility?

But let us return to the further evolution of the family as related by Engels.

CHAPTER II

THE MONOGAMOUS FAMILY UNDER CIVILIZATION

SECTION I

The Origin of Monogamy

THE monogamous family developed from the pairing family during the transition from the lower to the higher stages of barbarism, though its final victory was delayed until the advent of civilization, the time when arts and manufactures were invented. Engels characterizes it by the following traits.

"It is founded on the male supremacy for the pronounced purpose of children of indisputable paternal lineage." From the pairing family it is distinguished "by far greater durability of wedlock, which can no longer be dissolved at the pleasure of either party. As a rule, it is only the man who can still dissolve it and cast off his wife." "The privilege of conjugal faithlessness remains sanctioned for men at least by custom and is more and more enjoyed with the increasing development of society. If the woman remembers the ancient sexual practices and attempts to revive them, she is punished more severely than ever."*

*Origin of the Family, etc. p. 75.

The whole severity of this new form of the family, as Engels explains, confronts us in classical Greece. But even among the Greeks, the most developed nation of antiquity, monogamy is by no means the highest form of marriage. First of all, it was not the fruit of individual sex-love, but the outcome of economic and egoistic considerations.

"Monogamy was the first form of the family not founded on natural, but on economic conditions, *viz.,* the victory of private property over primitive and natural collectivism. Supremacy of the man in the family and generation of children that could be his offspring alone and were destined to be the heirs of his wealth—these were openly avowed to be the sole objects of monogamy. For the rest it was a burden to them, a duty to gods, the State and their own ancestors, a duty to be fulfilled and no more."

Secondly, monogamy, as the subjugation of one sex by the other, was the proclamation of an antagonism between the sexes unknown in all preceding history, the first class division and class oppression.

Thirdly, it was always attended by hetærism, sexual intercourse of men with unmarried women outside the monogamous family, and adultery on the part of the wife; both remnants of the old sexual freedom.*

*Ibid. pp. 79-82.

Among the Romans and Germans monogamy had not that severe classic form which it had among the Greeks. When after the downfall of the Empire these two nations mixed, a "new monogamy endowed male rule with a milder form and accorded to woman a position that was at least outwardly far more respected and free than classical antiquity ever knew." "Not until now was there a possibility of developing from monogamy . . . the highest ethical progress we owe to it: the modern individual sex-love, unknown to all previous ages."*

Section II

Modern Monogamy

Still monogamy did not exclusively or even principally develop as mutual love of man and wife. Among all historically active, *i.e.,* ruling classes, matrimony remained what it had been since the days of the pairing family—a conventional matter arranged by the parents. It remained such down to our days and was in consequence always attended by hetaerism and adultery.

"In Catholic countries, the parents provide a fitting spouse for their son as of old, and the natural consequence is the full development of the contradictions inherent to monogamy: voluptuous hetærism on the man's part, voluptuous adultery of the

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 83, 84.

woman. Probably the Catholic Church has abolished divorce for the simple reason that it had come to the conclusion, there was as little help for adultery as for death."

"In Protestant countries, again, it is the custom to give to the bourgeois son more or less liberty in choosing his mate. Hence a certain degree of love may be at the bottom of such marriages, and for the sake of propriety this is always assumed, quite in keeping with Protestant hypocrisy. In this case hetærism is carried on less strenuously and adultery on the part of the women is not so frequent. But as human beings remain under any form of marriage what they were before marrying, and as the citizens of Protestant countries are mostly philistines, this Protestant monogamy on the average of the best cases confines itself to a leaden ennui, labeled wedded bliss."

"In both cases the marriage is influenced by the class environment of the participants, and in this respect it always remains conventional. This conventionalism often enough results in the most pronounced prostitution—sometimes of both parties—more commonly of the women. She is distinguished from a courtesan only in that she does not offer her body for money by the hour like a commodity, but sells it into slavery once for all."*

*Ibid. pp. 85, 86. Does Engels so utterly ignore Catholic legislation on marriage? The Church regards marriage as essentially free and hence has for centuries made any previous

In the communist manifesto Marx and Engels characterize the present marriage, or, as they call it, the bourgeois marriage, as a system of community of wives, of prostitution, public and private. We read in Part II.:

"The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion than the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women."

"Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common, and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women. For the rest it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system: *i.e.*, prostitution both public and private."

Bebel, in his "Woman," has set to himself the special task of demonstrating at full length the immorality of modern monogamy. However drastic and indelicate his language may be, we can not leave his positions and arguments unstated, for they

intimidation, even by parents, an annulling impediment. Again, what proof has he that hetærism and adultery are rampant among Catholics, even more than among Protestants? Here Engels' hostile animus is undeniable.

express the strongest socialist views on the family and are at the same time the logical outcome of economic evolutionism.

As the fundamental principle he lays down that sexual gratification is a demand of nature and a physical necessity as Luther maintained, and that sexual abstention is harmful both to the individual and to society.* But monogamous marriage as a social institution, he subjoins, is beyond the reach of many, renders the sexual relations unnatural, and frustrates their object.

"We shall prove that marriage founded on bourgeois property relations is more or less a marriage of compulsion which leads numerous ills in its train, and which fails in its purpose quite extensively if not altogether. We shall show, furthermore, that it is a social institution, beyond the reach of millions, and is by no means that marriage based upon love, which alone corresponds with its natural purposes."†

The following are the proofs which Bebel alleges for this proposition:

In wedlock the sexes must be united not only physically by intercourse, but also spiritually by mutual attachment and love, made permanent by duty toward and pleasure in posterity. In other words, marriage should be a union that two persons enter into out of mutual love, in order to ac-

*Woman. pp. 79-85.
†Ibid. pp. 85, 86.

complish their natural mission, "the gratification of their natural instinct, and the transmission of one's being in the propagation of the race."

"This motive is, however, only rarely present in all its purity. With the large majority of women, matrimony is looked upon as a species of institution for support, which they must enter into at any price. Conversely, a large portion of men look upon marriage from a purely business standpoint, and from material view-points all the advantages and disadvantages are accurately calculated. Even with those marriages, in which low egoistic motives did not turn the scales, raw reality brings along so much that disturbs and dissolves, that only in rare instances are the expectations verified which, in their youthful enthusiasm and ardor, the couple had looked forward to."*

Marriages, thus, become money speculations and money matches.† Woman, in consequence, lives in a dependent position, is deprived of equal rights, despised, degraded. The misfortune of such marriages is yet increased by the difficulty of separation.

"When such a marriage proves a most unfortunate one—as foreseen by everybody, by the ill-starred victim, in most instances the woman, herself—and either party decides to separate, then, State and Church, who never first enquire whether

*Woman. p. 87.
†Ibid. p. 93.

real love and natural, moral impulses, or only naked, obscene egotism tie the knot—now raise the greatest difficulties. At present, moral repulsion is but rarely recognized as a sufficient ground for separation; at present, only palpable proofs, proofs that always dishonor or lower one of the parties in public esteem, are, as a rule, demanded; separation is not otherwise granted."

"We ask, Is such a marriage—and their number is infinite—not worse than prostitution? The prostitute has, to a certain degree, the freedom to withdraw from her disgraceful pursuit; moreover, she enjoys the privilege, when she does not live in a public house, to reject the purchase of the embraces of him who, for whatever reason, may be distasteful to her. But a sold married woman must submit to the embraces of her husband, even though she have a hundred reasons to hate and despise him."*

The frequency of actions for divorce in all civilized countries shows the unhappiness and dissatisfaction in the married life of present society, and hence also the unnaturalness of matrimonial relations introduced by monogamy.†

Marriage being everywhere controlled by economic conditions, and the evils inherent in it being constantly on the increase, many nowadays refuse to marry. In addition, the number of legitimate births is in decline. A large number of children is

*Ibid. pp. 96, 97.
†Ibid. pp. 98-101.

dreaded, prevention of conception, abortion, infanticide are resorted to and come ever more into practice. The industrial occupation of women proves hurtful to her health and to her offspring, before and after it is born.*

Among the working classes, owing to modern industrialism, family life is to a great extent destroyed. Labor in factories separates husband and wife, parents and children; poverty, pressing needs that can not be satisfied, absence of all comfort and necessaries of life bring about despair, quarrels, dissensions, impossibility of education, both physical and intellectual.†

Again, in almost all countries there is a numerical disproportion between the sexes, the females exceeding the males in number; a disproportion not due to birth, for there are on the average more boys born than girls, but to unfavorable social, political, and economic causes. For this reason and the fact in addition, that many men renounce marriage, because they deem themselves unable to support a family, a multitude of women are excluded from all chances of marriage, and of those who are not excluded, a great number can not enter wedlock at the proper marriageable age.‡

From these causes, in Bebel's opinion, prostitution with all its evils resulted as a necessary conse-

*Woman. pp. 88, 105-113.
†Ibid. p. 102.
‡Ibid. pp. 127-146.

quence in all capitalistic ages and is resulting in ever greater dimensions in our day. If men do not find satisfaction in wedlock, either because they renounce marriage, or because they are ill-mated, they usually seek it in prostitution, and women, because they can not marry or otherwise make their living, willingly or unwillingly prostitute themselves. Hence he concludes:

"Prostitution becomes a necessary social institution in the capitalist world, the same as the police, standing armies, the Church, and wage-mastership."*

By proofs like these Bebel thinks he has established beyond doubt the immorality and intrinsic corruption of monogamy, its unnaturalness, its insufficiency for sexual gratification and unfitness for the propagation of the human race, its baneful consequences both for individuals and for society.

Are German socialists the only accusers of monogamy?

Bax certainly is not less severe in its denunciation than they are, when he writes:

"Enforced monogamy and its correlate, prostitution, is the great historical antithesis of civilization in the sexual sphere, just as mastership and service are in the economic sphere, and as God and nature in the speculative sphere, or as sin and holiness in the sphere of ethics generally."

"In this, as in other departments, the modern

*Ibid. pp. 146-167.

man, immersed in the categories of the *bourgeois* world, sees everything through them. For him, therefore, there exists only legalized monogamic marriage and prostitution, both of which are based essentially on commercial considerations. The one is *purchase,* the other is *hire.* He cannot see the higher and only really *moral* form of marriage-relation which transcends both and which is based neither on *sale* nor on *hire.* Prostitution is immoral as implying the taking advantage by the woman of a monopoly which costs her no labor for the sake of extorting money from the man. But the condition of legal marriage-maintenance does the same.

"If it be asked, is marriage a failure? the answer of any impartial person must be—monogamic marriage is a failure—the rest is silence. We do not know what new form of the family the society of the future, in which men and women will be alike economically free, may evolve, and which may be generally adopted therein. Meanwhile, we ought to combat by every means within our power the metaphysical dogma of the inherent sanctity of the monogamic principle."*

But do our American socialists abstain from impugning the monogamous family? We can scarcely expect this on their part, since they have in the highest terms recommended Engels' work on the

*Outlook from a New Standpoint. Quoted by Goldstein. pp. 171.

"Origin of the Family," and spread among the masses of the American laborers a translation of Bebel's "Woman under Socialism." We shall reproduce the views of several prominent socialist authors. G. Wilshire in an editorial of his Magazine* speaks of the monogamous marriage in the following terms:

"In Europe the conventional view to-day is vastly different from the conventional views of the middle ages. A man marries a woman much as he bought a cow. She becomes his chattel together with all her belongings, and she has about as little to say about herself as has his cow. The chief difference is that he can get rid of his cow with much less difficulty than of his wife, or his woman, as she would usually be termed.

"In America the woman has a place superior to that of women in other parts of the world, not primarily because of her own superiority, but because the industrial conditions have made it such. . . . There was a time when, in order to get a living at all, a woman simply had to find a husband; and when she did find him, she very often had to make a living for him as well as for herself. In fact, such things are not entirely relegated to the past as yet."

"To-day a woman can do about as she pleases, as far as marrying is concerned. She is no longer confined to being a wife for a career. . . . Not

*Jan. 1905 p. 16.

only has woman become independent of man owing to her ability to make her way unaided by a husband, but she has also acquired the right of holding property in her own name, which is another road to her economic independence. The result of all this is that whereas at one time when a woman married a man, it was absolutely for life, simply because she would starve to death if she left him, to-day she may leave him and find it easier to get a living than if she remained with him."

"It is this facility of becoming independent that causes the facility of divorce."

According to Wilshire, then, it would seem that the marriage-tie consists merely in the economic dependence of the woman.

Chas. H. Kerr speaks of the monogamous marriage legalized in modern society as follows:

"A legal marriage in this country to-day is a contract by which the man agrees to support the woman, and the woman in return gives up the control of her own body to the man. If you doubt this, ask any lawyer and he will tell you that a 'criminal assault,' such as is punished in some States by death and in others by imprisonment for life, is no crime at all in the eyes of the law if committed by a man upon a woman to whom he has been legally married. Also he will tell you that a man charged with this crime can generally get an acquittal if he can prove that the woman who complains has prostituted herself. The two cases are

just alike. The prostitute and the woman who marries without love for the sake of a home are precisely on the same moral level. Each has made a fatal mistake and each is living in the worst kind of a hell that I know how to imagine."*

G. D. Herron, in a letter which he wrote to the Grinnell Church committee in defense of his divorce from a faithful wife, utters the following condemnation of the present marriage system:

"As a council, you are acting in defense of what you believe to be the sacredness of the family institution, against which I am to you an offender. In order that your action on this point may be complete, let me say to you that I do not believe that the present marriage system is sacred or good. It rather seems to me to be the destruction of the liberty and love and truth which make life sacred and worth living. If love and truth are the basis of morality, then a marriage system which makes one human being the property of another without regard to the well-being of either the owned or the owner, seems to me to be the very soul of blasphemy and immorality. The family founded on force is the survival of slavery, and one of the expressions of slave-principles on which our whole civilization is built. It is a mode of superstition which thinks it good for human beings to own each other, and good for the race to have all its sources and tools of life owned by the few who are strong

*The Folly of Being Good. pp. 19, 20.

and cunning enough to possess them. The ethics of the legally and ecclesiastically enforced family make it possible for a man to live a life of monstrous wrong, of ghastly falsehood, even of unbridled lust, and yet to be wholly moral according to the standards by which we are judged. The same standards condemn and disgrace the purest expression of comradeship, if they cross the conventions or forget the decrees of custom. Free and truthful living is thus made a tragedy, to have overwhelming and revengeful retribution added unto it, while slave-living and falsehood may be rewarded with world-blessings and ecclesiastical canonization."*

Socialist women agree with their enthusiastic defenders of the stronger sex. May Simons in her "Woman and the Social Problem" (Chicago 1899), and May Walden Kerr in her "Socialism and the Home" (Chicago 1901) utter indignant denunciations of the modern monogamous marriages. Based on sordid capitalistic consideration, the present marriage system, they say, chills love and mutual affection between husband and wife, impedes their peace and happiness, lowers wedlock to the level of prostitution, leads to ever more frequent divorces, establishes in society sexual relations which are worse than those existing among savages, and renders the education of children misconceived in such unions altogether impossible.

*Int. Soc. Rev. July 1901. p. 23.

Adeline Champney, in an address delivered before the Boston Social Science Club and later published in pamphlet form by the Comrade Co-operative Company, scrutinizes the modern marriage from the three-fold viewpoint of birth-supply, parental responsibility, and individual rational development. The conclusion she arrives at is, that it deteriorates the quality of births, takes away from parents responsibility with regard to the rearing of offspring, and makes them unfit for the physical and intellectual education of children. In lack of decency and modesty Adeline Champney equals Bebel, in vehemence of attack and accusation she even surpasses him. The following remarks which occur in the conclusion of her address are characteristic.

"Marriage, I have said, is a property institution, but in its development as such there has grown up with it and around it a feeling, an attitude of mind, a belief that amounts to a superstition, a superstition promoted and fortified by religion and boasting 'divine' authority. This is as deadly as any of the old theological beliefs from which we are freeing ourselves, and is much harder to eradicate, for it permeates the whole attitude of men and women toward each other. It is the very essence of our 'Christian marriage.' . . . This superstition may be briefly stated thus: Men have sexual needs which women must supply, but since this service of women in behalf of men entails some risk and sacri-

fice on their part, they must be given economic compensation." She finally terms modern marriage a thing of shreds and patches permeated by an atmosphere of falsehood and concealment.*

The arraignment of the monogamous marriage by the socialist writers quoted is definite and of a very serious nature. This form of marriage, they maintain, marks the end of man's original happiness; it is the necessary consequence of the introduction of private property, which divided mankind into a possessing and dispossessed class, into oppressors and oppressed; it enslaves woman and deprives her of her dignity, while it upholds the arbitrariness and cruelty of man. Contrary to the nature of wedlock, it suppresses love between husband and wife, and puts in its place cold and mean economic considerations; it rather impedes than promotes the end and object of conjugal union, and while it thus is unable to fulfil its natural destination, is always accompanied by adultery and prostitution as necessary attendants; it is, in a word, the very embodiment of immorality, not open and naked, but hidden under and consecrated by religion.

Concerning this summary of charges against monogamy, we shall for the present make only two remarks. First, we can not but wonder at the indignation with which socialists condemn monogamy,

*The Woman Question. 2nd Edition. New York 1903. pp. 26-29.

and especially at the charge of immorality which they raise against it. To the promiscuity, whether restricted or unrestricted, of primitive men they had not only no objection whatever, but termed it even good and moral. Whence, now, so much opposition to monogamy? It is just as much the outcome of the economic conditions of the capitalistic era, as, in their opinion, the group marriage was the result of the needs and conditions of prehistoric times. And as capitalism itself is a necessary stage in human development, so the restrictions inherent in monogamy proved beneficial and necessary for the evolution of the human species.

But, as we have seen in a preceding chapter, whatever results from the needs and conditions of a given epoch, and whatever contributes to the advancement of society, is, according to socialist ethics, morally good, insomuch that even capitalism can not be condemned as bad. Why, then, should monogamy be termed immoral? From the socialist point of view there is no reason discernible. It would almost seem as if monogamy were objectionable on account of its restrictions, and group marriage were approved on account of the freedom it affords.

We should like to remark, secondly, that socialists have an altogether wrong conception of Christian marriage. To their mind the monogamous marriage is a civil contract, by which the woman for lifetime surrenders herself to man to supply

his sexual needs, and the man in compensation takes upon himself the obligation of providing her with the means of sustenance. Socialists entertain this idea alike of the Christian marriage and of what they call the bourgeois marriage; that is, the marriage which grows out of the conditions of capitalistic society and is legalized by the capitalistic State. For they allow no distinction between the one and the other, nor can they allow any, since in their opinion Christianity itself is, just like capitalistic society, the outcome of economic conditions, and the Church is no more than the handmaid of the State, surrounding its actions with superstition and a feigned divine authority.

It is true, the modern bourgeois State has shown a remarkable tendency toward degrading marriage to a merely civil contract, and has, in fact, achieved great success in this direction, after it has of late taken into its hand all matrimonial affairs, to regulate them by its own legislation and to the exclusion of ecclesiastical interference. It has assumed this attitude in full consistency with the divorce it made from religion, and the unbounded absolutism which it professes and which it was taught by extreme modern liberalism, that very liberalism which, like socialism, is based on atheism or materialism.

With this tendency of the modern State, however, the Church has not co-operated, but has, on the contrary, condemned and combated it in many

ways. The latest proofs thereof are the Syllabus of Pius IX and the Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII on Christian Marriage. Nor could she do otherwise. For she finds in Scripture itself a most sublime, a divine idea of matrimony expressed and unfolded, which is totally different from that drawn up by unbelieving liberalism. Marriage, according to the words of Christ Himself related in the Gospel, is an institution of God, the Creator of human nature.

"Have you not read that He who made man from the beginning, *made them male and female?* And He said *for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh*" (*Matt.* xix. 4, 5).

Marriage according to the Christian conception is a contract, but one elevated to the dignity of a sacrament and sanctified by Christ; one whose object is not the gratification of lust, but the propagation and the education of the human kind; one which, for that purpose, man and woman freely enter into and by which they surrender to one another their bodies, acquiring equal mutual rights; one which it is in no man's power to dissolve.

"God created man to His own image, . . . male and female He created them. And God blessed them saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth" (*Gen.* i. 27, 28).

"The wife has not power of her own body, but the husband. And in like manner the husband also

has not power of his own body, but the wife" (1 *Cor.* vii. 4).

"They are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (*Matt.* xix. 6).

The duties of mutual love and assistance are very touchingly set forth by St. Paul. He tells the husbands:

"Love your wives as Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it. . . . So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife, loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ does the Church, because we are members of His body, of His flesh and His bones" (*Eph.* v. 25, 26, 28-30).

The duties of the wives conversely are defined by St. Paul in the following passages.

"Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord, because the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the Church. He is the Saviour of His body. Therefore as the Church is subject to Christ, so let the wives be subject to their husbands in all things."

"Let the wife fear her husband" (*Eph.* v. 22-24, 33).

This is not marriage as socialists characterize it; there is in it no sex-slavery, no oppression and tyranny on the part of the husband, no bondage

and degradation on the part of the wife, no commercial transactions and absence of mutual affection.

Christian wedlock is pure, ennobled, and elevated love, an institution that does not spring from economic condition, from lust and indigence, but from divine wisdom; that is calculated to bring happiness to those united by it and to promote the welfare of the human race; that, instead of being the play of human passions, is regulated and firmly held together by the will and law of God. It is the realization of a sublime divine idea.

Men, imperfect and subject to passions as they are, do not generally live up to great ideals, but remain in many respects far below them. Hence we can not expect that marriage among Christians has always attained to its ideal perfection; and it may with some reason be objected, that in our days it is farther than ever from its divinely intended beauty. But if this be so, where are the reasons of this decadence? In the atheistical teachings which in our days extinguish belief in God and respect for His law in the hearts of men; in the materialistic tendency which directs men to earthly goods and enjoyments as their supreme happiness; in the godless laws, which generally suppress religion and banish it from public life and, in particular, degrade the character of the matrimonial contract; in modern industrialism, which ignoring justice, charity, and the moral law in general, disrupts the family by

separating husband and wife, parents and children; in a word, in that liberalism and materialism, which are praised as the climax of modern enlightenment. In our day not the Christian religion but its suppression, is the cause of the unhappy marriages and the numberless divorces; not the Church, but her persecutors. On her part the Church has always upheld the sanctity and purity of matrimony, and defended its freedom and indissolubility against princes and governments as well as against the power of public opinion and the majesty of modern science. Nor has she struggled in vain. How great even to-day is the number of her faithful children, who contracting marriage and living in it in conformity with her laws, enjoy peace and happiness at their hearths and rear a pure and virtuous posterity, which is the hope of the human race!

CHAPTER III

THE FAMILY UNDER SOCIALISM

SECTION I

The Abolition of the Present Form of the Family

IF, as Karl Marx maintains, every historically developed social form is in a state of flux, the family must from age to age undergo continual transformations, to reach its final stage of development. And if, as socialists generally tell us, domestic society in its present form no longer answers the needs of the masses, but has become an impediment to freedom, happiness, and advancement, then its disappearance is instant in the near future, and the era of a new conjugal and parental life is already dawning. Socialist writers and speakers, when consoling the suffering laborer with this hopeful prospect, are very positive in their predictions. In this sanguine mood H. M. Hyndman writes:

"Breaking down and building up go on slowly together, and new forms arise to displace the old. It is the same with the family. That, in the German-Christian sense of marriage for life and responsibility of parents for children born in

wedlock, is almost at an end even now, . . . and must result in a widely extended Communism."*

Bax speaks with still greater clearness.

"Beneath throne, altar, and hearth, in their present form, all Socialists know that there lies the market. They know that the market is the bedrock on which the throne, the altar, and the hearth of the nineteenth century rest, and that this bedrock shattered, the said throne, altar, and hearth will be doomed."†

"The transformation of the current family-form, founded as it is on the economic dependence of woman, the maintenance of the young and the aged falling on individuals rather than on the community, etc., into a freer, more real, and, therefore, a higher form, must inevitably follow the economic revolution which will place the means of production and distribution under the control of all for the good of all. The *bourgeois* 'hearth' with its jerry-built architecture, its cheap art, its shoddy furniture, its false sentiment, its pretentious pseudo-culture, will then be as dead as Roman Britain."‡

The communist manifesto unhesitatingly affirms:

"The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter

*The Historical Basis of Socialism. p. 452. Quoted by Goldstein. Socialism. p. 147.

†Religion of Socialism. p. 136.

‡Ibid. p. 145.

of course, when its complement (prostitution) vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital."

Engels explains why and how the disappearance of the monogamous family will come to pass.

"We are now," he says, "approaching a social revolution in which the old economic foundations of monogamy will disappear just as surely as those of its complement, prostitution. Monogamy arose through the concentration of considerable wealth in one hand—a man's hand—and from the endeavor to bequeath this wealth to the children of this man to the exclusion of all others. This necessitated monogamy on the woman's but not on the man's part. Hence this monogamy of woman in no way hindered open or secret polygamy of men. Now the impending social revolution will reduce this whole care of inheritance to a minimum by changing at least the overwhelming part of permanent and inheritable wealth—the means of production—into social property."*

Socialist writers, of course, make no distinction between the bourgeois family and the Christian family, just as they make none between bourgeois and Christian marriage. Hence the Christian family also is expected to disappear with the communistic evolution of society.

*Origin of the Family. p. 91.

Section II

Marriage under Socialism

The present form of the family, then, will disappear; but it will pass away only to make room for another of greater perfection. For breaking down and building up go together, and in universal evolution the lower stage when disappearing introduces the higher.

To learn the nature of the new family that is expected to come in the final evolution of society, we must first establish what marriage, the nucleus of the family, will then be. From the objections made against marriage in bourgeois society, we may without difficulty guess of what kind it is hoped and desired it shall be in the co-operative commonwealth. It must be contracted without any economic considerations, so that love alone is its bond of union and vital principle; it must imply no inferiority of the woman, but guarantee to her equality with and independence of the man; it must, because it is a personal affair, be free from any legal restrictions or constraint; and finally, in order to remove the danger of adultery and prostitution, it must give full opportunity of sexual gratification. Such is evidently the ideal of marriage which socialist writers bear in their mind, when they denounce the monogamy of the capitalist era. And such ideal qualities, they are confident,

will inevitably develop in marriage after the abolition of private property and the introduction of collectivism.

Engels first essayed to show that this hope will be fulfilled.

All economic considerations will then cease. Instead of them love will become the bond of marital union and the only rule of sexual relations. This of course is not spiritual, but merely sex-love, which alone counts in a materialistic theory. Nevertheless, in his opinion, it will have a high standard and great intensity.

"Our sex-love is essentially different from the Eros of the ancients. In the first place it presupposes mutual love. In this respect woman is the equal of man, while in the antique Eros her permission is by no means always asked. In the second place our sex-love has such a degree of intensity and duration that in the eyes of both parties lack of possession and separation appear as a great, if not the greatest, calamity. In order to possess one another they play for high stakes, even to the point of risking their lives, a thing heard of only in adultery during the classical age. And a new moral standard is introduced for sexual intercourse. We not only ask: 'What is legal or illegal?' but also: 'What is caused by mutual love or not?' "*

Love under communism will be free; first of all in making marriage. In the era of capitalistic pro-

*Origin of the Family. p. 93.

duction, the marriage agreement, being according to bourgeois conception a contract, and even the most important one, was formally free and voluntary, in so much that without the consent of the contracting parties nothing could be done. But it was only too well known how this consent was obtained. Marriage remained a class marriage. But the ruling class remained subject to well-known economic influences, and, therefore, marriage by free selection could be seen only in exceptional cases. In the oppressed class alone love matches were the rule.

"Hence the full freedom of marriage can become general only after all minor economic considerations, that still exert such a powerful influence on the choice of a mate for life, have been removed by the abolition of capitalistic production and of the property relations created by it. Then no other motive will remain but mutual fondness."*

Men and women will be equal, and men will no longer have supremacy in marriage.

"The supremacy of man in marriage is simply the consequence of his economic superiority and will fall with the abolition of the latter."

"Remove the economic consideration that now force women to submit to the customary disloyalty of men, and you will place women on an equal footing with men."†

*Origin of the Family. pp. 95-99.
†Ibid. p. 99.

Marriage founded on sex-love will be monogamous, for "sex-love is exclusive by its nature." But it will under communism not be indissoluble.

"The indissolubility of marriage is partly the consequence of economic conditions, under which monogamy arose, partly tradition from the time where the connection between the economic situation and monogamy, not yet clearly understood, was carried to extremes by religion. To-day, it has been perforated a hundred times. If marriage founded on love alone is moral, then it follows that marriage is moral only as long as love lasts. The duration of an attack of individual sex-love varies considerably according to individual disposition, especially in men. A positive cessation of fondness or its replacement by a new passionate love makes a separation a blessing for both parties and society."*

Separation being thus left free when love ceases, and the equality of men and women being established, "humanity will be spared the useless wading through the mire of a divorce case," and prostitution and adultery will disappear.†

As to the new sexual relations which will thus arise under socialism, Engels makes the general remark:

"What we anticipate about the adjustment of sexual relations after the impending downfall of

*Ibid. pp. 99, 100.
†Ibid. pp. 91, 100.

capitalist production, is mainly of a negative nature and mostly confined to elements that will disappear. But what will be added? That will be decided after a new generation has come to maturity, a race of men who never in their lives have had any occasion for buying with money or other economic means of power the surrender of a woman; a race of women who have never had any occasion for surrendering to any man for any other reason but love, or for refusing to surrender to their lover from fear of economic consequences. Once such people are in the world, they will not give a moment's thought to what we to-day believe should be their course. They will follow their own practices and fashion their own public opinion about the individual practice of every person—only this and nothing more."*

Socialist literature, whether philosophical or popular, contains no disavowal of the free-love marriage as characterized by Engels in the preceding passages; what it offers to the reading public is but a reassertion and fuller explanation of its right and practice.

Bebel is of all contemporary socialists the most enthusiastic advocate of this new form of marriage. Freedom of love is according to him a demand of nature, not only for men but also for women, and will find its full realization in final society. To quote from his "Woman":

*Origin of the Family. p. 100.

"The woman of the future society is socially and economically independent; she is no longer subject to even a vestige of dominion or exploitation; she is free, the peer of man, the mistress of her lot."

"In the choice of love, she is, like man, free and unhampered. She woos or is wooed, and closes the bond from no considerations other than her own inclinations. This bond is a private contract, celebrated without the intervention of any functionary —just as marriage was a private contract until deep in the Middle Ages. (?) Socialism creates in this nothing new; it merely restores, at a higher level of civilization and under new social forms, that which prevailed at a more primitive social stage, and before private property began to rule society."*

"Seeing that all circumstances and conditions, which until then condemned large numbers of women to celibacy and prostitution, will have vanished, man can no longer superimpose himself."

"Matthilde Reichardt-Stromberg is of the opinion that if every woman were Lucretia Floriani, that is a great soul like George Sand, who draws her own picture in Lucretia Floriani, they should be free for the 'preservation of their equilibrium to quicken the circulation of their heart's blood in whatever way it may seem good to them.'

"Why should that be a privilege of the 'great souls' only, and not of the others also, who are not

*Woman. pp. 343.

'great souls,' and can be none? No such difference exists to us. If a Goethe and a George Sand—to take these two from the many who have acted and are acting like them—live according to the inclination of their hearts—and about Goethe's love affairs whole libraries are published that are devoured by his male and female admirers in wrapt ecstasy—why condemn in others that which, done by a Goethe or a George Sand, becomes the subject of ecstatic admiration?"*

As the choice of love, so is intercourse between those that love one another absolutely free and untrammeled by any law, the latter being but the consummation of the former and a merely private concern.†

The free-love marriage is also according to Bebel dissolvable.

"If incompatibility, disenchantment or repulsion set in between two persons that have come together, morality commands that the unnatural and, therefore immoral, bond be dissolved."‡

The equality of man and woman as to rights of every kind, the latter's complete independence of the former, is, in Bebel's opinion, the final goal of social development, the object for which socialists fight.

"Of all existing parties in Germany, the Social Democratic Party is the only one which has placed

*Woman. pp. 344, 345.
†Ibid. p. 343.
‡Ibid. p. 344.

in its programme the full equality of woman, her emancipation from all dependence and oppression. And the party has done so, not for agitational reasons, but out of necessity, out of principle. *There can be no emancipation of humanity without the social independence and equality of the sexes.**

"The complete emancipation of woman and her equality with man is the final goal of our social development, whose realization no power on earth can prevent; and this realization is possible only by a social change that shall abolish the rule of man over man."†

Similarly the Erfurt program demands the abolition of all laws which subordinate woman to man in public and private life.

Kautsky defends free sexual intercourse as moral.

"The same phenomena, say of free sexual intercourse or of indifference to property, can in one case be the product of moral depravity in a society where a strict monogamy and the sanctity of property are recognized as necessary; in another case it can be the highly moral product of a healthy social organism which requires for its social needs neither property in a particular woman nor that (property) in particular means of consumption and production."‡

*Ibid. pp. 5, 6.
†Ibid. p. 349.
‡Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History. p. 193.

Kautsky, moreover, regards full individual freedom in regard to sexual relations as a problem which a proletarian régime has to solve.

"The capitalist mode of production has created the problem of organizing the social process of production on a homogeneous and systematic basis. This problem involves a fitting in of the individual into a fixed order, to whose regulations he has to accommodate himself. On the other hand, the same mode of production has brought the individual more than ever to self-consciousness, placed him on his own feet, and divorced him from society. More than ever people demand to be allowed the opportunity of developing their own personality, and of determining their relations to each other, and that the more freely, the more delicate and individual those relations are; thus in the first place, their marriage relations; also, moreover, their relations as artists and thinkers, to the outside world. The regulation of the social class and the emancipation of the individual, those are the historical problems which capitalism has placed before society. They appear to contradict each other; yet they admit of simultaneous solution, because each of them concerns different fields of social life."

"*Communism in material production, anarchy in the intellectual*—that is the type of Socialist mode of production, as it will develop from the rule of the proletariat."*

*On the Morrow of the Social Revolution. pp. 38, 40.

In the literature of the German Social Democracy the same tenets are frequently set forth. As their stanchest advocates we may mention J. Stern (Thesen über den Socialismus), A. Hoffmann (Die Zehn Gebote und die Besitzende Klasse), Koehler (Der Socialdemokratische Staat), and L. Gumplowicz (Ehe und Freie Liebe), who finds no reason for condemning those men and women who under socialism might be prompted by love to practise polygamy or polyandry.

Women still more clamorously insist on their right of free-love.

Oda Oldberg demands not only that women be not debarred from motherhood, no matter whether they have a certificate of marriage or not, but also that for that purpose abortion be left free to them.*

The English socialists Morris and Bax in their joint work, "Growth and Outcome of Socialism," concur with Engels and Bebel and other German Social Democrats in their opinion concerning marriage. To quote:

"As to the particulars of life under the Socialistic order, we may, to begin with, say concerning marriage and the family that it would be affected by the great change, firstly in economics, and secondly in ethics. The present marriage system is based on

*See Dr. E. Kaeser, Der Sozialdemokrat Hat das Wort. 3rd Edition. Freiburg 1905. pp. 191-200. Stimmen aus Maria Laach. 1907. Drittes Heft. pp. 267-284.

the general supposition of economic dependence of the woman on the man, and the consequent necessity for his making provision for her, which she can legally enforce. This basis would disappear with the advent of social economic freedom, and no binding contract would be necessary between the parties as regards livelihood; while property in children would cease to exist, and every infant that came into the world would be born into full citizenship, and would enjoy all its advantages, whatever the conduct of its parents might be. Thus a new development of the family would take place on the basis, not of a determined life-long business arrangement, to be formally and nominally held to, irrespective of circumstances, but on mutual inclination and affection, an association terminable at the will of either party. It is easy to see how great the gain would be to morality and sentiment in this regard. At present in this country (England) at least, a legal and quasi-moral offence has to be committed before the obviously unworkable contract can be set aside. On the Continent, it is true, even at the present day the marriage can be dissolved by mutual consent; but either party can, if so inclined, force the other into subjection, and prevent the exercise of his or her freedom. It is perhaps necessary to state that this change would not be made merely formally and mechanically. There would be no vestige of reprobation weighing on the dissolution of one tie and the forming of another.

For the abhorrence of the oppression of the man by the woman or the woman by the man . . . will certainly be an essential outcome of the ethics of the New Society."*

We see that in one point these two authors improve on Engels and Bebel. They do not require for the dissolution of the marriage-tie the consent of both husband and wife, as German socialists do, but regard the will of either party as sufficient.

In his novel "News from Nowhere," published serially in the "Comrade" (November, 1901-May, 1903), Morris gives a pictorial representation of the love relationship to come into existence under the free conditions of socialist society.†

Edward Carpenter, the founder of "London Justice," in his latest book, "Love's Coming of Age," in strong terms asserts the necessity of free woman and of free-love.

"Here there is no solution except the freedom of the woman—which means of course also the freedom of the masses of the people, men and women, and the ceasing altogether of economic slavery. There is no solution which will not include the redemption of the terms 'free woman' and 'free-love' to their true and rightful significance. Let every woman whose heart bleeds for the sufferings of her sex, hasten to declare herself and to constitute herself, as far as she possibly can, a

*The Growth and Outcome of Socialism. pp. 299, 300.
†See Goldstein. Socialism. pp. 160-163.

free woman. Let her accept the term with all the odium that belongs to it, let her insist on her right to speak, dress, think, act and above all to use her sex, as she deems best; let her face the scorn and ridicule; let her 'lose her own life' if she likes; assured that only so can come deliverance, and that only when the free woman is honored will the prostitute cease to exist."*

Carpenter's work was published in Chicago by Chas. H. Kerr & Co., in 1903, and brought to the book market with a high recommendation by Leonard D. Abbott in the "Comrade." He called it as suggestive and noble a treatment of this subject, from the socialist point of view, as has yet appeared in the English language. His criticism was endorsed by other reviewers.

Marion Craig Wentworth says of the book in the "Socialist Spirit" (Chicago), November, 1902:

"This is a comprehensive and philosophical treatise on sexual science and marriage. Like all of Edward Carpenter's productions, it is written from high ground. There is no doubt that as soon as woman is free politically and economically, the marriage relation will undergo a radical change. For a comprehension of the possible lines upon which such changes may be worked out one may well turn to this little book of Mr. Carpenter's.

*Love's Coming of Age. Chicago 1903. p. 62. Quoted by Goldstein. Socialism. p. 156.

It is a real contribution, and the emancipated should not fail to have it on their book shelves."*

The publisher introduces the fourth edition, 1906, to the reading public with the following commendatory words:

"This work is undoubtedly the most satisfactory work that has thus far appeared on the relation of the sexes under the coming social order, and on rational sex ethics during the period of transition."†

Chas. H. Kerr, from whose pen are the preceding lines, in one of his red pamphlets gives to loving couples the following lesson on marriage:

"Now a word about marriage. Because I have said that many wives are in the position of slaves, I do not want you to think that I would for a moment advise you and your sweetheart to do without the marriage ceremony. Some time, when the working class get the power, they will change the marriage laws so as to make them just. That is true, and it is also true that the love is what makes your union sacred and the ceremony has nothing to do with it. But remember that you have to live among people who do not understand these things, and the chances are a thousand to one that they will make you unhappy in one way or another if you do not have the ceremony performed."‡

The foregoing quotations show that free-love

*Quoted by Goldstein. Socialism. pp. 155, 156.
†What to Read on Socialism. Nov. 1906. p. 29.
‡The Folly of Being Good. p. 22.

marriage is by no means unknown or unsavory to American socialists. It is true, the press has heretofore on this point been more guarded in this country than in Germany, undoubtedly from fear of offense. But now that the writings of Engels, Bebel, Morris, Carpenter, are circulating widely, less caution is necessary. The intellectual leaders grow bolder in their writings, and among the rank and file not a few begin to appreciate the new marriage theory.

In the National Convention of the Socialist Party in Chicago, 1904, the question of monogamy was discussed by the women delegates in a special meeting, of which the *Chicago Interocean,* May 3, 1904, gives the following report:

"There are about twenty-five women delegates to the convention, many of them from Montana, Colorado and Wyoming, where the polls are open to women."

"The question of monogamy has been of interest to the women delegates and came up before them at their convention held on Saturday. Yesterday the subject was much discussed about the hall, though it did not come up for general debate. 'Women should be financially independent of men, and in socialism this is possible,' said Luella R. Kraybill, the State Organizer for Kansas, who comes from Coffeyville. 'Women now marry for homes, but if they were independent they would marry for love. We Socialists believe that only

magnetic attraction and soul affinity justify marriage. If after marriage they learned that they had made a mistake, they should go before a justice and be divorced merely by signifying their mutual agreement to the divorce. Then they should try again, but with some one else.' 'We believe in marriage, but believe in divorce, and not a monogamy only for men, as is the imperfect monogamy of to-day. Where a woman had more children than she could care for, the State should support them. But with marriage limited to soul attraction, a person, either man or woman, might find but one person in a lifetime that either one would care to marry.'

" 'Home ties nowadays are nothing but a matter of home economics,' said Mrs. Corrine Brown. 'Under Socialism a woman would be entitled by three hours' work each day, to her food, clothes and shelter. She would marry for affection only, because she would not have to marry for support, which would bring about a higher ideal of home life and a strengthening of home ties.' "

We see, then, that free-love has outgrown the stage of a mere theory and has already become an object of ardent desire. Nay, proceeding still further, it has commenced to pass over into practice, not only secretly but openly.

Section III

Free-Love Actually in Practice

According to Engels, the proletarian family is no longer strictly monogamous. Love in man's relation to woman can become and in fact becomes the rule among the oppressed classes, the proletarians of our day, no matter whether this relation is sanctioned or not.

Among them the fundamental conditions of classic and bourgeois monogamy are abolished; its real foundation, property, is missing; civil law not caring for the laborer or being useless for him, the relations between husband and wife cease practically to be legal and become personal; the woman, having obtained an independent position, has regained the right of separation; and if a couple can not agree, they separate without any interference of civil or ecclesiastical authority.*

Thus to the socialist mind freer sexual relations are actually developing in the bosom of decaying capitalist society and preparing a stage of higher and more ideal married life, the only bond of which consists in free-love.

We can not admit as an established fact that nowadays among the working classes free-love with private divorce, whenever the married parties agree to it, is generally prevalent. There is among them

*Origin of the Family. pp. 86, 87.

still too much love for the family and especially for their children, too much moral sense and conscience to allow wedlock to fall to so low a level. This is especially the case where religious convictions, however much weakened they may be, have not yet entirely died away. Whether and how far among the socialist proletarians free-love and private divorce are in vogue it is difficult to ascertain, for it is in the nature of such practices that they are withdrawn from public attention. But if socialist leaders themselves unreservedly assert that they in fact prevail, or are beginning to prevail among their comrades, we are compelled to believe their word. Should they exaggerate, we must leave it to those whose morals are wrongly characterized to correct their leaders' assertions and to re-establish their reputation before the world.

One fact, however, is certain beyond all doubt, and known to the whole civilized world: the fact, that among the higher strata of contemporary socialists, free-love marriages have existed and are still existing, not secretly, but publicly, and with the full approval of the party press or party leaders.

The first marriage of that kind was that of Karl Marx's daughter Eleanor with Edward Aveling. Eleanor was the most prominent woman socialist ever known, who devoted her extraordinary talents to the interests of socialism. Having imbibed the teachings of her father, she believed in atheism,

economic determinism, and free-love. In the early eighties she made the acquaintance of her father's friend Edward Aveling, who gained a national reputation by translating Marx's "Capital" into English. He, too, was an atheist and believer in free-love. Thus harmonizing in their views, they fell in love and lived together as husband and wife, in accordance with the socialist morals of unconventional intercourse of the sexes, and with the full knowledge of Marx and the other leaders.

Aveling and Eleanor worked together in the socialist movement. In 1886 and 1887 they made, together with Liebknecht, a fifteen-weeks' tour in the United States, under the auspices of the Socialist Labor Party, and addressed about fifty meetings in the principal cities of the Union.

But it came to pass that Aveling's love faded away. Mrs. Caroline Corbin relates in "Labor and Capital," April, 1903, that at the death of his legal wife, an aged and invalid woman living in the meantime in London, Aveling married another woman and discarded Eleanor. The latter's fondness remaining unabated, a tragic catastrophe erelong ensued. Eleanor, disgusted with the world, committed suicide; Aveling, sex-crazed and filled with the unrest of an irreligious spirit, soon after followed her in death.*

Socialist writers have never disproved these facts,

*See Goldstein. Socialism. pp. 245-252.

but only attempted to make socialism unanswerable for them.

A more striking instance of a free-love marriage came to public notice in the spring of 1906, when the Russian socialist Maxim Gorky landed in New York as a refugee from his country. On his arrival it was reported that Madame Andreiva, who accompanied him as his wife, was his mistress only, and not his legal consort. When on this account general indignation arose against him, and, in consequence, he and his lady companion were debarred from better society, the socialists raised their voice in the press, not to deny the fact of bigamy, but to justify their matrimonial relations by the right and sacredness of free-love.

Eugene V. Debs wrote in the "Worker," April 28, 1906:

"With open arms and hearts attuned to love and greeting, we of the proletariat welcome Maxim Gorky and his wife to these shores."

"Christ-like is his love for the lowly and despised and his sacrifice of self, and Christ-like his persecution by the heartless pharisees."

"Had Gorky been an intellectual prostitute, he would be the social lion of the hour, especially here in the United States, and every door of the 'upper classes' would swing inward at his touch. But through all the fiery ordeals that have fallen to his lot he has preserved inviolate his mental and moral integrity; he has fought bravely and unflinchingly

the battle of the oppressed and heavy-laden of the earth."

"Bold and intrepid champion of social justice and passionate lover of freedom, the ruling class, to whom he has never crooked the knee, must find some excuse to pour their garbage upon his head and so they, arch-hypocrites that they are, affect to feel shocked at some irregularity alleged to have been discovered in his domestic relations, and now raise the cry that he is unclean."

"No wonder their refined sensibilities are shocked by the advent of genius, healthy, moral and sane, in full possession of all the virtues, nobility of soul, loftiness of mind and purity of heart; no wonder they bar the doors of their harems and hostelries and draw the blinds in dread and fear of a fresh and purifying breath of moral atmosphere."

Clarence Meily writes in the Toledo "Socialist":

"Wherein lay Maxim Gorky's fault? What is the height and front of this most serious offending? It is not far to seek. By placing a woman not his legally wedded wife in an accredited position, acknowledging her before the world as his intimate and beloved, he struck an unforgiveable blow at that most sacred and most dismal of human relations, the bourgeois marriage. The typical bourgeois marriage . . . is a pure expression of property interests. Ownership, the lust of accumulation and the desire to transmit the prestige of

power and property to descendants, in a word, the instinct of class preservation, is its occasion and its object."

"Proletarians, who have been generously relieved of all property rights and interests by the capitalist class, are at the present time alone free to contract ideal unions based solely on mutual love and terminating with their *raison d' etre.* But a proletarian system of conjugal relations is impracticable and dangerous so long as the institution of private property preserves woman's economic dependence upon man, and besides, in any event, would be fatal to the hereditary proprietorship. Indeed, in the general loosening of the marital bonds bemoaned by religious doctrinaires at the present day, may be traced a direct effect of the decadence of capitalistic property. And it was as a prophet, who was in advance of his era, that Gorky 'sinned' and suffered."*

This time the socialists found a stanch defender in Professor Giddings of Columbia University, who, struggling against the current of public opinion, wrote in the "Independent," April 26, 1906, the following lines in favor of the persecuted Russian couple.

"They (Maxim Gorky and Andreiva) insist that it is not right to set up a technical legal relationship, an economic convenience, or a circumstance of social conventionality as morally superior to the spontaneous preference of a man and woman

*Quoted by the Worker. June 16, 1906.

who know, and whose friends know, that they love each other. In this belief Gorky and Madame Andreiva are not singular. In whole or in part it has been held and taught by some of the best men and women that have yet lived."

Having mentioned as such authorities Dante, Petrarch, John Milton, Shelley, Goethe, Richard Wagner, John Stuart Mill, George Eliot, Herbert Spencer, he concludes:

"Perhaps all these eminent persons, being gifted beyond most of their fellow men, were a little bit cracked in the head, and altogether unsafe. That, we know, is the charitable view which is taken by conventional folk that have not been able to understand or to agree with them. Be that as it may, they all in their day and generation stood for the sort of thing that Gorky and Madame Andreiva stand for to-day."

An instance nearer home and in some way more interesting than Gorky's is that of Ferdinand P. Earle. This gentleman, a wealthy artist and socialist of Monroe, N. Y., was, whilst studying art in Paris, married to a French lady. But in June, 1907, he discovered that not she, though his legal wife, was his affinity, but a certain Miss Kuttner, with whom he was associated in socialistic work. To her, he found out, he was married already before they were born. Having explained to his wife this condition of their matrimonial relations and having induced her to separation, he sent her with their

two-year-old son, Harold, back to France, there to obtain a divorce and thus to make a legal marriage with his "affinity" possible. When these proceedings became known, not only a disagreeable discussion followed in the press, but also a very clearly outspoken indignation among his townspeople in Monroe. The socialists, as they are used to do on such occasions, came forth to rescue their persecuted comrade. Mr. Earle had stated that he did not believe in free-love. But to this his defenders paid no attention. And rightly so. For affinity and marriage before birth are too plainly but the invention of blind love. Hence they grounded his justification on the rights of free-love, alleging that marriage is a private contract, that it must be cemented by love alone, that when love grows cold, it becomes immoral and must be dissolved, and that according to this rule and standard marital relations will and must be regulated in future society.

Such was the view taken by the "New Yorker Volkszeitung" in its daily issue September 10, 1907, and in its weekly edition, September 15. "The Worker," September 14, 1907 had a defense of Mr. Earle written by Leonard D. Abbott in which we read:

"This is likely to become a historic case. In the long stretch of the centuries the marriage institution is constantly in process of modification. It is evolving toward something higher. Upon certain

individuals the brunt of this evolutionary process falls. They become, by sheer force of temperament and circumstances, the scapegoats who have to carry the disgrace and odium attaching to new moral standards, imperfectly understood. Ferdinand Earle is such a one."

"Let us never forget that all the hubbub in this now famous case has come from the newspapers, the public, and from outraged sentiment. The three parties immediately concerned are friends, and are acting in mutual agreement. All three believe that marriage may rightly be dissolved when the two parties to the marriage contract so decide. They feel that it is immoral to perpetuate the husk of a relation, when the essence is gone. I think that the future will vindicate that position."

"Goethe, Shelley, Byron, Richard Wagner, all trampled on conventional moral codes much more defiantly than Earle has done. The world has justified them. I venture to prophesy that, in years to come, it will justify Earle."

The outcome of F. P. Earle's marriage was a sad disappointment to the patrons of free-love. Very soon the espoused affinity complained of ill-treatment by the once love-crazed husband and, before two years of matrimonial life had elapsed, she asked in court for divorce from him on the plea of insanity.

The most remarkable free-love marriage, however, which America has witnessed is that of the

most eloquent advocate of pure and lofty morality in the Socialist Party—George D. Herron with Miss Carrie Rand.

G. D. Herron was at one time a minister of the Congregational Church in Burlington, Ia., and later Professor of Applied Christianity at Grinnell University. The foundation of this chair by Mrs. E. D. Rand had for its purpose the development of social philosophy and economics from the teachings of Christ. Whilst professing this science, he together with Rev. William Bliss and Professor R. T. Ely promoted "Christian Socialism." In the summer of 1894, he with Professor Ely organized at Chautauqua, N. Y., the "American Institute of Christian Sociology," which was designed to furnish literature and propaganda for the Christian socialist movement. But as his teachings were found to be in conflict with the views of the university, he was forced by the authorities to resign, and his chair was abolished. His resignation also put an end for the moment to the movement of Christian socialism in America. In 1900 G. D. Herron made an open declaration for revolutionary socialism at a mass meeting held by the Socialist Democratic Party in Chicago, and since that time, having completely severed his connection with the Church, has thrown himself with heart and soul into the work of the Socialist Party.*

*Hillquit. History of Socialism in the United States. p. 321. Goldstein. Socialism. pp. 256, 258.

One year before his ordination as a minister of the Congregational Church, Herron married Miss Mary Everhard of Ripon, Wis. Her faithfulness was always unequivocally and warmly acknowledged by him. Five children were born of their union. Nevertheless he was divorced from her on March 21, 1901 and in the following May married Miss Carrie Rand, the daughter of the foundress of his chair at Grinnell University and a member of his congregation in Burlington. The Congregational Church of Grinnell called a council to advise concerning the membership and ministerial position of Herron. It convened on June 3, 1901 and was attended by ten churches. A committee appointed presented a statement in which it was maintained, that the divorce proceedings, while brought in the name of Mrs. Herron as plaintiff, were in fact instituted by Mr. Herron and against her wish and protest; that divorce was granted by the court in Algona, Ia., because Mr. Herron had without cause and excuse deserted his wife and was guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment as seriously to impair her health and endanger her life; and that for nine years before the divorce was granted he had been on terms of friendship and intimate association with Miss Carrie Rand. The Council found Herron guilty of "immoral and unchristian conduct" and excluded him from the Church and the ministry of the Gospel; which sentence, however, it did not pronounce with-

out having given him a chance of defending himself.*

For this purpose G. D. Herron had sent a letter to the Grinnell Church Committee dated New York, May 24, 1901. In this he denied neither his divorce from his former wife nor his association with Miss Carrie Rand, but justified his conduct on two grounds. The first was the immorality of modern marriage, a passage referring to which we have already quoted in the preceding chapter. The other ground was the morality of free-love. His views on this point are for us at present of paramount interest and deserve to be reproduced in his own words.

"I thoroughly believe in the vital and abiding union of one man with one woman as a true basis of the family. But we shall have few such unions until we have a free family. Men and women must be economically free—free to use their powers to the fullest extent—free from interference of legal and ecclesiastical force, and free to correct their mistakes, before we can have a family that is noble, built on unions that are good. Lives that are essentially one, co-operative in the love and truth that make oneness, need no law of state or church to bind or keep them together. Upon such, the imposition of force is a destruction and a blasphemy. On the other hand, no law in the universe has a right to keep together those who are not vitally and

*Goldstein. Socialism. pp. 257, 263; 287, 288.

essentially one. It is only in freedom that love can find its own, or truth blossom in the soul, or other than a slave-individuality unfold. It is the business of society to see to it that every child is surrounded by full and free resources of a complete life; it is the business of society to see to its own fatherhood and motherhood of every child, as well as to hold every parent responsible; it is the business of society to know every child of woman as a free and legitimate child of God and welcome it as an inheritor of the reverence (revenues?) and resources of the earth; but it is not the business of society to unite and separate man and woman in marriage relation. Love must be set free and liberty must be trusted, if noble and beautiful homes are to spring up to make the earth a garden of truth and gladness. The coercive family system is filling the earth with falsehood and hypocrisy, misery and soul-disintegration, and is perpetuating the morality of slaves and liars. In times past, men have thrown away their lives in protest against what seemed to them tyranny and wrong. There is a new world coming whose way can be made ready only by those who will throw away their good names and accept, perhaps, everlasting disgrace, as the price of their protest. And if I willingly accept all the obloquy and retribution which church and society may visit upon me, in making a protest against a system that seems to me destructive to all true morality, and to the very citadel of the soul's

integrity, then my protest has earned its right to be heard."*

G. D. Herron's marriage with Miss Carrie Rand, we must infer, was a free-love marriage. As such it was, indeed, announced in New York City, May 25, 1901, on the morrow of the day on which the letter to the Grinnell Church committee was written. Leonard D. Abbott gives, in the "International Socialist Review," July, 1901, under the caption 'A Socialist Marriage,' a report of its celebration; from which we quote verbatim:

"We were gathered together, we of the inner circle of comradeship, on the last Saturday evening in May. . . . The fragrance and blossoms of spring flowers seemed to transform our rooms into a fairy garden, and the strains of a primitive love melody, as they drifted to us, were full of mystery and love.

"Our comrade, George D. Herron, arose, careworn and sorrowful as one who has passed through the valley of the Shadow of Death, yet stronghearted and gladsome withal; and beside him stood Carrie Rand, clad in pure vestal white and bearing lilies-of-the-valley in her hand. 'We believe, friends, in fellowship,' he said, 'and because we believe that fellowship is life we have asked a few of you to let us share with you the fellowship and sacrament of the unity of life which we wish to now

*Int. Soc. Rev. July 1901. pp. 23, 24.

announce to you. For many years this unity of life has made us one in fact, but now we wish this unity to become manifest unto the world, and it is to announce to you this marriage of our souls, which is to us a reality before the foundation of the world* and which we can conceive of as having no ending, that we have asked you to kindly come together to-night.'

"Miss Rand responded: 'This is the day and hour which we have chosen to announce to you and the world our spiritual union, which is a fact in the heart of God.'

"The host of the evening, Dr. Charles Brodie Patterson, editor of the *Arena* and *Mind,* next made a brief address. Dr. Patterson was followed by the Rev. William Thurston Brown of Plymouth Church, Rochester, whose 'Annunciation Service' was a poem in prose. It seemed entirely fitting that this tried and true comrade, whose best labor and thought for many years has been given to the socialist cause, should be here to participate in the dedication of these two lives to the socialist movement. He said (in part):

" 'That which calls us here to-day is a sacrament. Not in any conventional sense, but in the elemental significance of the word—a significance which reflects the mind and being of the Eternal and the Infinite. Nowhere has the religious institution so

*This is still more wonderful than Ferdinand P. Earle's marriage with Miss Kuttner before their birth.

nearly approached the frontiers of vital truth as in conceiving marriage to be a sacrament. But nowhere has it departed so far from all that is divine and ennobling as in supposing that any word of priest or prelate can be sacramental. Neither statute nor official, civil or religious, can ever create this sacred thing. Neither has it the smallest sanction to give to that which is sacred, if at all, by the supreme fiat of a pure and perfect love. The divine is not in legislature or council, church or state. It abides for ever in human life. Human life alone incarnates God—and laws and civilizations are tolerable only in the measure of their recognition and service of that life.

" 'We are not here to establish a relationship which otherwise would not have been. We are not here to inaugurate or consummate a marriage. No words of ours or any one's can add to or take from the truth and solemnity of the divine fact of a reciprocal love uniting soul to soul by a sanction in presence of which all human enactments seem profane and impertinent, for this is the supreme sacrament of human experience. There is something about it which transcends all other things and proclaims its inherent divinity.

" 'Inasmuch, therefore, as George D. Herron and Carrie Rand are thus united together by the bond of a reciprocal love, I announce that they are husband and wife by every law of right and truth, and I bespeak for them the fervent benediction of all

true souls and the abiding gladness that dwells in the heart of God for ever.'

"As Comrade Brown had concluded, Mrs. Rand stepped forward, kissed George D. Herron and his bride, and, with a voice trembling with emotion, invoked blessing on their marriage.

"Each of the fourteen guests present was now invited to make a verbal offering to the consummation of this love union. Richard Le Galienne, a poet famous in two continents, spoke first.

" 'All the friends that Mr. and Mrs. Herron love,' he said, 'will love them forever, and will love them all the better because they have had the courage to stand up and say that they love each other and that love is all the marriage they need. I feel very honored that I had the opportunity of being present on this occasion, and only wish that I had had longer notice, in order to have prepared an epithalamium worthy of its dignity.'

"Two of the Social democratic comrades spoke next, emphasizing the fact that the marriage meant, above all, more complete consecration to socialism.

"The last speaker was Franklin H. Wentworth. 'Having shared the joy and sorrow, the trials and problems, of my comrades here,' he said, 'it is perhaps fitting that I should say the last word on this occasion, and that this word should be a word of personal affection and comradeship. And yet I must confess that the feeling of joy I have to-night re-

lates not so directly to them as to the cause, in the service of which we are all enlisted. . . . In the very fact that so large a number of persons as are here assembled can be inspired by the same ideal, I see a demonstration that the truth is beginning to force its way and dramatize itself in reference to every human institution. There seems in the gathering of such a company a hint of the dawning of the day when the spirit of freedom shall rule the world—freedom of the body, and freedom of the soul.'

"The gathering broke up and finally, as a sweet benediction, the bride herself took her seat at the piano and played to us for awhile, pouring out her soul in the interpretation of one of Beethoven's greatest sonatas, and as she played, the memory of a ghoulish press of human vultures, of slave marriage, of cruel capitalism, was blotted out. We saw only the New Life of Socialism, when the love that made this union holy shall be the only basis of marriage, and when this love, stretching out, shall embrace the common life of the world."*

Was not marriage plainly declared at this wedding feast to be independent of any civil or ecclesiastical law or authority? Was not free-love openly proclaimed as the only valid marriage bond, nay, was it not termed the only sacrament hallowing and consecrating matrimony, extolled as the only source, from which the right matrimonial relations can

*Int. Soc. Rev. July 1901. pp. 14-20.

spring, glorified as pre-eminently sacred and divinely sublime, as an efflux of the Eternal and Infinite (immanent in the world)? Was not free-love regarded moreover as essentially connected with socialism, as a more complete consecration to it, as a dedication to the socialist movement, and did not the wedding-feast present itself to the inner circle as a "vision of the New Life of Socialism, when the love that made this union holy shall be the only basis of marriage"?

G. D. Herron's feast found approbation far beyond the inner circle in New York City. When his divorce and re-marriage were discussed in the press, there were no socialist voices heard that reproved him, but many that defended him and endorsed the principle on which he acted. The Haverhill "Social Democrat" July 2, said:

"Herron has been quoted by the capitalist press as saying that he does not believe that the present marriage system is sacred or good. We repeat the same. The truth cannot be avoided even when dealing with questions of a most delicate nature."

"The marriage system to-day is based on impurity, on ignorance and on a big lie. People marry not for love; therefore modern marriage cannot be sacred."*

When the San Francisco "Call" had accused G. D. Herron and his friends of "viewing marriage loosely" and of "attempting to cancel the line

*Quoted by Goldstein. Socialism. p. 281.

that divides honesty from dishonesty," the " 'Advance,' the Official Organ of the Socialists of the Pacific Coast," held him up as a man who dared and dares to speak and live the truth.*

After an ovation which had been given to G. D. Herron at a lecture, the "Worker," May 19, 1901, said:

"The welcome received came not alone as a tribute to the man who has been on the firing line of the Social Revolution for several weeks, the victim of a pitiless persecution by an unscrupulous enemy, but also as an endorsement of the principles for the promulgation of which he has undoubtedly been made to suffer."†

In the issue of the "Worker," June 16, 1901, G. D. Herron's marriage is termed "morally and legally correct."‡

In a lecture delivered by W. T. Brown in the Plymouth Church, New York, and reported by the "Social Democrat," Haverhill, Mass., May 4, 1901, G. D. Herron is called the greatest prophet of modern times, who came from Minnesota to Burlington with a message which the world must hear and reckon with. Nay, he is likened to the divine Redeemer Himself.§

David Goldstein is witness to the fact that just

*Quoted. Ibid. pp. 281, 282.
†Quoted. Ibid. p. 282.
‡Quoted. Ibid. p. 284.
§Ibid. pp. 289, 290.

at the time when this sentiment of admiration for G. D. Herron was sweeping through the socialist press, the then editor of the Haverhill "Socialist Democrat," while addressing a public meeting in Boston, referred to him as the second Christ.*

The free-love marriage of G. D. Herron is in every respect of marked significance.

It met with the highest approval of the leaders of socialism and found in the socialist press public recognition; it was not only justified in principle, but glorified and clothed with all the luster that could render it sacred and attractive in the eyes of the world, while its connection with the socialist movement was unequivocally asserted.

The facts advanced by us, with the interpretation given of them by socialist writers, show to evidence that free-love marriage is even in this country not only approved and put into practice in several individual cases, but also demanded and expected to come into general usage.

*Ibid. p. 292.

Rev. E. E. Carr, in answering to the attack which Mr. Roosevelt in the "Outlook" made against G. D. Herron, dares to say that the latter never advocated free love or was a free-lover, and that his life history was rather a real tragedy than a crime. (Christian Socialist, April 1, 1909.)

Rives La Monte meets the ex-President with "the bare statement of the fact that Mr. Herron was legally divorced from his first wife and married to his second wife by a ceremony that is recognized as legal and binding by the laws of the State in which it occurred—New York." (Int. Soc. Rev., May 1909. p. 839.)

It still remains to inquire whether or not the sexual relations which are to prevail under socialism destroy marriage, understanding this in the proper sense of the word, as a social institution distinct from concubinage or promiscuity. To answer this question let us sum up the properties attributed to free-love marriage by prominent socialist authorities.

First of all, we are told, marriage is a merely private affair—subject to absolutely no law, whether human or divine; whether civil, religious, or moral.

Secondly, it has directly for its end not the general welfare of the human kind, but the well-being of two individuals united by love. Bebel assigns as the real object of conjugal union the gratification of the natural instinct, and the transmission of one's being in the propagation of the race.* The education of offspring, as we shall see presently, is positively excluded from the object of wedlock. It must indeed be so.

If marriage had any direct relation to the welfare of the race, to its proper propagation and education, and if it were not in regard to its end and object merely private and personal, socialists could not consistently except it, as they do, from law and authority.

Thirdly, husband and wife by the socialist marriage are absolutely equal and independent of each

*Woman. p. 87.

other, so that neither of them can claim any authority over the other, neither is subordinated to the other.

Fourthly, under socialism the real bond of union, the marriage tie, does not consist in mutual rights and duties, but in sex-love alone, and hence it follows:

Fifthly, that socialist marriage has no stability and indissolubility. For sex-love is of its nature changeable and unsteady; hence marriage too, if constituted by it, is devoid of firmness and permanency.

That sex-love, especially if absolutely free and independent, is, as a rule, changeable and whimsical, is proved by the experience of all ages and is manifest from its very nature. For it is a passion, and a very vehement one, innate in man's organic being, and hence shares, like all strong emotions, the changes to which the human organism is subject from within by its own inherent laws, and from without under the influence of environment. Socialists are not wanting who openly grant this fact and hence infer the unsteadiness of free-love marriage.

The German socialist Stern (in his "Thesen ueber den Socialismus"), speaking of marriage under socialism, admits that its purity can not be perfectly realized, and alleges as a reason thereof that man's inclinations, changeable as they are, must be allowed their free course.*

*See Dr. Kaeser. "Der Sozialdemokrat Hat das Wort." p. 192.

Gumplowicz (in his "Ehe und Freie Liebe") concedes that neither he nor anybody else can know how long marriage contracts based on love alone are apt to last in the average, whether for lifetime or even less than six months. He guesses that between these two extremes indefinitely many grades will co-exist, all of which will be regarded as legal.*

All socialists, however, do not agree with this view. Not a few of them maintain that love, once freed from economic influence and unconstrained by law, will gain a superior, nay a divine strength, so as to effect a lasting and inseparable union between spouse and bridegroom. G. D. Herron, in his letter to the Grinnell Church Committee, expresses his belief in a vital and abiding union of one man with one woman as a true basis of the family, but denies that such unions are generally possible otherwise than by free-love.

In the speeches delivered in the inner circle, where G. D. Herron celebrated his marriage feast, the union effected by free-love was termed spiritual —a divine sacrament, a divine fact, a fact in the heart of God; and it was maintained that there was something about it which transcends all other things and proclaims its inherent divinity, something sacred and divine, because the human life incarnates God.

These are, indeed, tender and lofty poetical ef-

*Cf. Ibid. p. 199.

fusions, but they can not do away with the stern realities of human life, nor can they undo the sad experience which mankind has had concerning human passions in general and that of sex-love in particular. Moreover, idealistic as they are, they sound rather absurd in the mouths of genuine socialists, who openly and unreservedly profess their belief in materialism and in the materialistic conception of history. Materialism and idealism are irreconcilable. From a mere organism, as man is supposed by materialists to be, from merely material forces and influences, beyond which nothing is admitted to exist, it is impossible to develop moral qualities and powers of a spiritual nature, much less a divine life. Again the passion of sex-love, which is essentially bodily and organic, if it is granted full freedom and is exempted from law, can not, according to its nature, become spiritual, but must needs wax ever lower, coarser and more licentious. G. D. Herron's and W. T. Brown's idealistic views can have a palpable meaning only in the supposition that they are taken in a pantheistic acceptation. But so understood they present another absurdity. For then they would imply that sex-love in its full and free development, that is, the very passion by which man is nearest to the brute, and which obeys reason only reluctantly, is identical with the supreme and infinite life of the deity.

According to all principles of reason and all ex-

perience, then, free sex-love can not give firmness and stability to marriage, but, on the contrary, if made the bond of union, renders it dissolvable at any time and by any stronger impulse of passion.

This being the case, how shall we specify the socialist marriage, which is subject to no law, implies no duties, has no principle of unity and authority, no end that refers to the general well-being of the human race, no permanence and stability? No doubt, these are altogether new sexual relations. Certainly we can not call them marriage, which in its common and proper acceptation is a lasting union of male and female for the purpose of propagating and educating the human race. It seems to come in its conception, nearest to restricted promiscuity. For under its laws, one man may at the same time enter into union with only one woman, but he may, as passion bids him, dissolve his union, and unite successively with any other woman. So, likewise, may one woman simultaneously unite with only one man, but may in the same manner successively unite with any other man, her former connections notwithstanding.

It would not seem that socialists could with good reason protest against this specification of their marriage. For Bebel* tells us, and others repeat his assertion, that man in his final development will return to the starting point, that is, to the primitive condition of mankind, the return, however, being

*Woman. p. 347.

effected upon an infinitely higher social plane than that from which he started. This general rule has been applied to the relation between man and woman in particular.* Now there was originally promiscuity. Consequently the new sexual relations under socialism will be promiscuity on a higher plane.

Section IV

Parental Society under Socialism

Marriage is the first of all societies. It results immediately from nature, and from it grow and develop the other societies which make up the family, which, in its turn, is the unit of the State. What shall become under socialism of the societies constituting the family, if marriage be abolished and in its place a refined and restricted promiscuity of the sexes be introduced? The question especially concerns parental society, the society of parents and children, which has for its purpose the physical, intellectual, and moral education of the latter. As soon as offspring is born, it arises by force of natural necessity from conjugal society, conceived as a lasting union of man and woman for the purpose of propagating and educating the human race. Yes, what will become of this society, if marriage, its natural basis, shall be overthrown in

*Woman. p. 343.

future society? Socialist philosophers give us a very plain answer. Children under socialism do not belong to their parents, but to society, and are not to be brought up by them, but by the community. This undoubtedly is tantamount to saying that parental society will disappear together with the stable monogamous family.

We have already quoted passages from socialist authors which contain such contentions; here we only recall them to the mind of the reader:

"The care and education of children," said Engels, "becomes a public matter. Society cares equally well for all children, legal or illegal."

Hyndman expressed the opinion that marriage for life and responsibility for children born in wedlock is almost at an end even now and must end in a widely extended communism. According to Bax "the transformation of the present family-form, founded as it is on the economic dependence of woman, the *maintenance of the young* and the aged falling on individuals rather than on the community, etc., into a freer, more real, and therefore a higher form must inevitably follow the economic revolution."*

Herron in his letter to the Committee of the Grinnell Church asserted:

"It is the business of society to see to it that every child is surrounded by the full and free resources of a complete life; it is the business of so-

*See above. p. 126.

ciety to see to its own fatherhood and motherhood, as well as to hold every parent responsible; it is the business of society to know every child of woman as a free and legitimate child of God and welcome it as an inheritor of the resources of the earth."*

Similarly B. Bax and W. Morris maintained that with the advent of social economic freedom "property in children would cease to exist and every infant that came into the world would be born into full citizenship and would enjoy all its advantages, whatever the conduct of the parents might be."†

Bebel states the socialist view on this point most clearly and positively, when he says:

"One of the principal tasks of the new social system will be the education of the rising generation in keeping with its improved opportunities. Every child that is born, be it male or female, is a welcome addition to society. Society sees therein the prospect of its own perpetuity, of its own future development. It, therefore, also realizes the duty of providing for the new being according to its best powers."‡

W. Morris, in a letter to Rev. W. Sharman, Preston, England, denies to parents both the right and the ability to educate their children.

"As to the matter of education," says he, "it is after all a difficult one to settle, until people's ideas

*See above. p. 147.
†See above. p. 135.
‡Woman. p. 324.

of the family are much changed; but in the meantime here is the problem: How is it possible to protect the immature citizen from the whims of his parents? Are they to be left free to starve his body or warp his mind by all sorts of nonsense; if not, how are they to be restrained? You see that one supposes in a reasonable community that experience will have taught the community some wisdom in such matters; but the parents may, and probably will, lack this experience. Well, then, hasn't the young citizen a right to claim his share of the advantages which the community has evolved? Must he be under the tyranny of two accidental persons? At present the law says yes, which means that the young citizen is the property of two accidental persons.

"Putting myself in the position of the immature citizen, I protest against this unfairness." "On the whole, experience has shown me that the parents are the *un*fittest persons to educate a child; and I entirely deny their right to do so, because that would interfere with the right of the child, as a member of the community from its birth to enjoy all the advantages which the community can give it. Of course, so far as grown people are concerned, I quite agree with your view of complete freedom to teach anything that any one will listen to. But for children I feel that they have as much need for a revolution as the proletarians have."*

*Quoted by D. Goldstein. Socialism. pp. 234, 235.

H. G. Wells writes in the "Independent," New York, November 1, 1906:

"Socialism involves the responsible citizenship of women, their independence of men and all the personal freedom that follows. It intervenes between the children and the parents, claiming to support them, protect them and educate them for its ampler purposes. Socialism, in fact, is the state family. The old family of the private individual must vanish before it, just as the old water-works of private enterprise, or the old gas company. They are incompatible with it. Socialism assails the triumphant egotism of the family to-day just as Christianity did in its earlier and more vital centuries. So far as English Socialism is concerned (and the thing is still more the case in America), I must confess that the assault has displayed a quite extraordinary instinct for taking cover, but it is a question of tactics rather than of essential antagonism."

"It is possible to believe that so far as the middle classes are concerned, this discretion, this delicacy, has been carried altogether too far. Socialists would have forwarded their cause better if they had been more outspoken. The middle class family, I am increasingly convinced, is in a state of tension. I believe that a modest but complete statement of the Socialist criticism of the family, and the proposed Socialist substitute for the conventional relationship, might awaken extraordinary responses at the present time."

Bebel likewise insists on the insufficiency of the parents for education as required by our advanced age.*

If wedlock has to be dissolved as soon as sex-love ceases between husband and wife, and if the bringing up of offspring is not one of the principal objects of this union, the transfer of the duty of education from parents to society is a necessary part of the socialist system. Who else but the community should take care of children born in extreme physical and moral need? And besides, in what manner could socialists better obtain an opportunity of ingraining their principles on the future generation than by claiming for their commonwealth the exclusive right of educating youth?

Bebel draws up a complete system of communistic education to be imparted in the future socialist society.

The child is to be taken care of even before its birth, by providing for the mother.

"The first object of its (the society's) attention must be the one that gives birth to the new being —the mother. A comfortable home; agreeable surroundings and provisions of all sorts, requisite for this stage of maternity; a careful nursing—such are the first requirements. The mother's breast must be preserved for the child as long as possible and necessary. This is obvious."†

*Woman. pp. 326, 327.

†Ibid. p. 324.

Then follows physical and mental education in public playgrounds, kindergartens and schools.

"So soon as in the society of the future the child has grown up, it falls in with other children of its own age for play, and under common surveillance. All that can be furnished for its mental and physical culture is at hand, according to the measure of general intelligence."

"The playgrounds and kindergartens are followed by a playful introduction into the preliminaries of knowledge and of the various manual occupations. This is followed up by agreeable mental and physical work, connected with gymnastic exercises and free play in the skating rink and swimming establishments; drills, wrestling and exercises for both sexes follow and supplement one another. The aim is to raise a healthy, hardy, physically and mentally developed race. Step by step follow the induction of the youth in the various practical pursuits—manufacturing, horticulture, agriculture, the technique of the process of production, etc.; nor is the development of the mind neglected in the several branches of sciences."

"The knowledge of natural things, introduced in a natural way, will spur the desire for knowledge infinitely more than a system of education in which one subject is at odds with another; and each cancels the other, as, for instance, when 'religion' is taught on one hand, and on the other natural sciences and natural history. The equipment of the

school rooms and educational establishment is in keeping with the high degree of culture of the new social order. All the means of education and of study, clothing and support are furnished by society; no pupil is at disadvantage with another."

"The parents themselves have the regulation of education in their hands; it is they who determine the measures that shall be adopted and introduced. We are then living in a thoroughgoing democratic society. The Boards of Education, which will exist, of course, are made up of the parents themselves—men and women—and those following the educational profession. Does any one imagine that they will act against their interests?"

But in these boards, one might remark, the majority will decide, and the boards themselves in all probability will not consist of all parents, but of their representatives. Hence the wishes and the interests of individual parents may in the co-operative commonwealth be neglected and counteracted just as well as they are in the modern town or city school-boards.

"Education must also be equal and in common for both sexes. Their separation is justifiable only in the cases where the difference in sex makes such separation absolutely necessary."

"The Socialist system of education, properly regulated and ordered and placed under the direction of a sufficient force, continues up to the age when society shall determine that its youth shall enter

upon their majority. Both sexes are fully qualified to exercise all the rights and fill all the duties that society demands from its adult members. Society now enjoys the certainty of having brought up only thorough, fully developed members, human beings to whom nothing natural is strange, as familiar with their nature as with the nature and condition of society which they join full-righted."*

Bebel's educational system is no mere theoretical conception. The socialist programs and platforms in their immediate demands are both an endorsement of the principles on which it is based, and an attempt to carry it out as far as the present social conditions allow, in order to prepare for its full execution in the future society. About this there can be no doubt.

The "Program of the Social Democratic Federation" in England, (revised in 1893) calls for "free secular and technical education compulsory on all classes, together with free maintenance for the children in boarding schools." The Erfurt Program advocates "secularization of the schools, compulsory attendance at the public schools, instruction, use of all means of instruction (books, etc.), and board free of charge in all public elementary schools, and in the higher institutions of learning for such pupils of both sexes as, on account of their talents, are judged fit for higher studies."

The Indianapolis platform of the Socialist Party

*Woman. pp. 325-330.

of America, in general, demands the education of all children up to the age of eighteen years, and State or municipal aid for books, clothing and food.

In the National Convention of the Socialist Party in Chicago, 1904, the Committee on the State and Municipal Program proposed the following suggestions as "a preliminary basis for the activity of the Socialist members in State legislatures and local administrations."

"Freedom of speech and expression of opinion by teachers and students."

"Free textbooks for teachers and pupils, uniform textbooks on all subjects to be furnished free to public schools, and to private schools on request."

"The choice of textbooks to be left to a committee of teachers and students in all institutions above the grade of high schools."

"In history and economics, the proletarian standpoint to receive equal consideration with the capitalist standpoint."

"Compulsory education for both sexes up to the age of eighteen years."

"Co-education in all branches of science, and manual training for both sexes to be continued throughout all grades."

"Extension of the public school system to assure equal educational opportunities to all classes in all branches of learning, public supervision of all

educational institutions to secure an equal educational standard."*

If these socialist demands were enacted into laws, religion and the Church would be excluded from the public school, and, where compulsory attendance at public schools should be generally prescribed by law, from all educational institutions without exception. The Church, as Kautsky reasons, ought in fact to be excluded from all schools.

"If religion is a private concern, . . . then the school is in consequence a purely secular institution. . . . To mix up instruction of the children with religious affairs would be a fundamental error. Therefore the co-operation of ecclesiastical persons in the work of instruction is inadmissible."†

That by such a system of education religious liberty is infringed on, is not admitted by Bax; on the contrary, religious teaching by the Church must, in his opinion, be suppressed in the name of true liberty of conscience. He says:

"The freedom to hold and to propound any proposition, however absurd, as a theory to be judged of, and rejected or accepted at the bar of Reason, is quite another thing from the liberty of the 'hot gospeller,' who claims to hold a speculative pistol to the ear of the ignorant and weak-minded people by threatening them with damnation if they reject his teaching. The one is of the essence

*Int. Soc. Rev. May 1904. pp. 679-681.

†Quoted by V. Cathrein. Socialism. p. 64. Footnote.

of real liberty, the other is the vampire of a dead liberty of conscience, which was only living and real when it was opposed to the positive power of the representatives of dogma over men's persons and lives. As Gabriel Deville well puts it: 'The aim of collectivity is to assure liberty to each, understanding by this the means of self-development and action, since there can be no liberty where there is material or moral incapacity of consciously exercising the faculty of will. . . . To permit by religious practices the cerebral deformation of children is in reality a monstrous violation of liberty of conscience, which can only become effective under the proscription of what at present passes muster for religious liberty, the odious license in favor of some to the detriment of all.' The vampire, bourgeois liberty of conscience, must in short be impaled, before true liberty of conscience can become a healthy living reality."*

After these explanations it will not be difficult to form an idea of the education to be given in the co-operative commonwealth and in general in any society where socialism is to rule after the seizure of public power. It is to be imparted to children from their tenderest years by appointed nurses, teachers, and officials, devoid of parental love and affection, on the plan of collective production. The instruction included in it must be exclusively secular, in harmony with socialist science, hence anti-Chris-

*Religion of Socialism. pp. 114, 115.

tian, godless, materialistic, pointing to no other end of human life than temporal welfare and earthly enjoyments, inculcating boundless love of freedom and independence instead of submission to law and authority, whether divine or human, civil or domestic.

Furthermore, socialistic society, since it claims exclusive teaching authority, renders instruction in any other doctrine and the imparting of any principles other than its own absolutely impossible, imposes its tenets and views on all with irresistible necessity and enforces invariable uniformity in the training and developing of all minds. Is this liberal promotion of general mental culture or is it tyranny exercised over the mind?

To come back to our main question—when education has been transferred to the community, is parental society still left in existence, or is it even possible? Plainly, it has no longer an object; for its real end, as understood from its very conception, is the education of offspring. But any society whatever vanishes, when the object for which it is formed ceases to be.

And even if its object did not entirely pass away, it could not maintain its existence. Men and women being entirely equal in rights, and the latter in no way subordinate to the former, as the Erfurt Program demands, it would lack authority and hence unity. Besides, children brought up by the socialist community through public educators, imbued with

love of freedom and independence, would lose all respect for parental authority. A society thus destitute of submission and subordination, unity and organization, could not exist for any length of time.*

There remains still another side of the family to be considered, the private household. Will it continue under socialism? There is no reason why it should. For the mere purpose of gratifying sex-love or of generation, a common household of man and woman is not required. It is necessary for the rearing of children by both parents and has at all times been inseparably connected with it. But under socialism, education, because it has become a function of the community, is no longer imparted by parents. Society, consequently, having all productive means in its hands and being entrusted with the physical education of children, is also destined instead of the parents, to provide the means for their sustenance and evolution by a communal administration.

But where there is no reason for its existence, the private household will not come into being. Evidently Engels reasons as we do when he writes:

"With the transformation of the means of production into collective property the monogamous family ceases to be the economic unit of society. The private household changes to a social industry. The care and education of children becomes a pub-

*Cathrein. Socialism. pp. 340-351.

lic matter. Society cares equally for all children, legal and illegal."*

There are, in addition, urgent reasons why the private household should not continue under socialism.

"Woman," as Bebel says and is generally concurred with by socialist writers, "shall be like man, a productive and useful member of society, equal-righted with him. Precisely like man she shall be placed in position to fully develop all her physical and mental faculties, to fulfil her duties and to exercise her rights. A free being and the peer of man, she is safe against degradation."†

With these rights and this independence of woman, it is incompatible that she should keep a private household for her husband and the children; and yet, unless she keep it, a household is impossible. Having equal rights with man, she must have also equal duties, and hence also take her share in the labor of socialized production. Now, if besides this share in common labor, and besides the burdens and duties which maternity imposes on her, she is to take care of a private household and to do most of the work required by it, she has no leisure and opportunity left to fulfil her duties and exercise her rights in public life, to develop equally with man her faculties and acquire higher

*Origin of the Family. pp. 91, 92.

†Woman. p. 182.

intellectual and artistic accomplishment. She remains in such a supposition decidedly inferior to the man, confined to the house, burdened with work, deprived of freedom just as in the gloomy era of capitalism.

Still another reason is urged by Bebel: The progress of modern industry and modern ideas runs counter to private households. The private kitchen is already supplanted by co-operative cooking, with a large central kitchen and machinery. The women attend the work by turns, and meals generally come out cheaper, taste better, offer a greater variety, and give much less trouble. Thousands of rich families live the whole year, or a part of the year, in boarding houses or hotels, without in any way missing the private kitchen. Also the central and corresponding steaming arrangements for public use, central heating, etc., are found highly profitable. The views regarding the natural calling of woman for housework have changed; the majority of women have discontinued many of the former occupations. A revolution has taken place in domestic life, by which the position of woman in the family is altered. She has become freer, more independent. Women nowadays start societies for all manner of objects, establish papers, call conventions, assemble in trades unions, join the organizations of men, have the right of suffrage.

"The trend, accordingly, of our social life," concludes Bebel, "is not to banish woman back to the

house and to the hearth. . . . *On the contrary, the whole trend of society is to lead woman out of the narrow sphere of the strictly domestic life to a full participation in the public life of the people*—a designation that will not then cover the male sex only—and in the task of *human civilization.*"*

As evolution never comes to a standstill, the revolution of the family must go still farther in future society, and the trend to lead out woman from the house into public life must finally result in her exemption from all domestic duties.

Kautsky in his commentary on the Erfurt Program, Stern and the socialists in general, with but few exceptions, fall in with Engels and Bebel. Socialist women like Lily Braun are anxious to see this emancipation from the slavery of the house carried into effect.†

What, then, is left of the family? Marriage has been replaced by free-love; parental society, when education has been transferred to the community, no longer exists, and the private household, owing to the emancipation of woman from the home, is abolished. If all the compound parts are destroyed, the whole is annihilated.

In the face of these facts, the assertion of socialists that they do not do away with the family, but raise it to a higher plane, sounds like irony.

*Woman. pp. 186, 187.

†See V. Cathrein. Stimmen aus Maria Laach. Jahregang 1907. Heft IV. pp. 387-401.

PART IV

Ethics of the State

CHAPTER I

IDEA OF THE STATE

Not only do individuals unite into families, but families combine into ever larger aggregates, until at last they form one large, self-sufficient, and independent body politic. The motive which leads to social unions is fundamentally the same in individuals and in families, being always the desire to gain by co-operation such means of livelihood and well-being as can not be obtained at all or only with difficulty by single-handed efforts. Individuals, however, unite for the purpose of providing for the propagation of their kind, the sustenance of their daily life, and the satisfying of their immediate needs, but families associate in order to procure and ensure all the means necessary for perfect well-being as far as it is attainable within the limits of this earthly life. Unions of individuals, to achieve the former end, constitute private associations; the union of families, to attain the latter, is the State. This common and obvious conception social science develops into the

more complete and exact definition: the State is the lasting union of families in a perfect and self-sufficient community, that is, in an independent social body sufficient to provide for its members all the means necessary for their entire temporal well-being.

The State, if such is its idea and such its end and object, must be conceived as having its origin in human nature itself. For it is their rational nature that irresistibly impels men, taken in their generality, to strive during their earthly existence after ever greater perfection and more complete well-being. It is their natural weakness that makes it impossible for them to achieve so difficult an object by individual efforts; it is their community of nature that inclines them to friendly intercourse and mutual assistance, and their natural faculty of speech that enables them to communicate with one another; and finally it is a necessary dictate of their reason that commands them to associate and co-operate for the attainment of a necessary end which they can not obtain singly.

The State, thus being an institution of nature, God is its founder; and for this very reason the rights and duties, the juridical relations, by which its members are united into one body politic, as also the end and object which they must pursue, are not determined by the will of men, but by a divine and unchangeable law. Likewise, as no society, and least of all the State, could pursue its end by the

harmonious co-operation of its members without a government, God, when He created man's social nature, ordained civil authority for the purpose of government, though He did not by the same act mark out the subject in which it is to be vested.

Such was the position of the Church and the teaching of philosophy during the whole Christian era. But modern liberalism, following in the wake of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau, attempted to revolutionize the Christian view. The State, it maintains, does not grow out of families but of individuals, and does not originate in nature, but in the free will of men. Accordingly its object is not fixed and necessary, but changeable according to times and circumstances; the juridical relations between it and its members are not established by a higher law, but by human agreement; and authority is not ordained by God, but created by the consent of the governed. Socialism has adopted the modern social view, so, however, as to modify it by the theory of social evolution and the materialistic conception of history. While it admits that social life existed with the beginning of the human race as an inheritance from animal ancestors, and that it was steadily developing throughout the course of human history, it maintains that a self-sufficient society, aiming at the perfect well-being of men, will come into existence only in the period of final evolution. The State which now exists and has existed for centuries is conceived only as a

later stage of human development, the stage consequent on the introduction of private property and the struggle between possessing and propertiless classes. It will disappear, therefore, as soon as productive goods shall be possessed in common, and production carried on under a collective management. Accordingly the present system of social ethics also will be abolished, to make room for more enlightened views, based on perfect economic conditions.

The socialist theory of civil society was worked out by Marx and Engels jointly and laid down in the latter's work "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," Lewis Morgan's "Ancient Society" being taken by them as the starting point and basis of their social speculations.

CHAPTER II

THE PRIMITIVE FORM OF CIVIL SOCIETY

For a complete understanding of socialist philosophers it is necessary to follow up the course of social evolution, as explained by them, from its very beginning. According to Engels the original form of society, common to all barbarians up to the time of civilization, was the gentile constitution.

"Gens in Latin, genos in Greek," says Engels, "specially designate that sex organization which boasted of common descent (from a common sire) and was united into a separate community by certain social and religious institutions, but the origin and nature of which nevertheless remained obscure to all our historians." From recent researches we know at present that it originated in time of primitive men. Among them "it consisted of all individuals who by means of the Punaluan marriage and in conformity with the conceptions necessarily arising in it made up the recognized offspring of a certain ancestral mother."*

As the father was uncertain in this form of family, female lineage and maternal right alone were valid.

The gens, as Engels further states, was an institution common to all barbarians and is found

*Origin of the Family, etc. p. 103.

among the American Indians as well as the Greeks, Romans, and Germans.

Among the Iroquois Indians the gentile constitution had the following essential features. The gens elected its sachem, the official head during peace, and its chief or leader during war; the former, whose office was in a sense hereditary, must be selected within the gens; the latter could be selected outside. The power of the sachem was of a paternal, purely moral nature, without means of coercion; the chief had the right to command only in times of war. Both the sachem and the chief could be retired by the gens at will.

Above them there was in each tribe a council, a democratic assembly of all male and female gentiles of adult age, invested with supreme power.

All the members of an Iroquois tribe were personally free and personally bound to defend each other's freedom and to afford to one another help, assistance, and protection. All were equal in rights and privileges, the sachem and chief claiming in this respect no superiority. Thus united, they were a brotherhood bound together by the ties of kin, and resting on the principle of liberty, equality and fraternity.

Property remained always within the gens; for this reason husband and wife could not inherit from one another, nor children from their father, for nobody was allowed to marry within the gens, and

children did not belong to the gens of the father, but to that of the mother.

Four or more gentes were united into a separate group, called phratries by Morgan, and several phratries formed a tribe.

Each tribe had a distinct territory, a distinct name, and a distinct dialect, common religious conceptions and rites, and a common council of the sachems and chiefs of the different gentes, who deliberated in public, surrounded by the rest of the tribal members. Its functions were solemnly to invest the sachems and chiefs elected, whom it had also a right to depose even against the will of the gens, to regulate the relations with foreign tribes, to receive and dispatch legations, to declare war and make peace. Kindred tribes formed leagues, sometimes under the pressure of necessity, sometimes permanently, thus making the first steps toward the formation of nations.

The gens was thus the social unit; from it the whole constitution of gentes, phratries, and tribes naturally developed. "All three of them are groups of differentiated consanguine relations. Each is complete in itself, arranges its own local affairs and supplements the other groups. And the cycle of functions performed by them includes the aggregate of the public affairs of men in the lower stage of barbarism."*

"How wonderful," exclaims Engels, "this con-

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 103-117.

stitution is in all its natural simplicity! No soldiers, gensdarmes and policemen, no nobility, kings, regents, prefects, or judges; no prisons, lawsuits, and still affairs run smoothly. All quarrels and disputes are settled by the entire community involved in them. Only in rare cases the blood revenge is threatened as an extreme measure. Our capital punishment is simply a civilized form of it, afflicted with all the advantages and drawbacks of civilization. No vestige of our cumbersome and intricate system of administration is needed, although there are more public affairs to be settled than nowadays; the communistic household is shared by a number of families, the land belongs to the tribe, only the gardens are temporarily assigned to the households. The parties involved in a question settle it and in most cases the hundred-year-old traditions have settled everything beforehand. There cannot be any poor and destitute—the communistic households and the gentes know their duties toward the aged, sick and disabled. All are free, the women included. There is no room yet for slaves, nor for the subjugation of foreign tribes."

"What splendid men and women were produced by such a society. All the white men who came into contact with unspoiled Indians admired the personal dignity, straightforwardness, strength of character and bravery of those barbarians."

"Such was human society and its members, before the division into classes had taken place. And a

comparison of that social condition with the condition of the overwhelming majority of present day society shows the enormous chasm that separates our proletarian and small farmer from the free gentile of old."*

Still this social organization was doomed. It did not pass beyond the tribe. The league of tribes marked its downfall.

From the American tribes Engels turns to the classical nations of the East. He finds society among the latter just as well as among the former based on the gentile constitution, though modified already in the heroic age.

"Greeks," he says, "Pelasgians and other nations of the same tribal origin were constituted on the same systematic plan as the Americans: gens, phratry, tribe, league of tribes. The phratry might be missing, as *e.g.*, among the Dorians; the league of tribes might not be fully developed in every case; but the gens was everywhere the unit. At the time of their entrance into history, the Greeks were on the threshold of civilization. Two full periods of evolution are stretching between the Greeks and the above named American tribes. The Greeks of the heroic age are by so much ahead of the Iroquois. For this reason the Grecian gens no longer retains the archaic character of the Iroquois gens. The stamp of group marriage is rather blurred. Maternal law had given way to paternal lineage. Ris-

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 117, 118.

ing private property thus made its first opening in the gentile constitution."*

The coincidence of the Grecian with the gentile constitution in the heroic age is said to be established by the following facts. A system of consanguinity, corresponding to the archaic forms of the gens, preserved among the ancient Greeks the mutual relation of all members of the gens, the gentile name having the function of preserving the memory of the common descent of its bearers. The phratry, which Homer mentions as a military unit, had the right and the duty to prosecute the death of a phrator, had common religious rites and festivals, had a common official head, common meetings with binding resolutions, common jurisdiction and administration. Kindred phratries formed tribes and these again combined into small nations, but in such a manner that gentes, phratries, and tribes preserved their full independence. The government was carried on by a permanent council (boule), the public meeting (agora), and the military chief. The council was originally composed of the gentile archons, but was later on, when the number of members had become too great, recruited by selection in such a way that the aristocratic element was developed and strengthened. In the public meeting every man could demand the word. The final vote was taken by hand raising or by acclamation. The decision thus reached was supreme and

*Origin of the Family, etc. p. 120.

final. The military chief was the leader of the army of the tribe or league, but had as such no civil or administrative functions.*

As deviations from the old gentilism, already existing in the heroic age Engels mentions:

"Paternal law and inheritance of property by the father's children, favoring accumulation of wealth in the family and giving to the latter a power apart from the gens; influence of the difference of wealth on the constitution by the formation of the first rudiments of hereditary nobility and monarchy; slavery, first limited to prisoners of war, but already paving the way to the enslavement of tribal and gentile associates; degeneration of the old feuds between tribes; a regular mode of existing by systematic plundering on land and sea for the purpose of acquiring cattle, slaves and treasures."†

Passing over from Greece to Italy, Engels finds the gentile constitution also in ancient Rome.

"The Roman gens is recognized as an institution identical with the Grecian gens. The Grecian gens being a continuation of the same social unit, the primordial form of which we found among the American Indians, the same holds naturally good of the Roman gens."‡

The gens among the Romans had common burial

*Ibid. pp. 120-129.
†Ibid. pp. 129, 130.
‡Ibid. p. 145.

ground, common religious rites, a common piece of land, the right to adopt strangers and to elect chiefs; the gentiles were prohibited to intermarry, were obliged to protect and assist another, and had the mutual right of inheritance, in accordance, however, with paternal law.

"Ten (Roman) gentes formed a phratry, named curia. . . . Every curia had its own religious rites, sacred possessions and priests. . . . Ten curiae formed a tribe, which probably had originally its own elected chief—leader in war and high priest—like the rest of the Latin tribes. The three tribes together formed the populus Romanus, the Roman people."

According to the first Roman constitution public affairs were conducted by the Senate composed of the chiefs (elders) of the three hundred gentes. The Senate, like the Athenian boule, had to give the final decision in many affairs and to undertake the preliminary discussion of more important matters, especially of new laws. The people, assembled in the comitia curiata, adopted or rejected laws, elected higher officers, and declared war and peace. By the side of the Senate and the assembly of the curiae stood the rex, corresponding to the Greek basileus, not as an absolute king, but as a military leader, high priest, and chairman of certain courts.

The Romans, therefore, at the time of the so-called kings lived in a military democracy based on

and developed from a constitution of gentes, phratries, and tribes.*

As to the ancient Germans Engels sums up the result of his researches in two statements. The first reads:

"It is an indisputable fact that the Germans were organized in gentes up to the time of the great migrations."

The second is:

"In general, the German tribes combined into nations had the same constitution that had developed among the Greeks of the heroic era and the Romans at the time of the so-called kings: public meetings, council of gentile chiefs and military leaders, who coveted actual royal power."†

The gentile constitution, Engels goes on to explain, notwithstanding its perfection, had in its bosom the germ of dissolution. As causes of its final extinction he regards the substitution of paternal for maternal law, the inheritance of property by the father's children, accumulation of wealth in the family, the introduction of slavery, the gradual formation of nobility. Its complete downfall, however, came with the advent of civilization. In Attica it was brought about by the revolution of Kleisthenes, 509 B.C. By the new constitution then adopted, the nation was divided instead of the territory; a large number of aliens,

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 145-155.

†Ibid. pp. 162, 175.

partly slaves, partly immigrants, were admitted to citizenship; the organs of the gentile constitution were displaced in public affairs, and a formidable force of bowmen on foot and horseback formed to exercise coercion over the citizens.*

In Rome gentilism was abolished by the constitution attributed to Servius Tullius. By it a new assembly was created, which included or excluded all members of the populus and the plebs according as they were enabled or not by their possessions to render military service. Thereby the old social order of blood kinship was destroyed, and a new one substituted which was founded on territorial division and wealth. The public power of coercion consisted of citizens liable to military duties, to be used against the slaves and the so-called proletarians who were excluded from military duty and general armament.

"The whole history of the Roman republic moves inside of this constitution: the struggles between patricians and plebs for admission to office and participation in the allotment of state lands; the merging of the patrician nobility in the new class of large property and money owners; the gradual absorption by the latter of all the land of the small holders who had been ruined by military service; the cultivation of these enormous new tracts by slaves; the resulting depopulation of Italy, which not only opened the doors to the imperial tyrants,

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 141, 142.

but also to their successors, the German barbarians."*

Among the Germans the gentile constitution disappeared in quite a different manner. The Roman state had under the empire become the worst oppressor and exploiter of its subjects; hence the Teutonic barbarians who conquered the provinces came as real liberators. But, in return for liberating the Romans from their own State, they appropriated two-thirds of the entire land and divided it among themselves. The distribution was made by gentile rules. As the number of conquerors was relatively small, large tracts remained undivided in the possession of the nation, the tribe, or the gens. But the longer the gens lived in its village, and the better Germans and Romans became amalgamated in the course of time, the more was the character of kinship replaced by territorial bounds.

The rapid loss of the bonds of blood in the gens, as a result of conquest, caused the degeneration of the tribal and national organs of gentilism. The rule over subjugated people does not agree with the gentile constitution. The German nations, masters of the Roman provinces, had to organize their conquests. But they could neither adopt the Romans as a body into their gentes, nor rule them by the help of gentile organs. A substitute for them had to be placed at the head of the Roman

*Ibid. pp. 156, 157.

administrative bodies that were largely retained in local affairs, and this substitute could only be another State. Hence the organs of the gentile constitution became State organs. The first representative of the conquering nation was the military leader, whose power, for the sake of the external and internal security of the territory, needed to be strengthened. Thus the moment arrived for the transition from war leadership to monarchy. On account of the wide expanse of the empire, the council of chiefs could not hold any more meetings, and was, therefore, displaced by the standing retinue of the king.

In the meantime the free land-owning peasants were exhausted and reduced to penury by continual civil feuds and wars of conquest. Their place in the army was taken by dependents of the new nobility, whilst they themselves, impoverished and unshielded by the royal power, had to seek the protection of the nobles or the Church. But to obtain it, they had to transfer the titles of their land to their patrons, from whom they received it back only in consideration of tithes and services. Once driven into this form of dependence, they gradually lost their individual liberty so much that most of them became serfs.*

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 181-190.

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE STATE

THE gentile constitution of society, which vanished in ancient Greece and Rome as well as among the Teutonic tribes with the advent of civilization, is said to have been succeeded by the State. Engels does not content himself with stating this as a historical fact, but inquires into the deeper causes which brought about the downfall of the old, and the rise of the new form of society. The inquiry is highly interesting; since it is calculated both to account for the origin of the State and to disclose its nature. He professes in advance to base his deductions not only on Morgan's "Ancient History," but also on Marx's "Capital."

Consistently with the materialistic conception of history, the real cause of the transformation of gentilism into the State is found in economic conditions. This is shown by the following reasoning. In the lower stage of barbarism production was carried on for consumption only, not for exchange. In the middle stage the possession of cattle already gave a regular surplus to the nomadic nations with sufficiently large herds. Thus a division of labor between nomadic and backward nations without herds came into existence, and, in consequence, also the conditions were furnished for a regular

exchange of goods. The upper stage of barbarism introduced a new division of labor between agriculture and handicrafts, resulting in the production of a continually increasing amount of commodities for the special purpose of exchange. Civilization not only intensified the established divisions of labor, by rendering the contrast between city and country more pronounced, but also added a third.

"It created a class that did not take part in production, but occupied itself merely with the exchange of products—the merchants. All former attempts at class formation were exclusively concerned with production. They divided the producers into directors and directed, or into producers on a more or less extended scale. But here a class appears for the first time that captures the control of production in general and subjugates the producers to its rule, without taking the least part in production. A class that makes itself the indispensable mediator between two producers and exploits them both under the pretext of saving them the trouble and risk of exchange, of extending the markets for their products to distant regions, and of thus becoming the most useful class in society; a class of parasites, genuine social ichneumons, that skim the cream off production at home and abroad as a reward for very insignificant services, that rapidly amass enormous wealth and gain social influence accordingly, that for this

reason reap ever new honors and ever greater control of production during the period of civilization, until they at last bring to light a production of their own—periodical crises in industry."*

At the same time metal coins came into use and, through them, a new device for controlling producers and their products.

"Never again did the power of money show itself in such primordial brutality and violence as in its youthful days. After the sale of commodities for money came the borrowing of money, resulting in interest and usury. And no legislation of any later period stretches the debtor so mercilessly at the feet of the speculating creditor as the antique Grecian and Roman codes—both of them spontaneous products of habit, without any other than economic pressure."†

The wealth in commodities and slaves was further increased by large holdings in land. The titles of individuals to lots formerly assigned to them by the gens or the tribe had become so well established that they were now owned and inherited. But having become private property, they could, after the invention of money, be bought and sold as a commodity. Nay more, they could also be mortgaged. In fact, hardly had private ownership been introduced, when the mortgage put in its appearance,

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 200, 201.

†Ibid. p. 202.

and ever since clung to it as hetærism and prostitution did to the heels of monogamy.

"Industrial expansion, money, usury, private land, mortgage thus progressed with the concentration and centralization of wealth in the hands of a small class, accompanied by the increasing impoverishment of the masses and the increasing mass of the paupers. The new aristocracy of wealth, so far as it did not coincide with old tribal nobility, forced the latter permanently into the background. And this division of free men into classes according to their wealth was accompanied, especially in Greece, by an enormous increase in the number of slaves, whose forced labor formed the basis on which the whole superstructure of society was reared."*

Gentilism stood powerless in the face of the new elements that had grown without its assistance. It succumbed, to yield its place to the State.

"The gentile constitution had grown out of a society that did not know any internal contradictions, and it was only adapted to such a society. It had no coercive power except public opinion. But now a society had developed that by force of all its economic conditions of existence divided humanity into freemen and slaves, and exploiting rich and exploited poor. A society that not only could never reconcile these conditions, but drove them ever more to a climax. Such a society could only

*Origin of the Family. p. 203.

exist by a continual open struggle of all classes against one another, or under the supremacy of a third power that under a pretense of standing above the struggling classes stifled their open conflict and permitted a class struggle only on the economic field, in a so-called 'legal' form. Gentilism had ceased to live. It was crushed by the division of labor and by its result, the division of society into classes. It was replaced by the state."*

Having stated this as a historical fact, Engels sketches the idea of the State.

"The state, then, is by no means a power forced on society from outside; neither is it the 'realization of an ethical idea,' 'the image and the realization of reason,' as Hegel maintains. It is simply a product of society at a certain stage of evolution. It is a confession that this society has become hopelessly divided against itself, has entangled itself in irreconcilable contradictions which it is powerless to banish. In order that these contradictions, these classes with conflicting economic interests, may not annihilate themselves and society in a useless struggle, a power becomes necessary that stands apparently above society and has the function of keeping down the conflicts and maintaining order. And this power, the outgrowth of society, but assuming supremacy over it and becoming more and more divorced from it, is the state."†

*Ibid. p. 205.
†Ibid. p. 206.

To develop this idea still further, he sets forth the difference between the State and gentilism.

First, "the state differs from gentilism in that it first divides its members by territories."

Secondly, the State creates a coercive power.

"The state created a public power of coercion that did no longer coincide with self-organized and armed population. . . . This public power of coercion exists in every state. It is not composed of armed men alone, but also of such objects as prisons and correction houses attached to it, that were unknown to gentilism. It may be very small, almost infinitesimal with feebly developed class antagonism. . . . But it increases in the same ratio in which the class antagonisms become more pronounced, and in which neighboring states become larger and more populous. A conspicuous example is modern Europe, where the conquests and wars of conquest have nursed the public power to such a size that it threatens to swallow the whole society and the state itself."

Thirdly, the State raises taxes and contracts public debts.

"In order to maintain this public power, contributions of the citizens become necessary—the taxes. These were absolutely unknown in gentile society. But to-day we get our full measure of them. As civilization makes further progress, these taxes are no longer sufficient to cover public expenses.

The state makes drafts on the future, contracts loans and public debts."

Fourthly, the State officials are exalted above society.

"In possession of the public power and of the right of taxation, the officials in their capacity as state organs are now exalted above society. The free and voluntary respect that was accorded to the organs of gentilism does not satisfy them any more, even if they might have it. Representatives of a power that is divorced from society, they must enforce respect by exceptional laws that render them sacred and inviolable."

Fifthly, both the antique and the modern State is the State of the most powerful economic class.

"The state is the result of the desire to keep down class conflicts. But having arisen amid these conflicts, it is as a rule the state of the most powerful economic class that, by force of its economic supremacy, becomes the ruling political class and thus acquires new means of subduing and exploiting the oppressed masses. The antique state was, therefore, the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding the slaves in check. The feudal state was the organ of the nobility for the oppression of serfs and dependent farmers. The modern representative state is the tool of the capitalist exploiters of wage labor."

Sixthly, the dominating power in the State is wealth.

"In most historical states the rights of the citizens are differentiated according to their wealth. This is a direct confirmation of the fact that the state is organized for the protection of the possessing against the non-possessing classes."

"The political recognition of the differences in wealth is by no means necessary. On the contrary, it marks a low stage of state development. The highest form of the state, the democratic republic, knows officially nothing of property distinctions. It is that form of the state which under modern conditions of society becomes more and more an unavoidable necessity. The last decisive struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie can only be fought out under this state form. In such a state, wealth exerts its power indirectly, but all the more safely. This is done partly in the form of direct corruption of officials, after the classical type of the United States, or in the form of an alliance between government and bankers, which is established all the more easily when the public debt increases and when corporations concentrate in their hands not only the means of transportation, but also production itself, using the stock exchange as a center."

"The possessing class rules directly through universal suffrage. For as long as the oppressed class, and in this case the proletariat, is not ripe for emancipation, just so long will its majority regard the existing order of society as the only one possible,

and form the tail, the extreme wing, of the capitalist class. But the more the proletariat matures toward self-emancipation, the more does it constitute itself as a separate class and elect its own representatives in place of the capitalists."*

The foregoing quotations taken from one of Engels' classical works give a very clear and logically consistent statement of the socialist conception of the State. They account for its origin, mark out its end, show the nature of government, and define its dominating power—all in full accordance with the materialistic conception of history. Its origin is traced back to economic conditions arising after the introduction of private property classes; its government is described as the supremacy of the propertied using coercive power to keep down the propertiless; its dominating power is characterized as the prevailing influence of wealth.

It is remarkable how widely these ideas have been adopted by socialist writers and how faithfully they have been reproduced by them with scarcely any modification.

Bebel in his "Woman" merely condenses what Engels had explained at full length in his "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State." After stating that gentilism, the primitive form of society, was broken down by the introduction of private property, he briefly sets forth his views on the origin and nature of the State as follows:

*Origin of the Family, etc. pp. 206-211.

"Along with private property and the personal right of inheritance, class distinctions and class contrasts came into existence. Rich property owners drew together against those who owned less or nothing. The former sought to get into their own hands the public offices of the new commonwealth, and to make them hereditary. Money, now become necessary, created hitherto unknown forms of indebtedness. Wars against enemies from without, and conflicting interests within, as well as the various interests and relations which agriculture, handicraft and commerce mutually produced rendered necessary complicated rules of right, they demanded special organs to guard the orderly movement of the social machinery, and to settle disputes. The same held good for the master and slave, creditor and debtor. A power, accordingly, became necessary to supervise, lead, regulate and harmonize all these relations, with authority to protect, and, when needed, to punish. *Thus rose the State, the product, accordingly, of the conflicting interests that sprang up in the new social order.* Its administration naturally fell into the hands of those who had the liveliest interest in its establishment, and who, in virtue of their social power, possessed the greatest influence—the rich. Aristocracy of property and democracy confronted each other, accordingly, even there where externally complete equality of political rights existed."

"The institution of the State is, accordingly, the necessary result of a social order, that, standing upon the higher plane of the subdivision of labor, is broken up into a large number of occupations, animated by different, frequently conflicting, interests, and hence has the oppression of the weaker for a consequence."*

Bebel professed the same views in his famous speech delivered in the Congress of the German Social Democracy, at Jena, 1905.

Likewise, according to Loria, the gentile constitution was the original form of society, and the State, as it now exists, the form of society consequent to the introduction of private property. His theory is contained in the following propositions.

Association of labor constitutes the original foundation of civil society. At the outset it did not mean private property, for at first co-operation usually accompanies the collective property régime. But private property, when introduced later on, exercised a twofold influence on the political constitution. First, by allowing the members of the same *gens,* heretofore united by communal property, isolated and remote lands in severalty, it destroyed the ancient gentile nucleus, and substituted the State based on territory for the State founded on the *gens.*

Secondly, "private property with its natural outcome, the capitalistic system, concentrated political

*Woman. pp. 42, 43.

power in the hands of the proprietary class and consequently introduced radical changes in the nature of sovereignty. Under the régime of collective property, the State differed very slightly from society, of which it was simply the organizing force; but with the institution of private property and the concentration of political power in the hands of the proprietary class, the State suddenly severed its former connection with society as a whole, and came to represent the interests of a mere fraction of the community. Thereupon two distinctly separate series of relations were established, one between the State and the proprietors, and the other between the State and the non-proprietors. As against the proprietors, the State found itself, on the one hand, in a passive relation, inasmuch as it was the creature of their own making, and, on the other hand, in an active relation, in so far as it placed certain restrictions upon their liberty in their own interest."

To the non-proprietors the State stood in an entirely active relation. Having sprung from influences that were foreign to their interests, it subjected their liberty to such restrictions as it pleased the proprietors to impose. Thus although the institution of private property effected an enfeeblement of the State in its relations to the proprietors, it brought about at the same time an extension of State authority over those who were excluded from ownership. This dominion was still further in-

creased by the necessity of holding the propertiless classes in subjection and preventing violent reactions, which, however powerless they might be to destroy the economic system, would disturb the tranquillity of the opulent classes.

With this increase in force, the entire organization of the State underwent a substantial change. During the epoch of collective property either a patriarchal form of government prevailed, wherein authority was accorded to the oldest or wisest, or a military tyranny was established, which was elective and founded upon popular approval. But, with the growth of private property, these forms of government were rejected, because they were incapable of disciplining the class excluded from the possession of the soil. The State that then appeared, being capitalistic in character, was no longer permeated with the principles of equality and no longer echoed the peaceful and equitable expressions of universal consent, but became in the hands of a rapacious minority a terrible engine of offensive and aggressive war against the exploited majority.*

The following is Labriola's conception of the State.

*The Economic Foundations of Society. pp. 124-128. Loria does not agree with those writers who refuse the appellation of *State* to the primitive forms of political government, and affirm that the State only emerges with the institution of private property, which makes a coercive power necessary to hold

"It was necessary to arrive at a comprehension of the fact that the state exists and maintains itself in that it is organized for the defense of certain definite interests, of one part against all the rest of society itself, which must be made in such a way, in its entirety, that the resistance of the subjects, of the ill-treated and exploited, either is lost in multiple frictions, or is tempered by the partial advantages, wretched though they be, to the oppressed themselves."

"The concept of the state has ceased to represent the direct cause of the historic movement as the presumed author of society, because it has been seen that in each of its forms and its variations there is nothing else than the positive and forced organization of a definite class rule, or of a definite compact between different classes."*

Gabriel Deville, one of the leaders of the revolutionary socialists in France, in expounding his theory of the State, differs in no point from Engels and Marx. Laying down the definition of the State he says:

"The State, I will maintain in my turn, is the public power of coercion, created and maintained in human societies by their division into classes, and

the lower order of non-owners in subjection. He is of the opinion that the primitive clan and gens show us, though in an embryonic form, a political organization and, therefore, the institution of the State. See footnote, p. 127.

*Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History. pp. 183, 184.

which, having force at its disposal, makes laws and levies taxes."*

Interpreting his definition he subjoins:

"From the definition that I have given, it follows in the first place that the State has not always existed, but there have been societies without a State; but the absence of a State did not prevent these societies from having an organization. My thesis is that a social organization is possible without a State and that the State appears and subsists only in societies divided into classes. Some societies without States have continued to exist down to our own times among the Indians of North America. And it was by studying the social régime of these Indians, and of the Iroquois especially, that Morgan was able, by his remarkable work, *Ancient Society,* to enable us at last to clearly understand the primitive societies of Greece and Italy, societies which were based, like the Indian societies, upon the *gens.*"

"Thus the State whose non-existence in a society may be demonstrated so long as there are no classes in that society, makes its appearance in a more or less developed form with the existence of classes and the antagonism they involve."†

As the object of the State Deville marks out the ensuring of the submission of the dispossessed classes.

*The State and Socialism. Translated by Robert Rives La Monte. New York 1900. p. 4.

†Ibid. pp. 6, 13.

"As soon as there are in a society a possessing class and a dispossessed class, there exists in that society a constant source of collisions which the social organization would not long resist, if there was not a power charged with maintaining, to use the consecrated phrase, the 'established order,' charged in other words, with the protection of the economic situation of the possessing party. Now, from its very birth, this has been the rôle of the State.

"An organ of conservation, the offspring of struggles or threats of struggles between conflicting interests, conflicting because of the antagonism between economic conditions, born . . . with the division of society into classes, the State has evolved with the development of that division, *i.e.*, in short, with the economic relations which form the basis of that division; but, under the various appearances it has worn, its object has remained the same, because ever since the appearance of classes it has always had a privileged economic situation to defend and conflicts to repress. When it is known that the State is a class-instrument it is easy to understand whence comes its character of relative permanence which bourgeois writers point out without explaining."*

The State, based on private property and having for its object the subjection of the dispossessed classes, has in Deville's opinion, proved, under a

*The State and Socialism. Translated by Robert Rives La Monte. New York 1900. p. 21.

moral aspect, a degeneration, and by its economic results an evil for the masses. The disappearance of societies based on the *gens,* he says, was a progress, but not in a moral sense. It was not accomplished through aspiration toward the realization of righteousness. The extension of private property and the disappearance of the gens gave rise to the most despicable sentiments. Greed, hypocrisy, and false speaking, induced by personal interests, presided over the ruin of the old organization and the appearance of the classes. The result of progress has been the increase of the knowledge and power of man, the multiplication of the forces at his service, and the extension of the opportunities for more comfortable living and fuller development. But the realization of these advantages was a possibility only for the minority; for the majority it was but too often a source of new sufferings, from the time when classes and with them the rudiments of the State began to exist down to the present hour.*

To turn now to American socialists, concerning the State, Morris Hillquit holds the following propositions:

"The State appears in the social development of mankind simultaneously with the institutions of private property and slavery and as their necessary concomitant."

"The socialist definition of the State as an or-

*Ibid. pp. 14, 18. See on this topic also Bax. Ethics of Socialism. pp. 106-120.

ganization of the ruling classes for the maintenance of the exploited classes in a condition of dependence, is entirely correct in substance."

"The modern State is the State of the capitalistic extracting profits from the working members of the community, and the modern government is, in the words of Karl Marx, 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the capitalist class.' "*

G. D. Herron characterizes civilized society, the State included, as an institution organized for the oppression of the poor by the rich, of the laboring by the possessing class.

"The class question, he says, is not as to whether we like to have classes or not; the question is: Are there classes in society as it is now constituted, and is the present constitution of society founded upon the division of the people into classes? And do class antagonisms and social destruction inhere in the nature of a class society? No one disputes the affirmative answer to this question."

"And if I am to do anything whatever, even as a social coral builder, toward making the world equally good and resourceful and lovely for all men, I must begin with the fact that all that we know of as civilization, up to the present time, has been the institutionalized expression and defence of one class of people living off another class. There are no words that can make this fact hideous and ghastly enough, or vivid and revolutionary enough

*Socialism in Theory and Practice. pp. 96, 97, 131.

—the fact that society and its institutions are organized for the purpose of enabling some people to live off of other people, the few to live off the many. There is no language realistic enough, or possessed of sufficient integrity, to lay bare the chasm between the class that works and the class that reaps the fruit of that work; between the class that is grist for the great world-mill of economic might and the class that harvests that grist. And until the working class becomes conscious of itself as the only class that has a right to be, until the worker understands that he is exploited and bound by the power which his own unpaid labor places in the hands that exploit and bind him, until we all clearly see that what we call civilization is but the organized and legalized robbery of the common labor, until we have a revolutionized comprehension of the fact that our churches and governments, our arts and literatures, our educations and philosophies, our morals and manners, are all more or less the expressions and deformities of this universal robbery drawing their life and motives out of the vitals of the man who is down and unprivileged, out of his unpaid labor and exhausted life—until then, I say, our dreams and schemes of a common good or better society are but philistine utopias, our social and industrial reforms but self-deceit, and our weapons but the shadows of stupidity or hypocrisy. A civilization that is fundamentally parasitical, that has its birth and breath and being

in the power of one class to take what another class produces, cannot be so reformed or added to as to bring forth economic justice or any kind of emancipation; or so ordered as to procure equality of opportunity and free individuality."

"I am defining or characterizing the civilization we now have as an impersonal yet universal beast of prey, expressing the power of the ruling and possessing class to absorb the whole output of life and labor of humanity. There have never existed other than predatory civilizations. And our institutions, morals and creeds have but served to keep the people submissive to the depredations of the ruling class. To this end have the powers that might happen to be at any given time always been invested with the hypocrisy and threat of a divine origin."*

Later on Herron styles the American Constitution "a monumental and comprehensive deceit, deliberately devised for the purpose of preventing the people from governing themselves, and of keeping the affairs and issues of government in the hands of the possessing class."†

In the platform of the Socialist Party, adopted in Chicago, 1904, and penned by G. D. Herron, the political institutions of the United States are characterized in the same strain. We read in the introductory part:

*From Revolution to Revolution. New York 1903. pp. 8, 9.
†Ibid. p. 17.

"Our American institutions came into the world in the name of freedom. They have been seized upon by the capitalist class as the means of rooting out the idea of freedom from among the people. Our state and national legislatures have become the mere agencies of propertied interests. These interests control the appointments and decision of the judges of our courts. They have come into what is practically a private ownership of all functions and forces of government. They are using these to betray and conquer foreign and weaker peoples, in order to establish new markets for the surplus goods which the people make, but are too poor to buy. They are generally so invading and restricting the right of suffrage as to take away unawares the right of the worker to a vote or voice in public affairs. By enacting new and interpreting old laws, they are preparing to attack the liberty of the individual even to speak or think for himself, or for the common good."

The preceding quotations, taken from authors of various nationalities, so complete one another as to develop but one idea of the State. The gist of all of them is that civil society, originating ultimately in the introduction of private property, proximately in class antagonism, exercised government for no other purpose than that of subjecting and exploiting the dispossessed class, and by no other authority than the power of coercion resulting from economic superiority.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABOLITION OF THE STATE

THE State, if it is in reality what the socialists maintain it to be, is by its very nature doomed to extinction. It must break down, once private property is abolished and communism introduced, for then it will be without a basis on which to rest; it will cease to exist for lack of an object, once class antagonism is overcome, for then a power to keep the dispossessed in subjection is no longer necessary; it will be destroyed, if the oppressed rise against the oppressors and establish equality of rights and opportunities, because then the rule of the few over the many will be at an end. But all these conditions, socialists foretell, will be fulfilled, and very probably in a not very distant future. Socialism if once triumphant will do away with property, and consequently also with class distinctions and class struggle, with inequalities and influence of wealth.

Socialism, therefore, we are assured, will give the deathblow to the State. In this sense Engels writes in his "Origin of the Family, etc."

"We are now rapidly approaching a stage of evolution in production in which the distinction of classes has not only ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive fetter to production. Hence

these classes must fall as inevitably as they once arose. The state must irrevocably fall with them. The society that is to re-organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers, will transfer the machinery of the state where it will then belong, into the Museum of Antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe."*

Still more clearly he predicts the end of the State in his "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific."

"The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into State property."

"But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the State as State. Society thus far, based upon class antagonisms, had need of the State. That is, of an organization of the particular class which was *pro tempore* the exploiting class, an organization for the purpose of preventing any interference from without with the existing conditions of production, and therefore, especially, for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited class in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production (slavery, serfdom, wage-labour). . . . As soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the collisions and ex-

*Origin of the Family. p. 211.

cesses arising from these, are removed, nothing remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a State, is no longer necessary. The first act by virtue of which the State really constitutes itself the representative of the whole society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a State. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the conduct of processes of production. The State is not 'abolished.' It dies out."*

The communist manifesto, Part II, reads:

"When in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing the other. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and as such sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of

*Socialism, Utopian and Scientific. pp. 75-77.

classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class."

Bebel arrives at the same conclusion.

"The State is the inevitably necessary organization of a civil order that rests upon class rule. The moment class organizations fall through the abolition of private property, the State loses both the *necessity* and the possibility for its existence. With the removal of the conditions of rulership, the State gradually ceases to be, the same as creeds wane when the belief ceases in supernatural beings or in transcendental powers gifted with reason. Words must have sense; if they lose that, they cease to convey ideas."*

G. Deville, who had so faithfully adopted Engels' political views, maintains like him, that the State being a class-instrument, has lasted as long as there have been and will last so long as there shall be classes.†

Likewise R. Rives La Monte, after setting forth Engels' views on the subject, concludes:

"It is thus seen that, according to the teaching of historical materialism, the State is destined, when it becomes the State of the working-class, to remove its own foundation—economic inequality —and thus to commit suicide."‡

P. J. Troelstra in a memorial presented to the

*Woman. p. 272. See also p. 318.
†The State and Socialism. pp. 13, 23.
‡Socialism, Positive and Negative. p. 113.

International Socialist Bureau and the Interparliamentary Commission on August 5, 1907, affirms:

"Their (the Social Democrats') theory teaches us that the victory of the proletariat attacks the very foundation of the state, which afterwards may be stored away in a museum of antiquities."*

The State, then, as Bebel intimated, has the same destiny as religion, monogamy, and the family; like them, owing its existence to economic conditions, it will disappear in the final evolution of mankind under triumphant socialism.

*Int. Soc. Rev. Nov. 1907. p. 273.

CHAPTER V

SOCIALIST ATTITUDE TOWARD THE STATE

THE nature and the object of the State having been set forth at full length, it remains for us to discuss the attitude of its citizens toward it. Heretofore it has generally been maintained that a body politic has authority over its constituent members, and that these conversely are under the obligation of submission and allegiance. But consistently with socialist ideas such relations between governments and governed must cease to exist. The subjects of the present State, far from being liable to submission, have the right of assuming an attitude of opposition to the ruling power. This will be plain, if we recall to mind what the State is according to the views of contemporary socialists.

According to Engels it is "an organization for the purpose of preventing any interference from without with the existing conditions of production and especially for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited class in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production (slavery, serfdom, wage-labor)."

According to Deville:

"A good for the minority only; an evil, a source of sufferings for all others."

According to Loria:

"In the hands of a rapacious minority a terrible engine of defensive and offensive warfare against the exploited majority."

According to Labriola it "exists and maintains itself in that it is organized for the defense of certain definite interests of one part of society against the rest of society itself."

According to Herron:

"Society and its institutions are organized for the purpose of enabling some people to live off other people, the few off the many."

And civilization in general, as we have it now, is "an impersonal yet universal beast of prey, expressing the power of the ruling and possessing class to absorb and to convert into ever-increasing power to absorb, the whole output of the life and labor of humanity."

This view on the nature of the State is consistently held also with regard to the laws enacted by it. To quote from Loria:

"As a coactive and imperative instruction, the law is a necessary product of the capitalistic economy, serving to protect the income holders from their own importunities and from attacks on the side of the labourers. It becomes thus at once the complement and the integration of capitalist morality, where the latter proves insufficient."*

The "Western Clarion" writes:

*Economic Foundations of Society. p. 77.

"The garb beneath which present capitalist civilization masks its hideousness is termed 'law.' 'Law and order' is the slogan of every capitalist pirate who ventures forth in search of plunder. If his victims dare to raise their hands to stay his ravages, the law is invoked in behalf of their plunderer and the victims are awed into submission to his thieving practices. There is not a crime in the calendar that cannot be safely committed under the guise of the law, if the perpetrator thereof knows how to go about it. Millions of people are murdered by slow starvation and heart-breaking toil under its benign dispensations. Countless thousands experience life from the cradle to the grave merely as a torture and agony, while at all times the law interposes between themselves and the alleviation of their misery. And what is the law? It is merely the dictum of the dominant economic class in human society, calculated to safeguard their dominion over others and perpetuate their power and privilege to rule and rob."

"The law is purely the creation of rulers. It is but a clumsy pretext whereby they seek to justify their right to rule and rob. Itself but a flimsy pretense, a make believe, the art of administering it so as to make it effective for its purpose becomes the art of flimflam par excellence."*

Bax condemns the modern law for the same reason and in quite unmistakable terms.

*Quoted by the Worker. Aug. 10, 1907.

"A very little reflection will suffice to show that the civil law referred to is an entirely class-institution, designed (1) in the interest of that class within a class so powerful throughout all periods of civilization, *viz.*, the legal class, and (2) of the privileged and possessing classes generally."*

He has still more contempt for the criminal law, criminal courts, and judges.

"Paradox as it may seem, it is an undoubted truth that no judge can be strictly an honest man. The judge must necessarily be a man of inferior moral calibre."

"The festering mass of hypocrisy of which benchdom consists is only too evident at every turn. There is, of course, the hypocrisy which is racy of the judicial soil, just as there is the hypocrisy of the clerical soil. To this belongs the professed deep reverence for the 'law of England,' when no one knows better than the benchman who has studied it, that well nigh one half of English law is based on effete superstition, of which it presents in many cases the most grotesque instances, . . . and that the other half is founded on the baldest class interest and prejudice. So that all things considered there is hardly a branch of learning the pursuit of which is more calculated to inspire the average student with a contempt for its subject-matter than English law—hardly even excepting Divinity."

"That a society which is based on property and

*Religion of Socialism. p. 147.

privilege must have a criminal code as its necessary consequence we are well aware, but we none the less protest against its 'administrator,' the judge, being regarded in any more honorable light than its other 'administrator,' the hangman."*

If, as socialists maintain, the State is but the rule of the possessing classes in their own interest, if its authority is a coercive power over the dispossessed for the purpose of keeping them in subjection, if its laws are nothing but measures enacted to oppress and exploit the mass of the working people; then, indeed, there can not exist any obligation of allegiance and obedience to political sovereignty. The State, *in such a supposition,* has no right whatever to exercise any authority, and the laws it enacts are null and void under such conditions. Christian philosophy will always hold this view. For in accordance with its principles, civil authority is not main force exercised by the stronger against the weaker, but is essentially a moral power, conferred on governments, directly or indirectly, from on high for the benefit of the whole society, and not merely for the personal interests of a few. Socialist philosophers, of course, are still louder in denouncing the unlawfulness of governmental powers, which, as they assert, the possessing class has in the present State usurped over the dispossessed working people; but they advance reasons of quite a different kind.

*Ibid. pp. 108, 109, 110.

The capitalists, in Bax's opinion, have no right to rule, because they are only a sham majority.

"The bourgeoisie right of the majority is the vampire of a dead reality."

"With the entrance upon the arena of the modern proletariat, of capitalism and the differentiation of class-interests therein involved, the old popular sovereignty has become a meaningless phrase. The old majority is in the thraldom of this minority (the franchise notwithstanding)."

"The majority under a capitalist system will necessarily for the most part vote for the maintenance of that system under one guise or another, not because they love it, but of sheer ignorance and stupidity. It is by the active minority from out of the stagnant inert mass that the revolution will be accomplished. It is to this Socialist minority that individuals, acting during the revolutionary period, are alone accountable. The socialist leader or delegate, as such, does not take account of the absolute majority of the population, which consists of two sections, *i.e.,* of those who are interested in the maintenance of the present system and those who are blind or inert enough to be misled by them. To disregard the opinion of these latter is no more tyranny than it is tyranny to hold a drunken man back by force when he seeks to get out of the door of a railway carriage with the train going at full speed. The man does not want to be maimed or killed; he is simply misled by his drunken fancy as

to what is conducive to his welfare. In the same way the workman who sides with one or the other of the various political parties against Socialism, does not want to be the slave of capital, never certain of his next week's lodging and food. In coercing him if necessary, that is, in negativing his *apparent* aims, you are affirming his *real* aims."

"Of course, as soon as Socialism becomes an accomplished fact, the inert mass of indifferentism which long clings to the *status quo,* not from real class interest, but merely through ignorance and laziness, will be dissolved, and its elements pass over to the new *status quo* of Socialism. The Socialist party will then cease to exist as a party, and become transformed into the absolute majority of the population."*

Others, as for instance, Herron, Spargo, Burrowes, denounce modern governments as unlawful for the reason that capitalistic rule is but organized and legalized robbery of common labor; that the working class alone constitutes society, the real public, the social organism, and has alone the power and right to be; that the interests of the capitalist class, which conflict with those of the working class, must be eliminated, capitalism being a cancerous growth in the body politic; that socialism holds within it the religion, science, philosophy and morals which shall establish man upon earth.†

*Religion of Socialism. pp. 119, 120.

†See above, chap. III. The Worker. Feb. 3, 1906. Thoughts for the Majority. By P. E. Burrowes.

In accordance with such views, the actually existing governments are unlawful, because the proletariat alone represents society and is alone entitled to sovereign power and authority. It is scarcely necessary to remark that the laws, too, now in existence are regarded by socialist philosophers as void of any binding force. For to their mind they are but measures enacted by unlawful State authority for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the capitalist class and insuring the oppression and exploitation of the working people.

But modern socialism, since it is not only a philosophical theory, but also a revolutionary movement, goes still farther in its opposition to civil society. Whilst as a theory it merely denies the lawfulness of governments, as a revolutionary movement it calls for open war against the State and its institutions.

Revolutionary socialism is essentially a struggle of the dispossessed working class against the possessing class, of the proletariat organized into a class-conscious body against the capitalists. The Chicago platform of 1904 asserts this struggle in the strongest terms when it says:

"Between these two (the working and the possessing) classes there can be no possible compromise or identity of interests, any more than there can be peace in the midst of war, or light in the midst of darkness. A society based upon this class

division carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Such a society is founded in fundamental injustice. There can be no possible basis for social peace, for individual freedom, for mental and moral harmony, except in the conscious and complete triumph of the working class as the only class that has the right or power to be."

The end aimed at by this class-struggle is the general emancipation of the proletariat, or in the words of the Chicago platform just quoted, the complete triumph of the working class. But the possessing is also the ruling class. For the owners of private property in the means of production form the State, have invented and exercise governmental powers, in order to keep the dispossessed in subjection, have possessed themselves of all political institutions and use them as instruments to exploit the working class and rob it of the fruit of its labor. The class struggle, therefore, to become successful, must be a struggle also against governments, must end in their overthrow and in the conquest of governmental or political power by the proletariat.

This is the view universally taken by revolutionary socialists.

"The proletariat," says Engels, "seizes the public power, and by means of this transforms the socialized means of production, slipping from the hands of the bourgeoisie into public property. . . . To accomplish this act of universal emanci-

pation is the theoretical mission of the modern proletariat."*

In the communist manifesto, Part II, we read:

"The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of the political power by the proletariat."

The Erfurt program adopted the idea of Marx and Engels.

"The struggle of labor against capitalistic oppression is necessarily a political one. The laboring class cannot carry on its industrial struggles and develop its economic organization without political rights. It cannot effect the transfer of the means of production into the possession of the body social without possessing itself of political power."

The platforms of the American socialists are in this respect as in many others repetitions of the Erfurt platform. The Chicago platform of 1904 contains the following clause:

"Such measures of relief as we may be able to force from capitalism are but a preparation of the workers to seize the whole powers of government, and thus come into their rightful inheritance."

Of what kind this struggle against the State and government will be, we may form an idea if we

*Socialism, Utopian and Scientific. p. 86.

call to mind that socialists look upon the civil powers that exist as unlawful usurpations and the laws enacted by them as unjust measures of oppression, and further remember that according to their ethical theory, during the time of combat with capitalism, whatever leads to the proletarian victory must be regarded as morally good, and whatever tends to hinder or retard it as morally bad.

For this conception of socialist morality we have quoted passages from Spargo, Chas. H. Kerr, Burrowes, Robert Rives La Monte. To repeat some words of the latter:

"As fast as they (proletariat) will become class-conscious, they will recognize and praise as moral all conduct that tends to hasten the social revolution and they will condemn as unhesitatingly as immoral all conduct that tends to prolong the dominance of the capitalist class."*

The meaning of such a moral principle is very plain. It evidently amounts to this, that socialists need not scruple about the lawfulness of the means they are to employ in their attempt to overthrow the present social order and to conquer political power; for all means whatever, whether open, or secret, are allowed to them, provided they lead to the victory of the proletariat. The only question for them is, whether the method to be employed is opportune or not, effective or not under given

*See above. part i, chap. iv.

circumstances, qualified or not to carry their revolutionary enterprises to a successful end.

Stating this doctrine concerning the attitude toward the State as truly socialistic, we are not guilty of exaggeration or misinterpretation. It has not only been proposed by prominent intellectual leaders, as is evident from the above quotations, but is also practically applied in discussions which in these very days are carried on concerning patriotism, civil allegiance, and anti-militarism.

It is openly maintained that socialism abolishes national differences and national frontiers, and instead of them effects a union of the several national sections of the proletariat on the basis of a firm and equal friendship, so as to present a solid front to the common enemy, capitalistic society.

In the communist manifesto, Part II, Marx meets the objection that communists wish to abolish countries and nationalities with the following answer:

"The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

"National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing owing to the bourgeoisie development. . . . The su-

premacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster."

Bax develops this idea more fully and with greater clearness. He says:

"For the Socialist, the frontier does not exist; for him love of country as such is no nobler sentiment than love of class."

"No, the foreign policy of the great International Socialist party must be to break up these hideous race monopolies called empires, beginning in each case at home. Hence everything which makes for the disruption and disintegration of the empire to which he belongs must be welcomed by the Socialist as an ally. It is his duty to urge on any movement tending in any way to dislocate the commercial relations of the world, knowing that every shock the modern complex commercial system suffers weakens it and brings its destruction nearer. This is the negative side of the foreign policy of Socialism. The positive is comprised in a single sentence: to consolidate the union of the several national sections on the basis of firm and *equal* friendship, steadfast adherence to definite principle, and determination to present a solid front to the enemy."*

As an illustration of the socialist loyalty to their country we quote a passage from a manifesto of the International Socialist Bureau, 1907.

"In 1870, while the cannons were thundering on

*Religion of Socialism. pp. 126, 127.

the frontiers, the German workers wrote to the French workers: 'We must never forget that the workers of all countries are friends, and that the despots of all countries are our enemies.' And the French workers replied: French workers! German workers! Spanish workers! Let us unite in a cry of denunciation of war."*

We would undoubtedly go too far were we to maintain that all socialists take the same extreme ground as Bax. Some of them, as for instance the German Social Democrats, are at present so far from extreme radical views on this point as even to profess a moderate patriotism. But be this as it may, American socialists, at least at present, detest patriotism and national frontiers and advocate instead of them international union.

To May Wood Simon patriotism is the outgrowth of a past age, still fostered for the benefit of the ruling class, though the conditions from which it rose exist no longer.

"Although the conditions that made patriotism an essential to social progress have long gone, it lingers on, is taught in our schools and praised in our pulpits, for the benefit, as ever, of a ruling class, to whom alone it is advantageous."†

A passage in the Chicago platform is to the same effect.

"The chief significance of national boundaries,

*Int. Soc. Rev. Aug. 1907. p. 89.

†Ibid. Dec. 1900. p. 341.

and of so-called patriotisms which the ruling class of each nation is seeking to revive, is the power which these give to capitalism to keep the workers of the world from uniting and to throw them against each other in the struggles of contending capitalist interests for the control of the yet unexploited markets of the world, or the remaining sources of profit.

"The socialist movement therefore is a world movement. It knows of no conflict of interests between the workers of one nation and the workers of another. It stands for the freedom of the workers of all nations; and in so standing, it makes for the full freedom of all humanity."

Closely connected with the denial of political allegiance is anti-militarism. While the former signifies disloyalty to particular countries or nations, the latter means opposition to the wars and armaments of the modern State. It is only of late that an anti-military movement arose in France and Italy; but at present it has spread over all countries and was made the subject of a general and very hot discussion in the last International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart 1907.

Wars, according to socialist views, while they entail the greatest sufferings and losses on the working people, are carried on merely in the interest of the capitalist class and necessarily result from the economic and political system upheld by capitalism.

The resolution on militarism adopted by the Stuttgart Congress reads:

"Wars between capitalistic states are as a rule the consequence of their competition in the world's market, for every state is eager not only to preserve its markets, but also to conquer new ones, principally by the subjugation of foreign nations and the confiscation of their lands. These wars are further engendered by the unceasing and ever increasing armaments of militarism, which is one of the principal instruments for maintaining the predominance of the bourgeois classes and for subjugating the working classes politically as well as economically.

"The breaking out of wars is further favoured by the national prejudices systematically cultivated in the interest of the reigning classes, in order to turn off the masses of the proletariat from the duties of their class and international solidarity.

"Wars are therefore essential to capitalism; they will not cease until the capitalistic system has been done away with, or until the sacrifices in men and money required by the technical development of the military system and the revolt against the armaments have become so great as to compel the nations to give up this system.

"Especially the working classes from which the soldiers are chiefly recruited, and which have to bear the greater part of the financial burdens, are

by nature opposed to war, because it is irreconcilable with their aim: the creation of a new economic system founded on a socialistic basis and realizing the solidarity of the nations."*

Armaments and especially the modern standing armies are regarded by socialists not only as oppressive of the working classes, which chiefly have to do military service, and as instruments of wars to be carried on in the interest of capitalism, but also as the chief means to keep capitalistic governments in power and to break strikes, when becoming too powerful and too threatening.

Such being the view taken by socialists of wars and armaments, we understand why the Stuttgart Congress in the opening sentence of its anti-military resolution declares "that the fight against militarism cannot be separated from the socialist struggle of classes as a whole."

"The Congress, therefore, considers it to be the duty of the working classes, and especially of their parliamentary representatives, to fight with all their might against the military and naval armaments, not to grant any money for such purposes, to point out at the same time the class character of bourgeois society and the real motives for keeping up national antagonisms, and further to imbue the young people of the working classes with the socialist spirit of universal brotherhood and with class consciousness."

*Int. Soc. Rev. Sept. 1907. pp. 135, 136.

As effective means for making aggressive wars impossible the Congress considers the democratic organization of the national defense and the abolition of the standing armies, the preparing of the minds of the people by an unceasing propaganda, and the drawing together of the different national labor parties into an international union.

"In case of war being imminent," the Congress says, "the working classes and their parliamentary representatives in the countries concerned shall be bound, with the assistance of the International Socialist Bureau, to do all they can to prevent the breaking out of the war, using for this purpose the means which appear to them the most efficacious, and which must naturally vary according to the acuteness of the struggle of classes, and to general conditions.

"In case war should break out, notwithstanding, they shall be bound to intervene for its being brought to a speedy end, and to employ all their forces for utilizing the economical and political crisis created by the war, in order to rouse the masses of the people and to hasten the downbreak of the predominance of the capitalist class."

To the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels mentioned in the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress, the special task is set of uniting the action of the different socialist parties of the world against the breaking out of wars, or during wars broken out. A resolution submitted by it to, and

accepted by the National Committee of the Socialist Party of America, reads as follows:

"As soon as a situation shall be presented, which, openly or secretly, may give rise to an apprehension of a conflict between two or more governments and render a war between them possible or probable, the socialist parties of the countries concerned should at once, and upon the invitation of the International Socialist Bureau, enter into direct communication with a view to determine upon a concerted mode of action on the part of the Socialists and workingmen of the interested countries, in order to prevent the war. At the same time the parties of the other countries should be advised by the Secretary of the Bureau, and a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau should be held as soon thereafter as possible for the purpose of devising the most appropriate measures to be taken by the entire International Socialist movement and the organized working class to prevent the war."*

The Chicago "Daily Socialist" says concerning the International Socialist Bureau:

"In time of war the bureau would at once form a means of organized concerted action on the part of the Socialists of all parties. It already makes possible united, simultaneous agitation on any subject of international interest. It was through the international bureau that the 'Bloody Sunday' celebrations were organized that brought together mil-

*See the Worker. Feb. 3, 1906.

lions of workers speaking every tongue in protest against Russian brutality. The bureau also constituted the medium through which hundreds of thousands of dollars have been collected for the Russian revolution."*

The resolution of the Stuttgart Congress, revolutionary as it is, nevertheless is considered as too tame by a large number of socialists. The French socialist party, when assembled in a National Congress at Nancy, a short time before the International Congress, adopted under the guidance of Hervé and Jaures a resolution of a far more radical tendency. After a general declaration against war and militarism it has the following conclusion:

"The Congress . . . considers the international solidarity of the proletariat and of the Socialists of every nation as their duty . . . (and) invites them to render the effect of these decisions (against war and militarism) possible by means of a plan prepared, ordered, and confined by the national and international labor Socialist organization, which shall put forward in every country and especially in the countries concerned and according to the circumstances of the movement, the whole energy and the whole effort of the working class and of the Socialist Party for the forestallment and prevention of war by every means beginning with parliamentary intervention, public agi-

*Quoted by the Worker. Aug. 17, 1907.

tation, popular manifestation, even to a general labor strike and insurrection."*

In the Stuttgart Congress the extreme anti-militarists of the French delegation proposed, besides the general strike and insurrection as means to prevent war, desertion from the army by enlisted socialists and refusal to join the colors by the reservists.

In several countries the socialists have resorted also to other methods which are expressly mentioned neither in the Stuttgart nor in the Nancy resolution. One of them, which deserves particular attention, is the spreading of anti-militarism and of socialist views in the army and navy. To what extent this was done in France, may be understood from the following item of the "Worker," May 19, 1906.

" 'L'Echo de Paris' prints an interview with a French naval officer, who declares that the anti-militarists in the navy are numerous and active, especially in the Mediterranean squadron, with headquarters at Toulon. It was believed, he said, that there were men in the crew of every battleship and cruiser willing and able to put the vessels out of commission by tampering with some vital part, in the event of war being declared. This fact causes alarm among the higher authorities."

In 1907 the British Social Democratic Federation issued through its Executive Council a mani-

*Quoted by the Worker. Sept. 28, 1907.

festo protesting in the strongest terms against Holdawe's Army Scheme and recommending, instead of the present army organization, complete civilizing of the military service. Besides an animating address to the working men, it contains an appeal to the reservists which reads in part:

"Men of the Army Reserve, we especially appeal to you. Now is your time to organize in your own interest. To the political parties of the master class you are mere food for powder. Join the Social Democratic Federation, which has always championed the cause of the man in the ranks and is now taking the present opportunity to secure the redress of the many grievances under which you suffer. Think of the brutal military code, under which twenty thousand young men are committed to the military prisons of this country every year for offenses for which they have never had a proper trial."

"Now is the time, men of the Army Reserve, to strike for the abolition of the military law, and the civilizing of military service. We appeal to you to join with us and the whole of the workers of the country, in demanding the abolition of militarism, of military law, of any form of conscription and the establishment of a national citizen force in which, while every man will be a soldier, no man will cease to be a civilian—the democratic military force of the people, the nation in arms."*

*The Worker. May 11, 1907.

It is a generally known fact that in the recent Russian revolution the Army and Navy were in many places incited to insurrection by socialist influence, and that attempts are made in Germany to carry socialism into the army.

The International Socialist Review, December, 1906, has an article written by Maurice E. Elderidge, in which the socialist influence on the European armies is summarily described and a method is also proposed for reaching the United States army. To quote:

"In Russia the revolutionary propaganda has so completely permeated the regiments of the Czar's army that we have lately seen whole regiments hoist the flag of revolt and refuse to obey the commandments of the autocrat. We know that the German army is so thoroughly 'class conscious' and in sympathy with the great working class movement that when Kaiser 'Billy' was clamoring for war with France a few months ago, he was given to understand that the German workingmen had no quarrel with their brother workers across the border, and the war clouds were wafted away on the breezy atmosphere of diplomatic statesmanship. In Belgium the government is confronted with a situation which to us is indeed laughable. If regiments are drawn from the Flemish provinces for duty in the cities, it quickly develops that they are but a source of propaganda for socialism, and if regiments are drawn from the Walloon prov-

inces, they become immediately the willing prey of our propagandists."

"But in America, the land of the free, the home of the brave, the land where capitalism and wage slavery are in their most highly developed state, the military powers are absolutely at the beck and call of the capitalist exploiters."

"Therefore I am of the opinion that it is high time that the revolutionary workers in America begin to consider ways and means for the education of our soldiers. Every garrison in the United States has a library the shelves of which are heavy with books, some worthless fiction but mostly histories recounting the deeds of soldiers and heroes. Every soldier can read and many of them do read a great deal. If we can devise means of circulating among them the revolutionary literature of the proletariat, I believe that we can reach many of them and eventually win them to the cause of freedom."

"The regular soldier belongs to the proletariat, and too long we have neglected him in our propaganda work here in America. I have now nearly developed a plan to reach the soldiers in our army and feel assured that with the hearty co-operation of a goodly number of American comrades, we will be able to do with the American soldier what our comrades in Russia, Germany, Belgium, and other European countries have done with their respective armies."*

*Int. Soc. Rev. Dec. 1906. pp. 368, 369.

The "Christian Socialist," Chicago, in its issue May 15, 1907, contains a circular addressed to all socialists, in which the proposal is made to publish a special socialist paper for propaganda in the Army and Navy of the United States.

To come back to the clash between the moderate and extreme anti-militarists in the Stuttgart Congress, we should remark that the difference between the conflicting factions was only one of tactics and not of principles. Neither does the resolution finally adopted by the Congress condemn the measures proposed by the French delegates as improper or morally objectionable, nor did Bebel in his powerful speech advance any other reason against them than that of impractibility under the present circumstances. Algernon Lee, an American delegate at the Congress, in an article of the "Worker," September 7, 1907, very clearly states the reasons on which the opposition against the extremist was based. Summing them up he says:

"The opponents of this tendency (the general strike and insurrection) do by no means deny the propriety of using the proposed methods if practicable, nor deny that in a given case they might be found practicable. But they emphatically declare that it is not wise nor right to issue a general declaration, in effect to establish an international rule prescribing these measures in advance. They think we should do more than we promise or threaten to do, and that to adopt this resolution would be to

make a threat and a promise which we might very likely be unable to fulfil, and to give advice which might very likely result in disaster to those who followed it."

Nor should the concluding words of the Stuttgart resolution be overlooked.

"In case of war they (the working classes and their parliamentary representatives) shall be bound . . . to employ all their forces for utilizing the economical and political crisis created by the war, in order to rouse the masses of the people and to hasten the downbreak of the predominance of the capitalist class."

The breakdown of the predominance of the capitalist class in socialist language undoubtedly means the overthrow of the existing governments and the seizure of the political power by the working classes. In economical and political crises, then, usually created by wars, the workers should by all means seize the opportunity of stirring up a revolution and establishing the rule of the proletariat.

At the end of this rather lengthy discussion on the socialist attitude toward the State it is worth while to sum up the several conclusions reached.

Socialism as a theory does not acknowledge any power or authority in the present State, nor any binding force in the laws enacted by it; for it looks on the former merely as a usurped rule and on the latter as measures of oppression and exploitation. As a movement socialism takes a positively hostile

attitude toward the State, because it aims at its overthrow by the class-struggle and at the seizure of the powers of government, conceiving them as due to the proletariat and as a necessary instrument for the establishment of a new social order based on collective property. Socialist workingmen, consistently with their principles, disavow allegiance to any particular State or country. They consider themselves as the nation itself, but at the same time as an integral part of the world-wide international union which, being held together by common interests and carrying on with concerted forces a warfare against all capitalistic society, is alone competent to bring about the emancipation of the human race. Aiming at the destruction of standing armies and at the democratization of the national defense, they at once attempt to dominate the foreign politics of States and to withdraw from governments the power necessary to keep down internal disturbances and revolutions.

What consequences would attend such an attitude toward the State, were socialism to spread among the masses of the working people, every one must see who is to any extent acquainted with political life. In fact, the socialists themselves are confident that by their methods they will within a short time succeed in overthrowing all modern States.

CHAPTER VI

THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH

When the struggle between the capitalists, centralizing the means of production and the working class, degraded to miserable wage-slavery, shall have reached its climax, it will result in a revolution, by which private property, and with it also the State will be abolished. In place of the latter a new form of society will develop, more perfect than any that has existed heretofore. There will be then no distinction and antagonism of classes, no predominance of rich over dispossessed, no institutions calculated to aid the exploitation of labor, no coercive power to enforce the submission of subjects. The new society will be a commonwealth in which liberty and equality will spontaneously prevail, and the well-being of each will be the condition for the well-being of all. Such, we know, is the hope of socialists and the prediction of their intellectual leaders.

For our purpose it is necessary to outline in few words this new paradise on earth. Its essential features according to the Marxian conception are: Collective ownership in all productive means, social organization of labor and production on a democratic basis, social ownership of the goods

produced by co-operative labor, and in consequence also social distribution of them, a part of them being employed for further production, the rest being distributed for consumption.*

Socialist writers sometimes seriously tell us that it is impossible to foresee what form society will take after the introduction of collective ownership and socialized production; nevertheless, on other occasions, they give us a well-detailed description of the improved conditions that are to be in the new paradise, the co-operative commonwealth. Liebknecht accurately forecasts the democratic constitution of future society.

"In place of the present class rule we will institute a free government of the people. The clear statement of our party programme stamps as a slander the assertion of our opponents that socialism will secure the ruling power in the state for the laboring class. We have already said that the idea of mastery is above all undemocratic and consequently in opposition to the principles of socialism. All demands for liberty made by democracy are likewise demands of the social democracy. The difference between democratic and social democratic is that the latter sees the consequences which the former, entangled in civil prejudices, has not the courage to see. Social democracy is consequently actual democracy. It will bring into existence an organization of the state and society, which, rest-

*Cathrein. Socialism. pp. 54, 244-256.

ing on the equality of all men, will choke the source of inequality, will tolerate neither ruler nor servant and will found a fraternal community of free men."*

Bebel, in his "Woman," draws up a complete picture of the order that is to prevail and the happiness which shall be enjoyed in the socialist commonwealth.

The organic law of socialized society, he says, is *the duty to work on the part of all able to work, without distinction of sex.* The work, however, shall be moderate, agreeable, varied, and productive, and so conditioned, it will furnish to all the means for a pleasant life.

"Socialist society does not come into existence for the purpose of living in proletarian style; *it comes into existence in order to abolish the proletarian style of life for the large majority of humanity.* It seeks to afford to each and all the fullest possible measure of the amenities of life."†

An administration, central and local, chosen by the entire people, without distinction of sex, and embracing all branches of social activity, shall direct the entire production, ascertain the needs of all and determine accordingly the amount of goods to be produced, harmonize and equalize the produc-

*Socialism, What it Is and What it Seeks to Accomplish. Translated by May Wood Simons. p. 8.

†Woman. p. 275.

tive forces, and superintend the work undertaken by individuals according to their tastes and capabilities. Hence shall result a system of labor organized on a plan of absolute liberty and democratic equality, where each stands for all and all stand for each, and where the sense of solidarity reigns supreme. In consequence the antagonism of interests will be removed.

"Each unfolds his faculties in his own interest, and, by so doing, simultaneously benefits the common weal. *The gratification of the ego and the promotion of the common weal harmonize and supplement each other.*"*

Of the extent to which the welfare of all is promoted, the following statements should give us an idea.

"In Socialist society the only consideration is the welfare of its members. Whatever injures them must be stopped."†

"Socialist society produces not 'merchandise' in order to 'buy and to sell'; *it produces the necessaries of life, that are used, consumed, and* otherwise have no object. In socialist society, accordingly, the capacity to consume is not bounded as in bourgeois society, by the individual's capacity to buy; *it is bounded by the collective capacity* to produce. If labor and instruments of labor are in existence, all wants can be satisfied; the social capac-

*Ibid. pp. 276-281.
†Ibid. p. 285.

ity to consume is bounded only by the satisfaction of the consumers."*

As to the cultivation of arts and science, Bebel says:

"*It* (future society) *will have scientists and artists of all sorts in abundance; but all of them will work physically a part of the day, and devote the rest, according to their liking, to study, the arts or companionable intercourse.*†

In the new social order, Bebel goes on to say, there will be no civil authority, no governments, no laws, no courts, no coercive power, no armies.

"Along with the State, die out its representatives—cabinet ministers, parliaments, standing armies, police and constables, courts, district attorneys, prison officials, tariff and tax collectors, in short, the whole political apparatus. Barracks, and such other military structures, places of law and of administration, prisons—all will now await better use. Ten thousand laws, decrees and regulations become so much rubbish; they have only historic value."

All these things will be useless, because the administration of social affairs will be greatly simplified, all members of society being sincerely interested in the common good.

"The great and yet so petty parliamentary strug-

*Woman. p. 291.

†Ibid. p. 290.

gles, with which the men of the tongue imagine they guide and rule the world, are no more; they will have made room for administrative colleges and delegations whose attention will be engaged in the best means of production and distribution, in ascertaining the volume of supplies needed, in introducing and applying effective improvements in art, in architecture, in intercourse, in the process of production, etc. These are practical matters, visible and tangible, towards which every one stands objectively, there being no personal interests hostile to society to affect their judgment. None has any interest other than the collectivity, and that interest consists in instituting and providing everything in the best, most effective and most profitable manner."

A coercive power, courts, and prisons in particular become unnecessary, because there will be neither an occasion nor a motive for crimes.

"Henceforth there are known neither political crimes nor common ones. There are no more thieves, seeing that private property has ceased to be in the means of production, every one can satisfy his wants with ease and comfort by work. Tramps and vagabonds likewise cease to be. They are the product of a social system based on private property; the former cease to be with the latter. And murder? Why? None can grow rich at the expense of another. Even murder out of hate and

revenge follows directly or indirectly from the modern system. Perjury, false testimony, cheating, thefts of inheritance, fraudulent failures? There is no private property on and against which to commit these crimes. Arson? Who is to derive pleasure or satisfaction therefrom, seeing that society removes from him all sources of hatred? Counterfeiting? Why, money has become a chimera, love's labor would be lost. Contempt for religion? Nonsense. It is left to the 'omnipotent and good God' to punish him who should offend Him—provided there be still controversies on the existence of God."*

Bebel's view on the absence of law and government in the future society are held by many other socialist writers. Before him the communist manifesto (Part II) maintained that with the abolition of class distinctions and the concentration of production in the hands of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character, and that the proletariat, when, by a revolution, it shall have swept away the old conditions of production and with them also the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, will abolish its own supremacy as a class.

W. Morris and B. Bax affirm:

"As to the political side of the new society, civilization undertakes the *government of persons* by direct coercion. Socialism would deal primarily

*Woman. pp. 319, 320.

with *the administration of things,* and only secondarily and indirectly would have to do with personal habit and conduct. Civil law, therefore, which is an institution essentially based on private property, would cease to exist, and criminal law, which would tend to be obsolete, would, while it existed, concern itself solely with the protection of persons."*

A. M. Simons makes a statement very similar to Bebel's when he writes:

"Socialism points out that the next stage of economic evolution will be co-operative ownership and operation of industry. There will be no personal advantage in the possession of private property, as such ownership will have lost the power to take the fruits of others' labor. Hence there will naturally be no need of laws to 'protect the rights of private property'; under such conditions all the disagreeable features of government would disappear. Government would simply become an administration of industry. . . . In a co-operative commonwealth the government would be little more than a gigantic information bureau furnishing the citizens exact knowledge regarding the amounts of all kinds of commodities required by the community and notifying them where there is need of labor to be performed. If comparison is to be made at all with present institutions, the government of the future will be much more like

*Socialism, Its Growth and Outcome. pp. 289, 290.

an enormously developed 'statistical bureau' of to-day, rather than an overgrown police department."*

The co-operative commonwealth, based on collective ownership and on equal rights and freedom of all, is considered by socialist writers as a revival of primitive society in a higher form. For return to the primitive state of mankind is thought by them to be the tendency of all social evolution; quite consistently, indeed, with the dialectic method borrowed by Marx from Hegel, according to whose philosophy the negation of the negation, the

*Socialism *vs.* Anarchism. Chicago 1901. pp. 14, 15. Morris Hillquit is not quite so sanguine as Bebel and many other socialists who deny that the co-operative commonwealth will take the form of a State. He is decidedly of the opinion that it will be a definitely organized society with laws and government. We quote the following passages from his Socialism in Theory and Practice. pp. 99, 100.

"If we realize that the socialist commonwealth must of necessity be charged with the direction, regulation or control of at least its principal industries, and with the care of its old and decrepit, sick, invalid and orphaned members, we shall readily see that the socialist organization will have to be something more than a mere 'administration of things'—it will in all likelihood be a quite definitely organized society."

"For the purposes of public works, health, safety and relief, the socialist commonwealth will need vast material resources, probably more than the modern State, and these resources, in whatever form and under whatever designation, can come only from the wealth-producing members of the commonwealth—thus there must be a direct or indirect tax on the labor or income of the citizen. The collection of this tax, the direction of the industries and the regulation of the relations between

reconciliation of the thesis and the antithesis, always results in a higher synthesis.

Engels approvingly quotes Morgan's saying that the future society will be a revival in a higher form of the liberty, equality, and fraternity of the ancient gentes.*

Bebel develops the same idea at full length.

"Human society has traversed, in course of thousands of years, all the various phases of development, to arrive at the end where it started from, —communistic property and complete equality and fraternity, but no longer among congeners alone, but among the whole human race. In that does the great progress consist. . . . Nevertheless while man returns to the starting point in his development, the return is effected upon an infinitely higher social plane than that from which it started. Primitive society held property in common in the gens and clan, but only in the rawest and most undeveloped stage. The process of development that took place since, reduced, it is true, the common

the citizens, will require some laws and some rules and instruments for their enforcement; hence, even the element of coercion cannot be entirely absent in a socialist society, at least not as far as the human mind can at present conceive. The socialist society as conceived by modern socialists differs, of course, very radically from the modern State in form and substance. It is not a class state. . . . It is not the slave-holding state, nor the feudal state, nor the state of the bourgeoisie—it is the socialist state, but a state nevertheless."

*Origin of the Family. etc. p. 217.

property to a small and insignificant vestige, broke up the gentes and finally atomized the whole of society; but, simultaneously, it raised mightily the productivity of society in its various phases and the manifoldness of social necessities, and it created out of the gentes and tribes nations and great States, although it produced again a condition of things that stood in evident contradiction with social requirements. The task of the future is to end the contradiction by the re-transformation upon the broadest basis of property and productive powers into collective property.

"Society retakes what once was its own, but, in accordance with the newly created conditions of production, it places its whole mode of life upon the highest stage of culture, which enables all to enjoy what under more primitive circumstances was the privilege of individuals or individual classes only."*

Loria connects the beginning and the end of social evolution in more poetical language.

"The final social system ought to present the greatest quantitative divergence, and at the same time the closest qualitative analogy with the primitive social form. The last term of history should thus reproduce the first. . . . This tendency of the stream of life to remount to its sources, this circular movement of history, was recognized

*Woman. pp. 347, 348.

intuitively by primitive peoples, who represent the course of historical development by a circle."

"Such is the history of the human race. Out of the brute felicity of primitive communism mankind was cast forth upon the storms and vicissitudes of property. Under the stress of such conditions he has passed through centuries of struggle and martyrdom, until he has finally come to the last stage of his journey, and under the serene skies of a more equitable social system, he now sees peace and justice at last in the conditions of the earlier age, since ripened by civilisation."*

E. Ferri improves on Loria when he says:

"The track of social evolution is not presented by a closed circle, which, like the serpent in the old symbol, cuts off all hope of a better future, but, to use the figure of Goethe, is represented by a spiral, which seems to return upon itself, but which advances and ascends."†

Shall social evolution after this return to its starting point have reached its end? According to the glowing descriptions which represent the co-operative commonwealth as the paradise of mankind, as the highest grade of culture, peace, and happiness, we should think that there could not be a state of higher perfection beyond it. But according to the dialectic method, evolution goes on

*Economic Foundations of Society. pp. 352, 353.

†Socialism and Modern Science. p. 109.

without an end, in such a manner that every stage of development is followed by another, and every synthesis is resolved again into an antagonism between thesis and antithesis. Plainly there is here some inconsistency in socialist philosophy. Either the co-operative commonwealth will, after some time, just like ancient barbarism of which it is but a higher form, come to an end, or dialectic evolutionism needs an essential correction.

The future society as described by the authors quoted is clad in such splendor as should dazzle the eyes of all that take a glance at it, even though only from a great distance, and gladden the hearts of those who now pine away in misery and oppression. Nevertheless there is also a very dark side to it. As such we must characterize its very birth. True, the co-operative commonwealth is conceived by socialist philosophers as the natural outcome of social evolution now approaching its ultimate stage. Capitalist society, as Marx long ago foretold, is doomed to perish by its own intrinsic contradictions and already shows all the symptoms of a speedy dissolution. But, while decaying, it prepares in its bosom the form of a new society. The very centralization of production, which is the cause of the destruction of capitalism, is also the beginning of the socialization of industry. Thus with the downfall of the capitalist State and on its ruins will, by a natural process, rise a new society

in which property and production shall be socialized under the control and management of the entire people. Socialist writers often call attention to this natural rise of the co-operative commonwealth, both to show its inevitable necessity and to allay fears of calamities and catastrophes which might seem to attend its foundation.

But at the same time they do not fail to forewarn us that this new era will be ushered in by a revolution, the greatest of all that have taken place in history. Capitalism, they again and again repeat, can not be overcome but by a most embittered class-struggle, in which the united proletariat of the world will obtain the final victory. Once victorious, the proletariat will overthrow all governments, seize the public powers, expropriate private owners, bring all production and distribution of goods produced under socialized control. This is a thorough and universal revolution, political, social, economic, and, as was shown above, also religious, domestic, and educational; a revolution which, reaching the very foundations of society, pervading all provinces of human life and extending over all the civilized world, can not be brought about in one or two years, but implies a protracted period of transition from the old to the new order; a revolution which will be accomplished by a proletarian government. For during the transition period there will exist a proletarian State according

to Gabriel Deville* and Morris Hillquit,† or a proletarian dictatorship according to Marx. The latter says in his criticism of the program submitted to the Gotha Congress:

"Between the capitalist and the communist society, lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. To this there corresponds also a political transition period, in which the state can be nothing else than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."‡

And finally this is revolution that can not be but violent. True, revolutionary socialism professes to use legal and political means for the achievement of its end. But this holds good as a rule only in times and in countries where political means are at hand sufficient for the purposes to be accomplished. Where they are wanting or insufficient, socialists openly profess that they consider themselves justified in having recourse to violence, provided that there be hope of achieving success by it.

That in saying so we are not mistaken, we understand from a passage in "The Worker," April 28, 1906, in which the methods employed by the socialists in their struggle for victory are specified as follows:

*State and Socialism. p. 42.
†Socialism in Theory and Practice. pp. 100-105.
‡Int. Soc. Rev. May 1908. p. 656.

"Wherever possible it (Socialism) uses political action as its chief method. Side by side with this, separate but parallel, goes on the trade union movement of the working class, generally larger in numbers, but less far-reaching in its aims; the two if wisely used, do not conflict, but support each other. In various countries, to a greater or less extent, we have also the co-operative movement as an auxiliary to the political party of the workers or to their trade unions, or to both. In countries where political or civil rights are denied to the workers or greatly restricted, as in Russia, the method of physical forces is used—either in the form of assassination of despots or in that of armed insurrection by the workers and mutiny in the army and navy. At times the general strike is also used as a revolutionary weapon to compel the extension of the suffrage or to prevent the enforcement of reactionary measures. But in the United States, where manhood suffrage and legal freedom of speech and press and organization generally prevail, political action is the most important function of the Socialist movement."

Other writers are still more positive in justifying the use of violence. Hermon Titus in a letter written to "The Worker" during the Haywood trial, 1907, affirms:

"We are not weak enough to shrink from physical force when progress requires it, but we are not

foolish enough or inhuman enough to employ it without avail."*

Chas H. Kerr, discussing the means which the Socialist Party of America is to employ in the struggle against capitalism, says:

"As to the means by which the capitalist class is to be overthrown, the real question worth considering is what means will prove most effective. If it could best be done by working for 'one thing at a time' and bidding for the votes of the people who have no idea what the class-struggle means, we should no doubt favor that method. But history has made it very clear that such a method is a dead failure. . . . If, on the other hand, the working class could best gain power by taking up arms, just as the capitalist class did when it dislodged the land-holding nobility from power, why not?"†

The socialist press bestows the highest praises on the comrades who have used violence against existing governments, and extols as heroes the members of the Paris Commune who lost their life in the war against the State, as well as the red revolutionists in Russia who in our day had recourse to bloodshed and assassination. And why should it not?

According to socialist ethics all means are morally good which lead to the victory of the prole-

*Worker. June 22, 1907.

†What to Read on Socialism. Nov. 1906. Chicago. p. 10.

tariat. Why, then, should violence not be justified, if it brings success? The working class is the only class that has the right and power to be, it is society, the nation, the true public, while capitalism is but a cancer of the social organism. Why should it not employ violence, when deemed an effective means for emancipation, conquest of power, and introduction of collectivism?

That the revolution will in reality be brought about by violent means the highest socialist authorities foretell in positive terms. We read in the communist manifesto:

"The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole super-incumbent strata of official society being sprung up into the air.

"In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing civil society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

"The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class, and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

"Of course, in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production."

At the congress of The Hague, 1872, Marx declared:

"In most countries of Europe *violence* must be the lever of our social reform. *We must finally have recourse to violence* in order to *establish the rule of labor*. . . . The revolution must be universal, and we find a conspicuous example in the Commune of Paris, which has failed because in other capitals—Berlin and Madrid—a simultaneous revolutionary movement did not break out in connection with this mighty upheaval of the proletariat of Paris."*

Bebel in his work "Unsere Ziele" (p. 44) writes as follows on the use of violence:

"We must not shudder at the thought of the possible employment of violence; we must not raise an alarm cry at the suppression of 'existing rights,' at violent expropriation, etc. History teaches us that at all times new ideas, as a rule, were realized

*Quoted by Cathrein. Socialism. p. 209.

by a violent conflict with the defenders of the past, and that the combatants for new ideas struck blows as deadly as possible at the defenders of antiquity. Not without reason does Karl Marx in his work on 'Capital' exclaim:

"Violence is the obstetrician that waits on every ancient society that is to give birth to a new one; violence is itself a social factor."*

Dietzgen advances a like reason for the necessity of a violent revolution.

"O, ye short-sighted and narrow-minded, who cannot give up the fad of the moderate organic progress! Don't you perceive that all our great liberal passions sink to the level of mere trifling, because the great question of social salvation is on the order of the day? Don't you perceive that struggle and destruction must precede peace and construction, and that chaotic accumulation of material is the necessary condition of systematic organization, just as the calm precedes the tempest and the latter the general purification of the air? . . . History stands still, because she gathers force for a great catastrophe."†

Bax advises a sudden and drastic expropriation of the capitalists by the proletariat as the best method of establishing the new order.

"Justice," he says, "being henceforth (after the victory of the proletariat) identified with *con-*

*Quoted by Cathrein. Ibid.

†Philosophical Essays. pp. 99, 100.

fiscation and *injustice* with the rights of property, there remains only the question of the 'ways and means.' Our bourgeois apologist, admitting as he must that the present possessors of land and capital *hold* possession of them simply by right of superior force, can hardly refuse to admit the right of the proletariat organised to that end to *take* possession of them by right of superior force. The only question remaining is how? And the only answer is how you can. Get what you can that tends in the right direction, by parliamentary action or otherwise, *bien entendu,* the right direction meaning that which curtails the capitalist's power of exploitation. If you choose to ask further how one would like it, the reply is so far as the present writer is concerned, one would like it to come as drastically as possible, as the moral effect of sudden expropriation would be much greater than that of any gradual process. But the sudden expropriation, in other words, the revolutionary crisis, will have to be led up by a series of non-revolutionary political acts. . . . When that crisis comes the great act of confiscation will be the seal of the new era; then and not until then will the knell of Civilization, with its right of property and its class-society, be sounded; then and not until then will *Justice*—the *Justice* not of Civilization but of Socialism—become the corner-stone of the social arch."*

*Ethics of Socialism. p. 82.

Dr. E. Kaeser in his work "Der Sozialdemocrat Hat das Wort" (pp. 1-10) quotes from the minutes of socialist conventions and congresses at Wyden (in Switzerland) 1880, Copenhagen 1883, St. Gall 1887, Halle 1890, Erfurt 1891, Stuttgart 1898, as also from those of the International Congresses of Laborers at Paris 1889, and Zurich 1893, numerous utterances and addresses made by prominent socialist leaders and applauded by the assembled delegates, in which a violent and even bloody revolution is not only justified, but also advocated as a necessary measure.

A future social order, a commonwealth established by means of a violent and even bloody revolution, undoubtedly presents a very dark side, so dark, indeed, that besides a discontented proletariat nobody can be anxious to see its advent. For what else is its coming than a time of war and oppression, a devastating storm, a most distressful catastrophe? It will, of course, be said that these gloomy days will be only transient like a tempest that opens a beautiful springtide. But this seems to be rather a vain hope. The stormy period of transition from the old to the new order can not, as already stated, be of short duration, but requires a length of time which nobody can define. Nay, if the entire ethical system of socialism is taken into consideration, it seems very doubtful, whether it will run out into the halcyon days of the long-expected co-operative commonwealth and not

into an era of chaotic disorder. But this question we reserve for discussion in our concluding treatise.

To review in brief the socialist theory of the State, we must grant that it is in every respect new and unprecedented. It is new in that it takes the State not for an institution of nature, but as a stage of social development consequent on the introduction of private property; new in that it regards the same not as necessary for the welfare of the human race during its earthly existence, but for that of the few only who have possessed themselves of the wealth of the earth by the exploitation of the many; new also in that according to it civil society is not ruled by authority of a moral nature, but by mere physical superiority and coercion, and directed by laws which do not aim at protection of rights and freedom in general, but at oppression of the mass of the people; and new, finally, in that the entire social order existing at present is by its very nature doomed to downfall and destruction, to make room for a new form of society in which morality, freedom, and happiness will be supreme without duties, without laws, without governments. Upon inquiring into the basis of this new theory, we find that it rests entirely on evolutionary materialism and especially on the materialistic conception of history, upon which it is built with remarkable consistency. But resting on such foundations it is open to all the objections to which they are. It

is a one-sided interpretation both of history and of society. It adopts as basic principles Morgan's ethnographical views, though they rest to a great extent not on scientific inquiry but on evolutionary presuppositions, and though they have been proved to be incorrect by the researches of most reliable authorities. It recognizes as the *chief* and *ultimate* cause of historical events no other than economic factors and merely egoistic motives as manifested in embittered class-struggles, though the influence of higher and spiritual ideals, which are far above material and individual and even national interests, is altogether undeniable. It finds in the history of all civilized ages nothing but oppression and misery on the part of the lower classes, and nothing but injustice, exploitation, and luxury on the part of the wealthy, notwithstanding the great deeds that have been achieved for the advancement of material welfare, of mental culture, and of morals. It altogether ignores the nature both of man and of society. For, recognizing in man none but material powers and faculties, it stigmatizes all rational sciences as false ideologies, as absurd and fictitious abstractions, despite the fact that the achievements of the human mind since the dawn of civilization are of all the most wonderful.

Again it represents society merely as the outcome of private property relations and as organized to keep the laboring population in subjection and

miserable servitude, whereas social union is a demand of human nature, and has in the course of time been a source of uncounted benefits for the human race and especially for those in need and wretchedness. Finally, while it is utterly pessimistic with regard to all former ages under civilization, characterizing them as corrupt, immoral, superstitious, and ignorant, it indulges in the rosiest optimism with regard to future society under proletarian administration.

CONCLUSION

Our discussions on the religious and moral attitude of socialism are coming to a close. After having in a former work, "The Characteristics and the Religion of Modern Socialism," examined the socialist teaching concerning God, the Creator, and Christ, the Redeemer, concerning religion in general and Christianity in particular, concerning the nature of man, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, we have in the present volume subjected socialist ethics to a critical analysis. We have searched the very foundations, which socialist philosophers have laid for morality, and scrutinized the views which they hold on law, sanction, obligation, conscience, and motives of right action. Thence proceeding to the precepts for individual conduct and to the theory of society, we have seen what stages they distinguish in social evolution, what evils they find in the present civilization, the family, and the State, what remedies and reforms they advise, to what ultimate form of society they look forward after the introduction of socialized property and control of production, and what duties they regard as essential to social life in its approaching completion.

One thing remains to be done. We still have to determine the final outcome of socialism both as a

social movement and as a scientific system bearing on religion and morality. For this purpose we shall retrace our steps over the wide field we have covered. To do so, we shall first turn our thought to the method we have followed in our discussions, in order to test the solidity of our deductions; then, after having recapitulated and summarized the conclusions reached in our several treatises, we shall point out the final result to which they, taken as a whole, must lead with logical and moral necessity.

I

THE METHOD EMPLOYED IN THE PRECEDING DISCUSSIONS

As to the method we have employed thus far, the reader will easily remember the way we have always proceeded. We have in the first place set forth the teachings of the founders and chief exponents of scientific socialism, especially of Marx and Engels, who are still recognized as the classical authors, from whom the true and genuine theory of socialism should be learned. Then we have rendered the views of later and more recent writers, who, after commenting upon and completing the fundamental tenets of the former in accordance with modern views, are spreading them nowadays among the masses in a more popular form. The teaching of both the one and the other

class of authors we have ascertained in most cases by recurring directly to their own writings, and when this was not possible, to altogether reliable secondary sources. Our quotations from standard works of the classical authors, because usually extensive, afford a full understanding of the genuine socialist theory; those taken from the writings of later expounders, various and numerous as they are, contain the views of nearly all contemporary leaders of the socialist movement.

That we have, indeed, set forth the genuine socialist philosophy, must be inferred from the perfect agreement which we find in all essentials among the various authors quoted. We have heard socialists from nearly all civilized countries, of every time and date from 1848, when the communist manifesto was published, down to the International Congress at Stuttgart in 1907, men of divers conditions and callings in life, of different grades of culture and of various nationalities. And what is the outcome? At least as far as the revolutionary wing is concerned, which forms the main body of the socialist army, they all expound substantially the same doctrine. They all profess the same fundamental tenets explained by Marx and Engels; espouse evolutionary materialism and, consequently, oppose Christianity and, in general, any form of divine worship; regard economic conditions as the ultimate basis of religion, morals, science, and social life; consider

private property in the means of production as the cause of all corruption, immorality, and oppression in modern society; look upon the monogamous family and the State as merely capitalistic institutions contrary to nature and doomed to disappear; stir up an irreconcilable class struggle, in order to emancipate the dispossessed proletariat, to seize political power, and found on the basis of collectivism a new commonwealth in which happiness, freedom, and equality shall be guaranteed to all without distinction. Though differing in minor details, their views supplement one another and, built up on the same basis, constitute one complete economic, social, and political system. Thus corroborated by their mutual agreement, our quotations can not possibly be an untrue or distorted statement of the socialist theory.

We deem these remarks necessary on account of the tactics constantly followed by socialists. When attacked, they nearly always complain of misstatements and misrepresentations, to which their doctrine is subjected, and, to disprove the arguments advanced against their teachings, prefer against their adversaries even charges of deliberate and malicious untruthfulness. We have carefully avoided anything that might give reason for such complaints.

The charge of dishonesty so frequently preferred by socialists against their opponents justifies in this place some exposition of their own tac-

tics, to ascertain the degree of honesty which they themselves observe in their controversies. For he who demands fairness of others is expected to regard strict fairness on his part as an indispensable duty, and, if found to be wanting in it, is considered to have forfeited his right of complaining. What, then, do we constantly observe in this regard in socialist writers and speakers?

They profess the socialist theory as conceived and set forth by Marx and Engels—scientific socialism—but when the latter are attacked, they shift their position by modifying their masters' teachings. They advertise and praise certain writings of their intellectual leaders as standard works from which genuine socialism must be learned, yet when the doctrines contained in them are refuted, they appeal to their platforms as symbols of their faith. They glory in materialistic evolution as the only true scientific system and maintain it to be fundamental to their philosophy; but when they are accused of materialism, they answer that some only of their rank are materialists and atheists, and even these not as socialists, but only as individuals. They most fiercely attack religion and especially Christianity, impugning its very foundation and proposing measures for its complete suppression; but when called to account, disown hostility and profess the sincerest religious toleration. In full consistency with the materialistic conception of history, they condemn in the most outspoken terms

monogamous marriage and propose free-love as the ideal sexual relation; but protest indignantly when accused of undermining the sacredness, unity, and existence of the family. If socialism can at any moment alter its tenets as a chameleon changes its colors, then, indeed, its advocates may on every occasion charge their opponents with misrepresentation. But who does not see that such tactics are foul play?

Carrying on an unrelenting war against the Catholic Church in particular, they never tire of condemning its doctrines as false and absurd, of reviling every one of its institutions, of discrediting its noblest works of charity, of charging it with hypocrisy and self-interest, with neglecting the poor and ignorant, with co-operation with the capitalists in oppressing the dispossessed classes. In the meantime it is quite evident that they are utterly ignorant of all Catholic teaching; that they have altogether neglected to study the genuine sources in which Catholic dogma is contained, or the classical and recognized theological authors by whom it is explained; nay, that they have not even attentively perused a catechism in which the elements of Christian faith are set forth. Nor have they ever closely inspected Catholic institutions, or taken care to measure the extent of the work which the Church has undertaken during so many centuries for the improvement of morals, the advancement of arts and science, and the relief of the poor, the sick, and

the oppressed. They overlook the grand monuments still extant as proofs of the mission she has fulfilled and remain unacquainted with the many and most reliable researches which have been made in our very day, to bring to light the history of the Christian era. Or if they have any knowledge of their existence, they set them aside and draw their information from authors who, full of prejudice and inflamed with hatred against Christianity, distort what is good and grand in it, and with special predilection relate and exaggerate the faults they can descry in its adherents.

We abstain from further recriminations. Only one remark we can not refrain from adding as a necessary conclusion. It is to the effect that socialists, when accusing their opponents of dishonesty, while they themselves employ the most unfair methods to defend their system or to refute objections raised against their teachings, in all justice deserve to be ruled out of court.

II

THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT

BUT to return to our subject. What conclusions have we arrived at by our method of inquiring into the doctrinal system of socialism, that is, by reproducing the views of leading socialist writers in their own words in lengthy and numerous quotations?

As evolutionary materialists, modern socialists have completely done away with the spiritual or immaterial order of things. According to their philosophy there is no supreme supramundane Being, no God, self-existent, infinite, and eternal, no Ultimate Cause, Creator, and Ruler of this visible universe. Nor is there in man a spiritual and immortal soul distinct from his physical organism. The only reality they admit is matter.

And what is matter itself? The socialists, as empiricists, find in the material world nothing but qualities that strike the senses, without a substratum underlying them; as evolutionists, nothing but fleeting phenomena which succeed one another in an uninterrupted series without an element persistent in them. Matter, indeed, is thus reduced to a very thin and flimsy reality.

The ever-succeeding phenomena, both physical and psychical, are produced by no other than material forces and organic faculties, and governed and reduced to order by no other laws than those common to the whole material universe. There are, therefore, no supersensible, eternal, unchangeable truths; no ideals, which, shining above the ever-changing world, enlighten the mind; no rules of a divine or superhuman origin that direct and elevate the human will. Religion conceived as a divine worship is, consequently, only absurd superstition; Church and Christianity, as they now exist, are human institutions organized by the possessing

classes for the purpose of consolidating their rule and of furthering the oppression and exploitation of the working people. Religious creeds of any description will disappear with the spreading of materialistic science and with the abolition of the present economic conditions on which they rest as their natural basis.

Morality, likewise, is shattered to its foundations. There is, according to socialist philosophy, no essential distinction between good and evil, in so much that the same actions which are good at one time may be bad at another and *vice versa*. Whatever furthers at any time the social interests, in accordance with prevailing economic conditions, is morally good; hence morality is different in primitive, slave, feudal, capitalistic, and future society.

There is no divine supreme good, for which man is made and in the possession of which he is destined to attain happiness in an immortal life to come; man's end is the temporal welfare of the society of which he is a member. There is no divine lawgiver who enacts moral laws and sanctions them by dealing out rewards for their observance and punishments for their transgression; no moral obligation binding in conscience, no free will and, consequently, no responsibility for actions done or omitted. The moral precepts that are acknowledged to exist are but temporary and changeable; for they are said to result in part from social needs and economic conditions, in part from the social

instinct developed in man by gradual evolution, an instinct merely organic and in its kind not higher than that of reproduction. Precepts of this sort are enforced by physical coercion and public opinion as long as society is yet imperfect, but need no sanction when social evolution will have reached its last stage.

Lastly, the realm of morality is reduced to a minimum. Private or individual conduct does not belong to, but is altogether outside of it. Sexual and matrimonial relations likewise, because they are considered to be private, are exempt from moral precepts and left merely to the direction of good taste. The proper sphere of morality is social life. But, in the present order of things and under the economic conditions now prevailing, when the working class is growing into power, the laws of the State are no longer moral and of binding force, because they are not enacted by legitimate authority and tend only to oppression of the majority, the real body of society. At present only those actions are morally good which make for the overthrow of the capitalistic rule and only those are bad which retard the victory of the proletariat.

As the moral so also the social order now existing loses its ground and is overthrown. The societies which civilization has brought into being are doomed to extinction. Monogamous marriage will be abolished and in its stead free-love marriage will come in vogue, which, lacking unity and stabil-

ity, can not be considered as a society in the proper sense. Parental society, likewise, will disappear, because the commonwealth will take upon itself the education of children. Private associations for the purpose of production or distribution, the relations between master and servant, employer and employee will be discontinued, and even the State will die out. For all these societies were built on the basis of private property in the productive means, and hence with the introduction of collectivism must vanish by natural necessity.

This is a short and plain recapitulation of the conclusions we have arrived at. Every clause contained in it was discussed at full length in the preceding treatises; every particular conclusion, as the reader may remember, was inferred either from the fundamental tenets of socialism, or from the utterances of socialist speakers and writers. Nor is this, we may add, only our own recapitulation of the socialist theory. Robert Rives La Monte similarly sums up his work, "Socialism, Positive and Negative," in the following words:

"The thesis, that the realization of the socialist ideal involves the atrophy of Religion, the metamorphosis of the Family, and the suicide of the State, would now appear to be sufficiently demonstrated."*

To concentrate our conclusions still further and to sum them up in one word, we may say that we

*Socialism, Positive and Negative. p. 114.

have found socialism to be of a destructive nature. For, it works utter destruction both from a theoretical and a practical point of view; from the one it denies all reality except the phenomena proper to matter, from the other it tends to shatter the triple order, or the triple realm, in which heretofore men were living, religion, morality, and society.

But though this be so and be even granted by consistent socialists, it is nevertheless denied that universal destruction is the last outcome of socialism. Destruction, according to the evolutionary theory, is the rise of new life, and the disappearance of one form implies the sprouting forth of another. Socialism, it is said, is the negation of superstition, error, and falsehood; it gives the death blow to a decrepit order of things which is the embodiment of wrong and injustice, and by this very fact brings into existence a new order of truth, peace, justice, and happiness. Hence it is maintained that socialism, though it is at first destructive, is ultimately constructive, even more than any other philosophical system or social movement has been heretofore.

Hence arises the last question we have to solve before concluding.

III

THE FINAL OUTCOME OF SOCIALISM

To make good their contention, socialist philosophers ought to prove two things: first, that their theory is a negation of error, superstition, hypocrisy, and systematical oppression, and secondly, that after they have completed their work of destruction, there will still remain a solid foundation for a better order of society. That theism, Christianity, Christian ethics are merely error and hypocrisy, and the social order based on Christian morals is a system of oppression, socialists certainly have not yet proved, and, we may confidently say, will never be able to prove. But this point we need not discuss here. We direct our attention chiefly to the question, whether, when socialistic destruction shall be completed, a seed will yet be left, from which a new and higher life may sprout, or a basis on which a better order of human relations may be built up.

Since religion, as far as it is worship of a personal deity, will die out in future society according to socialist views, and humanitarianism, which some would fain substitute for it, coincides with morality, the question here to be discussed directly concerns only the moral and the social order. What foundations, then, will remain for these two orders after the great socialist revolution both in life and

philosophy shall be accomplished? On what basis may morality still be built up, when belief in God, the supreme good, the supreme Lord, Ruler, and Lawgiver has been uprooted, when conscience, moral obligation, and responsibility have been done away with, and divine sanction of the moral law, especially beyond the grave, has been declared to be a fiction? And on what ground can society rest, if the family and the State are not institutions of rational nature or rather of the Creator and Orderer of it, but the result of ever changing economic conditions; if the members which compose it are naturally free, independent, equal in rights, and under no authority of human or divine law, but directed only by their innate instincts and inclinations?

In Part I, Chapter V, we related that several attempts have been made by socialist philosophers to reconstruct the moral and social order even under the presuppositions just mentioned. They may in short be reduced to two classes, which, though starting from opposite points of view, aim at the same object. The one derives righteousness of conduct directly from the influence of better environment, the other, on the contrary, from social instincts developed and perfected under the normal economic conditions which are to exist in future society. The latter kind of attempts suited the more sanguine socialists, as Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Untermann, Herron; the former those of a more realistic disposition, like Achille Loria.

In all such reconstructive attempts made by socialists the moral and the social order are supposed to coincide completely; and morality is assumed to be not of a spiritual, but of a bodily and organic nature, because resulting from external and material causes or merely animal and organic instincts and dispositions. Of course, it might at once be objected that this is not the morality proper to rational and free man, endowed with the knowledge of higher and immaterial goods and naturally aspiring to supersensible and imperishable ends, and that, on this account, every reconstruction of true morality founded on socialist philosophy is in advance sure to be a failure. But we waive this point. For the present we only inquire whether socialists may succeed at least in reconstructing on the basis left for them such materialistic morality as they foretell will prevail in the coming co-operative commonwealth.

Let us first examine Loria's attempt in particular. Not believing in the possibility of changing human nature in itself, he is of the opinion that under an economic system, in which all men will be free and equal, motives for doing wrong will be totally absent.*

Even were in final society such an economic environment to exist as will ensure freedom and equality to all, free land economy and mixed association of labor, undoubtedly man would abstain

*Economic Foundations of Society. pp. 13-16.

from injury and usurpation only in the supposition that he be free from passion and obey in his actions only the dictates of cool reason. For as long as passionate impulses exercise an influence on human conduct, men will, blindfolded as it were, often do what turns to their disadvantage and even to their destruction. But that under economic conditions, in which men are free and equal, passions will become extinct in the human heart, Loria can not admit. He would, if he did, contradict himself, since he does not believe in the possibility of changing human nature.

This, however, is not the main difficulty he has to encounter in defending his theory. The first question that presents itself is, whether economic conditions, under which freedom and equality of all are guaranteed, can subsist among men for any length of time. Under his presuppositions the answer can not but be in the negative. He supposes men moved and guided only by egoistic instincts and propensities, subject to no superior power, exempt from any higher law, restrained by no moral precepts. But egoism, free and unrestrained, does not tend to establish economic equality. Men are driven by their egoistic tendencies to outdo others, to gain advantages over them, to acquire pre-eminence, to obtain more abundant means for the gratification of their desires. Human individuals being naturally unequal in their gifts and abilities, those who are better endowed will succeed in at-

taining greater power, wider influence, more means, and larger possessions. Thus situated, they will singly or conjointly overcome the weaker and reduce them to dependence. Should society oppose their interests, they will revolutionize it and reconstruct it according to their ideas. What power could impede their success, when nature itself has made men unequal in their endowments; or what objection could be raised against their right of subjecting others, when there is no law and no higher power to restrain them? Loria starts from the same suppositions as the liberal economists, from the unrestricted freedom and equality of men in their economic relations, and from egoism as the only motive of human action. But hence arises free competition, and from this results inequality in possessions and political power, riches on the one side and poverty on the other, a ruling class consisting chiefly of the propertied, and a ruled class made up mostly of the propertiless. This is the very order of things that once existed in Greece and Rome, the very condition of modern society, which socialists hate and denounce, the very inequality which they condemn and combat.*

Loria's proposal, therefore, must of necessity end in failure. The reconstruction of the moral and social order advocated by him rests essentially on the equal economic conditions of men as the

*See J. G. Brooks, The Social Unrest, New York 1903. pp. 222-243.

means necessary and sufficient to regulate human conduct. But such equality can never be realized in the double supposition that men are essentially egoistic so as to act only from egoistic motives, and are at the same time, while altogether unequal in their natural endowments, left free and unrestrained in their egoistic pursuits. Either a preexisting higher law must effectively control egoism and thus establish a moral order, or equality in the economic conditions will never come into existence.

Will the attempt of the more sanguine socialists be more successful? They suppose, as was said above, that the economic environment to exist in future society will thoroughly change egoistic human nature, by developing in it social instincts and sympathies, disinterestedness and zeal for the common weal, horror of wrong and love of justice. Such a happy change being brought about, men will spontaneously be good and moral, just and righteous, without the behest of any authority, without hope or fear of any retribution, merely by an impulse from within. Above in Part I, Chapter V, we quoted a good many socialist authorities, from Karl Marx down to the most recent writers, who set forth at full length how under communism human nature, freed from the perversity which was generated in it by capitalistic ages, shall be awakened to the noblest moral aspirations. If E. Untermann is correct, we might have quoted many more authorities. For he says:

"Change conditions, and you change human nature. That is the refrain through all the works of proletarian thinkers of modern times."*

The hopes of these philosophers are very sanguine, but they fail like those of Loria as soon as their arguments are sifted. First of all, is a change of nature to be expected as probable? Certainly not if we consult history. Through all past ages the human heart has remained the same. If we go back in history as far as the Babylonian and Assyrian antiquities recently unearthed, to the Egyptian inscriptions and papyri found in the pyramids, to the books of Moses and the poems of Homer, man in all these monuments appears with the same passions and inclinations, the same tendencies, the same emotions, and the same weakness of will which we observe in him this very day. He was then, as he is to-day, prone to anger, revenge, avarice, lust, anxious to domineer, naturally impatient of submission and oppression, unwilling to undergo labor and hardships unless allured by the hope of gain and success, mostly self-seeking, seldom generous and disinterested. His mind, though taking delight in the knowledge of truth and bent on inquiry, was and is still easily warped by prejudice and passion and therefore apt to embrace the most fatal errors. His will was, as it is now, longing for happiness in the supreme good, and loved right and justice, but owing to the pres-

*The World's Revolutions. p. 162.

sure of sensual impulses, was prone to vice and inordinate gratifications. Only the highest spiritual ideals and supernatural institutions as found in Christianity, have exercised an influence powerful enough to redeem men from their natural weakness, and to elevate them above their congenital inclinations, to a higher plane of morality; an influence, however, to which the majority of mankind has refused to yield or even to be subject. Nay, according to socialist teaching, the human character has in the course of history not only not improved, but has become ever worse, ever more egoistic, ever meaner, and ever more corrupt.

If during such length of ages, from the dawn of historical times down to our day, under various circumstances, under manifold material, political, cultural, and religious conditions, human nature has remained unchanged and preserved the same innate passions and propensities, will it be thoroughly transformed all over the earth in the near future, not by any ideal, spiritual, or supernatural influence, but merely by the introduction of new economic conditions? The experience made through all ages does not justify such an assumption. What reason, then, can socialist philosophers advance for it? Nothing but the universality of evolution.

Because gradual development and transformation of species are found in the vegetable and animal kingdom, they infer that evolution must be universal and hence comprise also the human race.

But by so reasoning they plainly commit themselves to a self-contradiction. For they promise to establish evolutionism as a universal theory merely by experience and by no *a priori* principles. But now they are to prove its applicability to mankind not from experience, but admit it against experience. Nay, more, they evidently move in a vicious circle. For they prove the transformation of human nature from the universality of evolution, and *vice versa* can not maintain evolution to be universal, before they have evinced the evolution of the human race as an undeniable fact, and have evinced it from experience alone.

But to come still nearer to the point, evolution as conceived by socialist philosophers will never succeed in transforming and ennobling the nature and character of man to such a degree, that charity and justice will be generally exercised in society without the control of law and religion, merely by the impulse of social instincts.

Let us consider the moral condition of society at the time, when, according to socialist predictions, the proletariat will have seized the supreme political power and made the first attempts at socializing the means of production. What an amount of corruption will just then exist and demand reformation? The capitalists will have reached the climax of depravity. Their cold and heartless egoism, their greed and craving for oppression and unjust exploitation, their degrading voluptuousness will

have grown to an unparalleled degree. This statement will be denied by no socialist. The middle classes and independent farmers, if there be any left, will undoubtedly live in very abnormal conditions, entailing on them much misery and hence preventing their moral development. The workingmen and their families must be stunted by their long-protracted wretchedness, ill-bred on account of the oppression through all the capitalistic ages, embittered and inclined to violence owing to the class struggle to which they were accustomed in the immediately preceding epoch.

Best disposed of all should be the socialists, for they are already educated by their leaders through the press and numerous addresses. But to judge from their conduct, it would seem that this careful training is of little avail. Not to speak of the immoderate hatred they bear to the possessing classes and in general to all that show themselves opposed to their aims, there is a lack of harmony and fraternal feeling among their own ranks. The whole world is witness to the rudeness shown and the oral outrages committed in the Congress at Dresden in 1903 and even of late in the International Congress at Stuttgart. What bitter strifes among the different parties and divisions in France and Italy, does not the socialist press itself continually report? Again how intense is not the hostility that at present divides the Socialist Party of America and the Socialist Labor Party? What

scenes of discord were enacted in New York* and later on in Chicago and Indianapolis, when the Socialist Party was formed! That even of late, factions, egoistic and unsocial sentiments, exist among American socialists no less than among the capitalists, we must infer from admonitions administered to them by Herron in the International Socialist Review, April, 1904. He says in part:

"It is high time that the Socialist movement shall pass beyond the factional or personal stage of its growth."

*In a meeting of July 8, 1899, a pitched battle took place, of which Frederick Heath, a socialist himself, in his "Brief History of Socialism in America" (p. 72) gives the following description:

"The meeting had scarcely begun before the two factions came to blows. The following from the account of one of the eye-witnesses will give some idea of the scene that followed. 'This act of violence on the part of Keep was the signal for an outburst of passion seldom witnessed in any political meeting, much less in a meeting of Socialists. The delegates pummeled each other until blood was soon flowing from many wounds. Men were sprawling upon the floor, others were fighting in the corners, upon the tables, chairs and upon the piano, Hugo Vogt having climbed upon the latter, yelling and fairly foaming from the mouth,' etc. Finally the DeLeon contingent withdrew.

"On Monday July 10, another fight took place. The 'Volkszeitung' faction had held a meeting, deposed the National Committee and elected one in its stead. A committee was sent to the officers of the 'People' to demand the party property. They attempted to force their way in and were repulsed by DeLeon and others, who were in possession, with clubs, bottles and other weapons. The police were called in and obliged the intruders to retire."

"The closer we examine the causes of most of our factional troubles, the more we will find them to be personal self-seeking, masquerading as principle. Men unconsciously seize upon some fragment of a truth or principle and make it a platform upon which to exalt themselves. Personal ambition is essential treason anyhow, and the self-seeker will always unconsciously or consciously lead or direct a movement or faction in the interest of his self-seeking. And it is time we understood this self-seeking origin and nature of nearly all our factional troubles, and that we outgrow them by relating ourselves to the larger outlook and opportunity of the Socialist movement. It is time that we put away these childish things, in order to seize upon greater things that are unused in our hands."

"Our factions are a part of our capitalist inheritance. They are survivals of the animal mind of capitalism. They are the persistence of the competitive spirit that has produced the capitalist monster.

"For capitalism is but the survival of the animal in man; the survival of the predatory world in the jungle. Our present industrial world is due to the fact that we have not yet become human; that we are still beasts of prey fighting with each other for our bread. Those of us who possess are but the lion, or the tiger, or the wolf, with paw upon their prey. We are still cannibals, by economic indirection, still peeping from the forest of our primal

experience, still waiting to be evolved into the human."*

The bitter dissensions existing at this very moment among American socialists about political organizations and industrial unionism are ample proof that Herron's warning is to the point.†

The beast of prey and the cannibal, of whom he speaks, will undoubtedly remain in the socialists up to the day on which they shall gain possession of the public power. For the advent of the commonwealth is, as we hear it said, near at hand, and within so short a time a thorough change of their nature is not possible. Moreover, moral development is said to depend on the economic conditions and the social environment in which men live. But up to the actual establishment of the future society there will be the old economic relations and the old social surroundings, which, as socialist philosophers maintain, have thus far brutalized the human character. Furthermore, the unrelenting war which socialists carry on against capitalism, the hatred they nourish in their hearts and inflame in others, the fights and strifes they continually rouse and foster, sometimes even by violent methods, are certainly more suited to inflame their passions and to intensify their inherited fierce-

*Int. Soc. Rev. April 1904. pp. 581, 582.

†See Untermann's article in the Int. Soc. Rev. March 1908. pp. 538-547.

ness than to soften their hearts and fill them with tender sympathies.

Now in what manner shall this universal corruption of morals, which has become a second nature of the capitalist class, this inveterate egoism, these remnants of brutality, which are still the inheritance of the working classes and even of the socialists, be remedied and uprooted in the human heart, when the happy times of the co-operative commonwealth shall have dawned? It would certainly be most unreasonable to maintain that the mere seizure of the governmental power by the proletariat, or the proclamation of the communistic republic will heal human hearts and regenerate them to righteousness as the sun in spring melts the icy surface of the earth and awakens nature to new life. This would be the most astounding phenomenon ever seen, contrary to all laws thus far known. The socialists themselves, with whom we deal, do not entertain such an idea, nor could they consistently with their evolutionary materialism. The change of human character will, in their opinion, be brought about by evolution under the influence of better economic conditions and social environment prevailing in the new commonwealth, and in accordance with the universal laws of the great world-process.

But is such evolutionary transformation of man's nature possible, or probable, and how shall it take place? Evolution, in general, may change species

in two ways, which are described by Hugo de Vries in the following paragraphs.

"On this point Darwin has recognized two possibilities. One means of change lies in the sudden and spontaneous production of new forms from the old stock. The other method is the gradual accumulation of those always present and ever fluctuating variations which are indicated by the common assertion that no two individuals of a given race are exactly alike. The first changes are what we call 'mutations'; the second are designated as 'individual variations' or as the term is often used in another sense as 'fluctuations.' "

"The actual occurrence of mutations is now recognized, and the battle rages about the question as to whether they are to be regarded as the principal means of evolution, or, whether slow and gradual changes have also played a large and important part.

"Mutations under observation are as yet very rare; enough to indicate the possible and most probable ways, but no more. On the other hand the accumulation of fluctuations does not transgress relatively narrow limits as far as the present methods of observation go."*

"The principle of natural selection is the sifting out of all organisms of minor worth through the

*Species and Varieties. By Hugo de Vries. Chicago 1906. pp. 7, 8.

struggle of life. It is only a sieve, and not a force of nature, not a direct cause of improvement, as many of Darwin's adversaries, and unfortunately many of his followers also, have so often asserted. It is only a sieve which decides what is to live and what is to die."

"Natural selection may explain the survival of the fittest, but it cannot explain the arrival of the fittest."*

From these explanations we must infer that neither the theory of mutations nor that of fluctuations or variations has thus far been *generally* verified by experience; and least of all are they verified as far as human evolution is concerned. Accumulation of varieties is nowadays regarded by the majority of scientists as insufficient to explain the origin of species. Mutation has been observed only in few species of plants and animals, and has in most cases been obtained only by artificial experiments. The species thus produced, in order to become permanent, must usually be secluded from others, as otherwise they disappear by intercourse with them. Universal evolution, and human evolution in particular, is, therefore, by no means as yet an *established fact* or a certain theory, so that socialists may recur to it as an incontestable

*Species and Varieties. By Hugo de Vries. Chicago 1906. pp. 6, 825. A. M. Simons prefers De Vries' theory of mutation (Int. Soc. Rev. Sept. 1905. p. 172). Raphael Buck recommends Darwin's theory of fluctuations (Ibid. May 1902. p. 782).

proof for the transformation of human nature in final society.

But let us for the sake of argument make abstraction from the want of evidence furnished by experience, and inquire only what conclusions may be drawn from evolution in favor of socialism. This much is certain, that according to the hypothesis of mutation as well as of fluctuations the change of nature and character in the human race can not be but very slow. By accumulated fluctuations, as Darwinists generally grant, species are transformed only within periods of thousands and even millions of years. Mutation will scarcely be less slow, if there is question of the transformation of nature not only in some individuals but in the whole human race. For though it produces new species at once, it leaves the old stock, from which the new forms sprang, unchanged. Hence it happens that improved and not improved species will live together. But by such a mixture improvements obtained are easily lost again. Selection also extinguishes the lower species very slowly in the struggle for existence or rather, as far as present experience proves, it extinguishes only some and allows thousands and thousands of them to continue their existence.

It will, consequently, be necessary to admit a period of transition between the moment that the proletariat seizes the public power and the time that the nature and moral character of the human race will be completely transformed; and this

period can not possibly be short, but must necessarily be of a long, nay indefinite duration. But if this be so, the question presents itself, of what kind will the social and economic conditions be which during this transition period are to prevail and to exercise an influence on human character?

Economic equality can not at that time be introduced. Many socialists admit that in the beginning of the commonwealth the farmers will not be expropriated, and smaller industries will not be suppressed. Distribution also will be unequal, because it will be made in proportion to work performed. This is expressly granted by Marx.

"Each producer (laborer) will receive—after deduction has been made for the needs of society—exactly what he has contributed. His contribution is his individual share of labor." . . . "The society will give him a certificate that he has furnished a certain quantity of work . . . and showing his certificate he will draw from the society's stores an amount of provisions equivalent in value to his work. The amount of work given to the society in one shape is again received in another."

Hence Marx concludes:

"In substance as well as in their nature rights will be unequal, . . . but these inconveniences are unavoidable during this first period of communist society which, after long travailing, is just then issuing from the womb of capitalist society. Right

can never be superior to economic conditions and to the development of civilization determined by them."

Only in a later and *more perfect* society will each one receive according to his needs.

"In a higher phase of communist society, after slavish subordination of the individual under the divisions of labor, and consequently the opposition between mental and bodily work has disappeared; after labor has ceased to be merely the means of sustaining life, but has become an urgent desire; after the individual has become more perfect in every respect, increasing thereby also the productive forces and giving full play to the fountains of co-operative wealth—then only the narrow ordinary barriers of right and justice can be demolished, and society may inscribe upon its banner: Each one according to his abilities, to each one according to his needs."*

During the transition period there will also exist a government. For egoistic and discordant as men will still be, they can co-exist and co-operate for the common good only under the direction of authority exercising effectual coercion. But this government, as was stated above, will be conducted by the victorious proletariat, which, after over-

*Quoted by Cathrein. Socialism. pp. 55, 56. From Capital. vol. i. pp. 566, 567. The same passage in substance is found also in Marx's criticism of the program submitted to the Gotha Congress of 1875. See Int. Soc. Rev. May 1908. pp. 648, 649.

throwing capitalistic society by a violent revolution, will confiscate the large possessions of the ruling class and forcibly prevent the "expropriated exproprietors" from recovering their former wealth, or, as Marx says in the communist manifesto, make despotic inroads on the rights of property.

And what kind of social relations will exist among the members of the proletarian State? The expropriated, undoubtedly, will submit to the victorious majority only reluctantly, only with the most embittered feelings, remaining always bent on resistance. Those who are not imbued with socialist principles will detest the new government and long for its abolition. The proletarians themselves will be anxious to take revenge on their former oppressors and exercise their power with harshness, rigor, or even cruelty. Still egoistic, addicted to self-interest and accustomed to contention, as they are, they will not agree among themselves, any more than they do at present, so long as they do not submit to a higher power that could unite, or to a law that could restrain them.

There will, consequently, be no harmony and unity in government. Besides government will be merely coercive. Having no authority to lay the members of the State under moral obligation, or enact laws binding in conscience, its power consists merely in the arbitrary and absolute will and the main force of the proletarian majority, and the acts by which it maintains some order will consist

but in compulsion. But force arbitrarily exercised by a selfish majority in its own interest is the worst of all tyrannies. Hence must of necessity result discontent with public administration; discontent with the distribution of work as well as with the distribution of products, not to speak of confiscation and expropriation; discontent with the prohibition of private production; discontent with the manner in which public education is conducted. There will be discord not only between those in power, between the government and the citizens, but also among the individual members of the republic on account of clashing interests and difference of opinion; nay more, there will be mutual hatred and aversion on account of injuries and disadvantages suffered and opposition experienced. Passions thus being excited and not restrained by a moral law, fights, strifes, attacks will inevitably be frequent, if not perpetual occurrences. Resistance to government, attempts to overthrow it, revolts and civil wars can not but be necessary consequences.

Will human character in such social environments be improved? Will egoism disappear, devotedness to the commonweal be fostered? Will justice and mutual love blossom? To think so would be a plain absurdity. The socialists themselves could not entertain such an idea. Human nature, as they teach, will be changed in a later period of the commonwealth, when perfect equality of rights and opportunities shall be established,

coercion by government will not be necessary, well-organized social labor will produce plenty of means of subsistence; frictions, opposition, clashing of interests, compulsion, and oppression will no longer exist, and, instead of strifes which engender bitterness, universal peace and concord will reign. Evidently, then, during the transition period human nature will not be changed, and character will not be improved.

But, it is said, this transition period will run out into the felicitous conditions of final society as the necessary terminus of universal evolution. What reasons are there to think so? To conceive such a progress to a higher stage of evolution as possible, it would be necessary that the co-operative commonwealth with its peace and plenty be precontained in the conditions of the transition period as in its cause. This is granted also by socialists. Marx and others after him tell us in clear terms, that every new form of society must be prepared in the bosom of the preceding one from which it is developed. But in the social disorder which of necessity will reign in the transition period, the perfect peace and order of the co-operative commonwealth is certainly not preformed or predetermined. According to all historical experience and in accordance with all principles of reason, we must expect that the heat of unbridled passions, universal discord, unabated egoism, general dissatisfaction, the absence of laws binding in conscience

and of the influence exercised by religion, the harshness and arbitrariness of government, conducted by the victorious proletariat with unrestricted power and the use of main force, will result in the violent dissolution of society. No, the seizure of the public power by the proletariat, the establishment of a proletarian government, the confiscation of private property, the introduction of collective ownership and socialized production and distribution, will not end in an ideal democratic commonwealth, in a peaceful and happy social life, but in wretched disorder, in a most gloomy chaos.

On the ground of the preceding considerations we must characterize as false and absurd the assumption itself, that the perfect social and economic conditions which are supposed to prevail in future society will improve and regenerate corrupted human nature. These much praised normal economic conditions, these happy and peaceful social surroundings, will come into existence and be maintained for any length of time only when men shall have outgrown their evil habits and inveterate egoism, when they shall have been accustomed to sacrifice personal to public interests, when discord and jealousy shall have died out, when all shall have learned to take delight in labors of whatever kind for the common welfare and to restrict the satisfaction of their needs and the gratification of their inclinations as far as the well-being of their fellow-men requires; in a word, when the moral

character of the members of the community shall have reached a very high degree of excellence. The assertion, therefore, that human nature as to its moral tendencies will be regenerated by the economic and social environment which is to exist in a later and more perfect period of the co-operative commonwealth, is a vicious circle. For what is a necessary prerequisite, a cause of the perfect and normal environment, is asserted to be its effect. Moral integrity, in a high degree, is the very basis on which the commonwealth must be built up, if it is to exist lastingly and to ensure plenty, peace, and happiness. And this very integrity and perfection, so sorely wanting not only during all capitalistic ages but also in the period of transition, is maintained to be the outcome and the result of the happy conditions to exist in the co-operative commonwealth, the final society.

The hope, then, that human nature will be changed and morally regenerated when the last stage of evolution will have arrived in socialist society, is vain, because based on imagination, on a mere sophism, on an absurd assumption. But this being so, the foundations of the social and moral order ultimately had recourse to by socialist philosophers have vanished. The destruction of morality and of society, domestic and civil, wrought by them is complete; so complete that absolutely no basis for them remains, so thorough, that there are only

ruins left, on which it is impossible to build up a new structure.

The ultimate outcome of socialism, then, is annihilation of morality as well as of religion, of the social order as well as of right individual conduct, in the same way as it is denial of the world beyond the everchanging phenomena, of the supersensible and eternal, of the spiritual and immortal soul, of God, the infinite Spirit, the Creator, and Supreme Good. Socialism is by its very nature destruction and negation. Such is the conclusion in which all our particular deductions are focussed.

This outcome is the condemnation of socialism both as an economic social movement and as a philosophical system, a condemnation than which no other could be clearer and more peremptory. As an economic movement it aims at radically healing the evils which modern capitalism has brought on society: the division of its members into two hostile classes, the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the one, and misery oppressing the other, the unjust methods employed by the owners of the means of production, and the exploitation suffered by the laborers. Undoubtedly capitalism, in its modern form, because a source of untold evils, deserves condemnation in many respects. But socialism, notwithstanding its pretensions and splendid promises, has no remedy for them. It may break down the capitalistic State, but can not substitute for it another peaceful and well-ordered society;

it may confiscate the wealth accumulated by trusts and gigantic productive or commercial associations, but it can not maintain in existence for any length of time nationalized production and distribution of the goods produced under a proletariat administration. Capitalism, since it embraced religious unbelief and atheism, has succeeded in its enterprises by trampling under foot and ignoring the laws of justice and morality. Socialism goes still farther in this direction by overthrowing the basis of morality, by persecuting religion and Christianity, by substituting for divine law proletarian coercion or mere animal instincts. If capitalism entails evils on the modern State, socialism, instead of remedying them, shatters society to its very foundations.

As a philosophical system socialism is evolutionary materialism, which nowadays is considered supreme wisdom, disrespect for which is a stigma, a stamp of ignorance. The greatest philosophical minds we meet in the course of history, have condemned materialism, and have shown its falsity by unanswerable arguments. But they are ignored by socialists; their treatises, to all appearance, are not studied by them, but disdained with supercilious contempt. It would, therefore, be useless to enter, in conclusion, on a philosophical refutation of materialism. Nor is further disproof necessary.

Evolutionary materialism, as a philosophical system embodied in socialism, stands condemned as

false and absurd by the Nihilism in which it results. By its conclusions it denies the Ultimate Cause, independently of which this finite universe can not exist, the Supreme Wisdom, to which must be retraced the order and beauty of the world. It denies the Supreme Truth in which alone the human mind can find rest, and the Supreme Good for which the will longs; it denies the eternal, necessary principles without which reason can not operate, and the eternal laws by which the will, not to leave the path of right and virtue, must be directed and restrained; it denies the existence of the human intellect itself, of whose operations we are conscious and whose achievements fill everybody with wonder, and the freedom of the will, without which the wisest laws and institutions are absurdities. Furthermore, it strips man of all the gifts and prerogatives distinct in kind from the endowments of the brute, though his rule and pre-eminence over irrational creation is beyond all doubt; it silences conscience manifesting to man a divine law, though its voice is heard most distinctly; it abolishes the moral precepts, which demand the subjection of passions to reason and justice in dealing with others, though without their observance neither individual nor social life can subsist. Finally it undermines authority, does away with natural rights and duties, replaces moral obligation by physical coercion, the dictates of reason by animal instincts, though a society of free ra-

tional beings, a human society distinct from the aggregation of animals, is thus made impossible. All these denials and destructions are contrary to man's rational nature, contrary to his firmest and most certain convictions, contrary to his rank and position in the universe, contrary to the right order which reason prescribes for social and individual life, and in the observance of which alone man can find his supreme good and happiness. They are, consequently, theoretically and practically absurd and contradictory; they are the annihilation of all that is human and rational as well as of what is ideal, spiritual, and divine.

In truth, socialism stands condemned by the Nihilism which is its ultimate outcome.

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